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I. INTRODUCTION

Restrictions on affirmative action by the United States Supreme
1
2
Court and the ban of the policy by some states created anxiety among
affirmative action proponents that the high court would use the
opportunity afforded by the challenges to the University of Michigan's
affirmative action programs to declare affirmative action
3
unconstitutional. This anxiety explains the acclaim with which these

I. See Norma M. Riccucci, The Immortality of Affirmative Action, in Public Personnel
Management: Current Concerns, Future Challenges 73, 73-79 (Carolyn Ban & Norma M. Riccucci,
eds., 3d ed., Longman 2002) (highlighting the series of affirmative action decisions by the federal
courts, beginning with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion),
including some of the decisions which eroded affirmative action).
2. See id. at 79-80 (discussing the rash of anti-affirmative action voter referenda, both
ongoing and concluded, in many states). At the time the Michigan cases were decided in the summer
of 2003, four states-California, Florida, Texas, and Washington-all adopted initiatives or voter
referenda banning the use of race in public education, public employment, and government
contracting. For example, the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI), passed in 1996, ended thirty
years of affirmative action practice in that state.
3. This is not the first time proponents of race-conscious programs felt apprehensive that the
Supreme Court might seize an appropriate opportunity to invalidate affirmative action. In 1997,
black leaders paid over $400,000 to a white woman, Sharon Taxman, to prevent her case from
reaching the Supreme Court. Taxman, a teacher, sued the Board of Education in Piscataway
Township, N.J., alleging that she was laid off because of her race, while another teacher of similar
qualifications hired on the same day as herself, who was black, was retained. Taxman was rehired by
the time the case reached the Supreme Court but had to be paid $433,500 in back pay and legal fees
to drop the case, a bill African American leaders were all too glad to foot. See Hanes Walton Jr. &
Robert C. Smith, American Politics and the African American Quest for Universal Freedom 2\9 (2d
ed., Longman 2003) (discussing Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1966)
(en bane), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997)). A similar
apprehensiveness occurred with respect to Regents ofU. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See
Thomas R. Hensley et al., The Changing Supreme Court: Constitutional Rights and Liberties 713
(West Publg. 1997) (indicating that some groups advised the University of California at Davis not to
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, after the University lost at the lower court level, on the ground
that a negative U.S. Supreme Court decision would endanger affirmative action programs across the
country).
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cases, particularly the pro-affirmative action ruling in Grutter v.
4
Bollinger, have been received in civil rights and educational quarters.
For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) stated that the decision has "provided the [N]ation with
a road map on how to construct affirmative action programs in higher
5
education." Additionally, the Urban League applauded it as "an historic
victory for America and a reaffirmation of the nation's commitment to
6
equality and diversity." The American Bar Association welcomed it as a
"victory for progress toward a legal profession that reflects the American
7
society it serves." And the Association of American Colleges and
Universities (AACU) remarked, "The courts have recognized that racial
inequality still disfigures our democracy and that higher education can
8
and should play a crucial role in closing the opportunity gap."
Notable individuals have hailed the Grutter decision in
commentaries published in both popular and scholastic media. These
individuals include Professor Lani Guinier of Harvard Law School, who
9
called it "a slam-dunk for affirmative action;" the legal analyst Martin
10
Michaelson, who assessed that not since Brown v. Board of Education
in 1954 "has the [Supreme] [C]ourt spoken with one voice in a major
11
ruling that affected race and education;"
and the university
4. 539 U S. 306 (2003 ).
5. The Thin Race Line, Chi. Trib. Red Eye Ed. 10 (June 24, 2003) (quoting NAACP
President Kweisi Mfume). The NAACP was founded in 1909, on the hundredth anniversary of the
birth of President Abraham Lincoln, by upper-middle-class white Protestants and Jews as an
interracial organization. Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 95. Until the 1960s, it remained the principal
civil rights protest organization. !d. The organization has a membership of about 450,000 people in
1700 local chapters and an annual budget of about $11.9 million in 1995. !d. at 118.
6. Urban League Applauds Court AA Ruling, New Pitt. Courier A5 (July 2, 2003) (quoting
Urban League President Marc Moria!) [hereinafter Urban League Applauds AA Ruling]. The
organization stated: "With this decision, the [C]ourt has made clear that diversity and excellence are
not mutually exclusive." !d. It took special care to distinguish Grutter from Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003). "It is extremely important that citizens realize that the [C]ourt did not reject
affirmative action, it rejected Michigan's specific scoring system." /d. The Urban League is designed
to promote African American economic advancement. Founded in 1910, the organization has about
118 local affiliates in 34 states and the District of Columbia, and boasts an annual budget estimated
at about $24 million in 1995. !d.; Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 118.
7. Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., American Bar Association, News Release, Statement of Alfred P.
Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Association, June 23, 2003, RE: Ruling by Supreme Court of
United States in Grutter v. Bollinger, http://www.abanet.org/medialjun03/statement062303.html
(accessed Oct. 7, 2005).
8. Greg Winter, Ruling Provides Relief,' But Less Than Hoped, N.Y. Times A26 (June 24,
2003) (quoting AACU President Carol Geary Schneider).
9. Lani Guinier, The Constitution Is both Colorblind and Color-Conscious, 49 Chron.
Higher Educ. B II (July 4, 2003 ).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
II. Martin Michaelson, The Court's Pronouncements Are More Dramatic and Subtle Than
the Headlines, 49 Chron. Higher Educ. 811 (July 18, 2003 ).
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administrator M. Lee Pelton, who praised the decision as a "summer
12
blockbuster ruling" on affirmative action.
However, not all analysts who wrote commentaries on Grutter
believed the decision marked an auspicious development in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on affirmative action. Critics of the decision can
be divided into two categories: individuals who assessed it as going too
far and those who viewed the decision as not going far enough. The first
category includes Professor Shelby Steele and Ward Connerly. Steele, a
black conservative, lambasted Grutter as "a victory for [w ]hite guilt,"
maintammg, "[w ]e deserve justices who can feel certain about the
capacity of [W]hites to be fair and the capacity of minorities to
13
compete."
Connerly, a black reputed for his stout opposition to
affirmative action, berated the Grutter ruling as a "cloudy vision of a
14
race-free America."
Commentators who viewed the decision as not going far enough
include the distinguished educator and veteran commentator on African
American affairs, Professor Ron Walters, and the newspaper writer
Derrick Z. Jackson. Professor Walters assesses Grutter merely as "a stay
15
of execution on affirmative action." He would "hold [his] applause-or
maybe applaud lightly" and view any victory dance as premature, given
that "what the court did was to constitutionalize the concept of diversity
16
as an appropriate basis for the practice of affirmative action." He
17
condemned the role of the Bush administration in the Michigan cases.
Similarly, Jackson opined that Grutter means simply that "affirmative
12. M. Lee Pelton, After the Supreme Court Michigan Cases, 6 Presidency 18 (Fall 2003)
(Pelton is the President ofWillamette University).
13. Shelby Steele, A Victory for White Guilt, Wall St. J. A 16 (June 26, 2003 ). For a discussion
on the identity and ideology of the new black conservatives, see Lucius J. Barker et al., African
Americans and the American Political System 98-101 (4th ed., Prentice Hall 1999). The group also
includes Justice Clarence Thomas of the U.S. Supreme Court.
14. See Ward Connerly, The Cloudy Vision of a Race-Free America, Chron. Higher Educ.
B 12 (July 4, 2003). Connerly stated regrettably, "While I and many others viewed Michigan's
reasoning about diversity as the snow job of the century, the [C]ourt saw otherwise and elevated
Justice Lewis Powell's dictum in the Bakke case to the law of the land." !d. Connerly serves on the
governing board of the University of California and is one of the architects of the CCRI, which is a
measure approved by voters of California in 1996, that forbids the use of race, gender, or ethnicity as
criteria in state hiring and admission to public universities.
15. Ron Walters, Affirmative Action Wins: But Which Version? 39 Wash. Informer 13 (July 9,
2003).
16. !d.
17. See generally Ron Walters, The Michigan Affirmative Action Case and Black Patriotism,
10 N.Y. Beacon 8 (May 21, 2003). He berates the "crowd in the [Bush] White House" as "especially
callous." !d. He points to the actions of the government as "one powerful reason why" blacks
generally maintain a lukewarm attitude with respect to the war in Iraq, and because "[t]hey are not
sure they are full Americans," they "do not engage as much as Whites in flag-waving, decal-wearing
and chest-thumping exercises of Americanism." !d.
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action survived, but in a form more limited than ever and with [Justice
Sandra Day] O'Connor setting the nation's timer to get rid of it by
18
2028."
19
Affirmative action is a necessary tool of remediation. Affirmative
action is the use of race or gender consistent with the Equal Protection
20
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as a factor in decisions relating to

18. Derrick Z. Jackson, Taking on the Bonus Points for Whites, Chi. Trib. § I pg. 19 (June 30,
2003). Although this piece discussed Grutter, its main focus, as even the article's very caption bears
out, was on Gratz. Jackson contended: "Getting rid of a point system may sound fine to someone
who refuses to open a history book .... The court took away bonus points for black, brown, and red
people on behalf of angry white people. But the bonus points of white privilege are still in place,
unchallenged and unrelenting, no matter how angry minorities get." !d.
19. See Kanya Adam, The Politics of Redress: South African Style Affirmative Action, 35 J.
Modem African Stud. 231, 240 (June 1997) (quoting former South African president, Nelson
Mandela, "[Affirmative action is] corrective action to bring previously disadvantaged people to the
same competitive levels as those who have been advantaged."). See also William J. Clinton,
Remark\· on Affirmative Action at the National Archives and Records Administration, July 19, 1995,
in Public Papers olthe Presidents <Jlthe United States: William J. Clinton 1995 Book JJ 1108 (Nat!.
Archives & Rec. Admin. 1996) (indicating that affirmative action is a tool designed "to give our
Nation a way to finally address the systemic exclusion of individuals of talent on the basis of their
gender or race, from opportunities to develop, perform, achieve, and contribute"). As a presidential
candidate, Clinton pledged, "I don't think we've got a person to waste." Charles R. Lawrence Ill &
Mari J. Matsuda, We Won't Go Back: Making the Case for Affirmative Action 176 (Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1997). Then as President, he released an important statement on affirmative action
preceded by a long study. The statement came one month following the handing down of Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), analyzed below in this Article, where the Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny, its highest standard of constitutional review, to all affirmative action
programs. He said "While our Nation has made enormous strides toward eliminating inequality and
barriers to opportunity, the job is not complete." Clinton, supra n. 19, at 1113. He directed all federal
agencies to comply with the decision. See id. at 1114 (citing Adarand v. Peiia). Clinton pledged that
"we will seek reasonable ways to achieve the objectives of inclusion and anti[-]discrimination
without specific reliance on group membership." Jd. at 1114. And in complying with Adarand, his
administration will "apply the four standards of fairness to all our affirmative action programs" that
he articulated, namely: no quotas in theory or practice; no illegal discrimination of any kind,
including reverse discrimination; no preference for people who are not qualified for any job or other
opportunity; and as soon as a program has succeeded, it must be retired. Any program, he said, that
doesn't meet these four principles must be eliminated or reformed to meet them. !d. Clinton pled
with Americans by stating, 'The job of ending discrimination in this country is not over. ... We
should reaffirm the principle of affirmative action and fix the practices. We should have a simple
slogan: Mend it, but don't end it." ld.
20. The portion of the U.S. Constitution that guarantees equal protection under state law is the
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, which provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I.
Challenges to affirmative action involving the federal government are decided under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Statutory provisions also implicated in challenges to
affirmative action programs include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § I981
(2000). Title VI, in relevant part, provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42
U .S.C. § 2000d (2000). Title VI applies to institutions receiving federal funds, including private
colleges and universities. Section 1981 (a) provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the
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public contracting, public employment, and public education?' "[M]ere
prohibition of discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the
effects of past practices and to permit attainment of an equitable
22
representation of minorities, women, and handicapped persons." As
President Johnson said, employing the metaphor of a footrace in which
some runners are shackled while others make their way around the track,
"Freedom is not enough. You do not take a person who, for years, has
been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of
a race, and then say, 'You are free to compete with all the others,' and
23
still justly believe you have been completely fair." Affirmative action
24
programs are measures, voluntary or court-imposed, "beyond simple
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." Rev. Stat. § 1977, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2000). Section 1981 applies to public and private contracts, such as the contract that is formed when
a college or university admits a student. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976)
(explaining that a contract for educational services qualifies as a "contract" for purposes of§ 1981 ).
It is inescapably odd for white litigants to be asking for protection and benefits "enjoyed by white
citizens." Consequently, the Court has explained that the provision was "meant, by its broad terms,
to proscribe discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any
race." McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976). Under the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence, all three provisions are coterminous: a use of race consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause also withstands challenge under Title VI and§ 1981. In contrast, a use of race
found to violate the Equal Protection Clause is also a violation of Title VI and§ 1981.
21. Many public higher educational institutions admit almost every student who applies and
have little need for any affirmative action policy. Competition for places is fierce only for elite
public institutions like the University of California at Davis, whose affirmative action program came
under scrutiny in Bakke, and the University of Michigan, whose own programs came under review in
Grutter and Gratz. For example, the University of Michigan Law School "receives more than 3,500
applications each year for a class of around 350 students." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312-13. The Equal
Protection Clause binds state-owned or public schools. Interestingly, the Harvard Plan, the
affirmative ac~ion program Justice Powell held out as a model in Bakke, was designed not by a
public school but rather by Harvard University, a private school. Note, however, that although equal
protection binds only public schools, affirmative action also applies to private universities, since
federal law forbids racial discrimination by institutions that receive federal funding, which most
universities, public and private, do. Competition for scarce educational resources in elite higher
educational institutions, public and private, is not limited to admission, but rather includes
scholarship awards and opportunities, as well. The Supreme Court has yet to review a dispute
involving affirmative action in primary and secondary educational institutions.
22. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 620 (1987) (approvingly
citing the employer's thoughtful argument for adopting the gender-conscious affirmative action plan
under challenge). This case, decided under Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, upheld a
voluntarily developed affirmative action program intended to eliminate imbalances against women
in traditionally segregated job categories-such as road dispatchers. !d. Title Vll (§ 703A) outlaws
employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. (2001 ).
23. Lyndon Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, in The Affirmative Action Debate 16, 16-24
(George Curry ed., Addison-Wesley Publg. Co. 1996) (commencement address at Howard
University in 1965).
24. An example of a voluntary program is the Johnson case referred to in supra n. 22.
Congressional legislation supports voluntary affirmative action measures designed to diversify the
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termination of a discriminatory practice," designed to redress the
lingering effects of past discrimination against minority groups in society
and to level the playing field for talented individuals who, in the past,
have been systematically excluded for no reason other than their race or
26
gender. Like many government laws and programs, affirmative action
policies go beyond a strict interpretation of the Equal Protection
27
Clause. In addition to being a remediation device, affirmative action is
also an indispensable tool for inclusiveness of groups "regularly
excluded from decision making in government, business, industry, the
legal system, religious hierarchies, labor organizations, and political
parties" because of their gender, race, or other immutable
8
characteristics.Z Every responsible government has a constitutional
29
obligation "to act affirmatively to achieve equal opportunity for all."
In the past, the U.S. government sponsored certain relief programs
for minority groups. These included measures unveiled, following the
Civil War (1861-65), by the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and
30
Abandoned Lands, known as the Freedmen's Bureau.
They also
workforce. See 137 Cong. Rec. S7024 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (providing that "Nothing in the
amendments ... shall be construed to affect ... voluntary employer actions for workforce diversity,
or affirmative action or conciliation agreements .... ").
25. U.S. Commn. Civ. Rights, Statement on Affirmative Action 2 (Clearinghouse Publication
1977).
26. See the quote attributed to the former President Clinton, supra n. 19.
27. Steffen W. Schmidt et al., American Government & Politics Today 171 (2005-06 ed.,
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning 2005). As Justice Blackmun said in Bakke, to treat people equally,
we are sometimes compelled, legitimately, to treat persons differently. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And to get beyond racism and gender
discrimination, we may, legitimately, have to take race and gender into account. See id. at 407
(referring only to racial discrimination). Justice Blackmun thinks it "somewhat ironic to have us so
deeply disturbed" over interjecting race in decision making regarding distribution of educational
resources, and yet quite oblivious to widespread special preferences in higher education based on
athletic skills, legacy (benefits to children of alumni) and the like. /d. at 404. It is not clear whether
the disturbed "us" in the sentence is the Supreme Court or society generally. His message resonates
regardless. Justice Blackmun warned, "We cannot-we dare not-let the Equal Protection Clause
perpetuate racial supremacy." /d. at 407. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280
(1986) (holding, "[w]e have recognized ... that in order to remedy the effects of prior
discrimination, it may be necessary to take race into account.").
28. See Michael E. Milakovich & George J. Gordon, Public Administration in America 48
(8th ed., Wadsworth Publg. 2004). Affirmative action's value as an inclusive tool was one reason
why, despite the regressive rulings by the federal courts on affirmative action, Professor Riccucci
still indicated "affirmative action may be around for a long time or at least until it is truly no longer
needed, that is, when discriminatory practices cease to exist and when diverse workforces become
the norm in this nation." Riccucci, supra 11. I, at 81 (hence the "immortality" in the title of her
piece).
29. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
30. Congress created this "first race bureaucracy" to provide education for the newly freed
slaves. See Walton & Smith, supra 11. 3, at 227, 229. In his opinion in Bakke, Justice Thurgood
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included initiatives by various U.S. presidents from Roosevelt to
31
Eisenhower, building on the Unemployment Relief Act of 1933. While
some of these relief initiatives, without question, served as important
32
prelude to present policies, affirmative action, in its present format, has
33
a more recent history that parallels the civil rights movement. As both
doctrine and policy, affirmative action was born during the Kennedy
34
administration, received a strong shot in the arm during the Johnson
Marshall designated the Freedmen's Bureau programs affirmative action, but, most informatively,
with the two words secluded in quotes. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 402 (Marshall, J., concurring and
dissenting). But for the reasons given below, these sporadic and short-lived remedial measures do
not form proper policy; although, along with latter programs such as those unveiled starting from the
1930s (see infra n. 31 and corresponding text), they may have served as preludes for modem-day
affirmative action programs.
31. This law incorporated the principle of equal employment opportunity for African
Americans by outlawing discrimination in hiring based on race, color, or creed. In the aftermath of
this law's passage, President Franklin Roosevelt, in 1941, promulgated an executive order that
established the first Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). Following the FEPC, President
Truman wrote an executive order creating the President's Committee on Government Contract
Compliance. President Eisenhower did something similar by creating the President's Committee on
Government Contracts. Emmanuel 0. Jheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action,
and the March Toward Co/or-Blind Jurisprudence, II Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rights L. Rev. I, 5 (2001 ).
32. It is difficult to draw a rigid line regarding the starting point in the evolution of modem
affirmative action; accordingly, this Article does not contest Jones's suggestion that the roots of
modem affirmative action were tucked away in the policy statements of the initial order of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt. See James E. Jones, Jr., The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative Action
in Employment: Economic, Legal, and Political Realities, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 901,907 (1985).
33. See Cornel West, Race Matters, 63-64 (Beacon Press 1993) (portraying affirmative action
as a distinctive outcome of a "protracted struggle" during the 1960s between "American
progressives and liberals in the courts and in the streets."). See also Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at
159 (stating that equality before the law became an idea whose time had come "[a]s the civil rights
movement mounted in intensity."). The civil rights movement is a movement for African American
equality that later broadened to include other minority groups, such as Hispanic Americans, and
Native Americans, among others. See id. at 162.
34. In 1961, President Kennedy formed the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity. Next, he issued Executive Order I 0,925, which forbade discrimination within the
federal government based on race, religion, color, and national origin as well as mandated
affirmative action in federal employment. The use of the term "affirmative action" in Executive
Order I 0, 925 marked the first time such terminology appeared in an executive order. The term itself
was coined by Hobart Taylor, an African American lawyer from Detroit, who, along with Arthur
Goldberg and Abe Fortas, drafted Executive Order 10,925, signed by President Kennedy. The Order
banned discriminatory hiring in federal contracting. "I put the word 'affirmative' in there at that
time," Taylor said. Explaining why he chose that term, Taylor disclosed, "I was searching for
something that would give a sense of positiveness to performance under that executive order, and I
was tom between the words 'positive action' and the words 'affirmative action' ... [a]nd I took
'affirmative action' because it was alliterative." See Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action
Apart, N.Y. Times Mag. 40 (June II, 1995). Revealingly, Goldberg and Fortas went on to become
U.S. Supreme Court Justices. They were both Caucasian. However, Taylor, an African American,
was all but forgotten. Goldberg (1908~90) served on the Supreme Court from 1962~65; Fortas
(1910~82), who replaced Goldberg, served on the Court from 1965~69. Both were Democrats
appointed by Democratic Presidents, Goldberg by President Kennedy, and Fortas by President
Johnson.
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administration, and "effectively became the law of the land" under
Pres1.dent N.1xon. 36
35. The foundation for the strong rooting of affirmative action that took place during the
Nixon administration was laid under President Johnson. Johnson complemented Kennedy's
Executive Order 10,925 with his own order, Executive Order 11,246. Issued in 1965 and amended in
1967, this order (a) required contractors conducting business with the federal government to refrain
from discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin; and (b) mandated them to
take race and gender into account in recruitment and promotion. The Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) was also established during the period of the Johnson presidency.
President Johnson's unflinching support for affirmative action was evidenced in the commencement
speech he gave at Howard University in 1965 where he used the metaphor of a footrace in which one
runner is shackled as the others make their way around the track. Just freeing the shackled runner
and shouting "compete" without more to help the formerly shackled runner compete, he said, is
unfair. See Johnson, supra n. 23 and corresponding text. Under President Johnson, government
agencies at all levels-national, state and local-were required to implement affirmative action
policies. So also were companies that sold goods or services to the federal government, institutions
receiving federal funds, and employers under court order or order by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to maintain affirmative action programs because of evidence of past
discrimination. Finally, labor unions who discriminated against women and other minorities were
required to establish and comply with affirmative action plans. See Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at
171.
36. Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 198. A monument of President Nixon's affirmative action
initiative was his support for the Philadelphia Plan. The Plan was designed by Arthur Fletcher, an
African American, who was the Assistant Secretary of Labor, with the assistance of another Nixon
appointee, John Wilks, director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. It was a revived
version of the Cleveland Plan that used Philadelphia as the model city. It required government
contractors to set specific numerical goals for the employment of minority workers. The Cleveland
Plan was designed to promote equal employment opportunity for blacks in the Cleveland, Ohio
construction industry. Its architect and brainchild was Edward Sylvester, an African American and
director of the OFCCP under President Johnson. The Sylvester plan required that construction
companies awarded government contracts develop detailed plans specifying the precise number of
blacks they planned to hire in all phases of their work. However, it drew strong opposition from
labor unions, business groups, conservatives, and liberals who argued that it established racial hiring
quotas and was dropped after the comptroller general (head of the General Accounting Office, the
congressional watchdog agency) ruled it illegal, not because it imposed quotas, as its opponents
argued, but because it violated standard contract bidding procedures. !d.
Unlike the Cleveland Plan, the Philadelphia Plan complied with standard contracting
procedures. Yet, the comptroller general ruled it illegal, but this time on the ground that it used race
as a factor in determining employment. President Nixon rejected the comptroller general's ruling,
arguing that as president he had the inherent "executive power" to implement the Philadelphia Plan
by executive order. The Senate passed an amendment upholding the comptroller general's decision.
It took the rejection in 1971 of the Senate's amendment, by a vote of208 to 156, following intense
lobbying by President Nixon and Secretary of Labor George Shultz before, as Professors Walton and
Smith said, "Affirmative action became the law of the land." Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 198.
Prior to the Bakke case in 1978, the Philadelphia Plan was the model for affirmative action in the
U.S./d.
Other affirmative action achievements of President Nixon include the passages of§ 718 of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. (2001),
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Also, Nixon took office following publication
of the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, better known as the Kerner
Commission, after Illinois governor Otto Kerner, who chaired the panel. President Johnson set up
the Commission to investigate the causes of the rash of violent uprisings or rebellions in many urban
areas that took place during the 1960s and recommend solutions. The Report concluded, darkly, that
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Whether by fate or design, black political appointees have played an
instrumental role in the design and implementation of these affirmative
37
action policies. The instrumental role black federal appointees played
in the design of affirmative action policies probably explains the support
for the policies by later black officials, such as former Secretary of State
38
General Colin Powel1, and the impatience with which some African
Americans view black federal personnel opposed to affirmative action,
39
such as Justice Clarence Thomas.
While early challenges to affirmative action came from Caucasian
males, recent challenges include Caucasian women. Almost from the
very moment of its inception, affirmative action generated challenges
from Caucasian males who viewed these programs as "reverse
40
discrimination." One analyst speculates that increased competition for
admission to schools coupled with "a political environment of backlash
against" President Johnson's Great Society programs helped to galvanize
41
these challenges to race-conscious programs.
A significant recent
development in the affirmative action debate is the growing number of
Caucasian females who, secure in the gains preferential programs have
42
brought white women,
have no qualms pointing their finger at

"[o]ur [N]ation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal."
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1967).
37. See supra nn. 34 and 36 and accompanying text.
3 8. See Jheukwumere & Aka, supra n. 31, at 13.
39. See Vernon Jarrett, Thomas Stabs Douglass in Grave, Chi. Defender (June 28, 2003)
(accusing Thomas of "stab[bing] Douglass in [the] grave" by comparing himself to Douglass); see
also Thomas Shows His True Colors on Affirmative Action Ruling, Westside Gazette 3B (Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla.) (July 9, 2003) (A commentary, as the title shows, berating Justice Thomas, while
praising O'Connor as "an unabashed conservative" who "refuse[s] to be typecast by her ideological
disposition.").
40. See e.g. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), and the Bakke decisions, both of
which were lawsuits brought by white men.
41. William C. Kidder, The Struggle/or Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A History of African
American, Latino, and American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950--2000, 19 Harv. Blackltr. L.J.
1, 19 (2003) (drawing on the authority of James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States
1945-1974 676-77 (Oxford U. Press 1996)). The extent to which affirmative action divides America
is reflected in the large number of "friend of the court" briefs filed before the Supreme Court in
cases, such as DeFunis, 416 U.S. 312, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, and the Michigan cases, Grutter, 539
U.S. 346, and Gratz, 539 U.S. 301. Regarding DeFunis, Professor Peltason noted, "By the time the
case came before the Supreme Court it was the center of national attention. More amicus curia .
briefs were filed in this case than in any other case ever argued before the Supreme Court." J. W.
Peltason, Corwin & Peltason 's Understanding the Constitution 205 (7th ed., Dryden Press 1976).
More than a hundred groups turned in briefs as friends of the court for or against affirmative action
in the Michigan cases.
42. See Tracey Robinson-English, Minority Set-Aside Programs Help Women Get a Piece of
Affirmative Action, N'Digo (Chicago) 7 (Mar. 24-30, 2005) (citing a recent study by Catalyst, a
New York-based organization that promotes the interests of women in business, showing that
"[o]verall, White women are the biggest winners of affirmative action programs, claiming more than
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preferences 44
based on race. Women were plaintiffs in Grutter43 and Gratz
v. Bollinger as well as in the Fifth Circuit Court's decision in Hopwood
45
v. Texas, which struck down the University of Texas law school's
affirmative action program and called into question the weight of Justice
Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke46 as
precedent. In contrast, since Johnson, few, if any lawsuits, have been
instituted contesting affirmative action programs based on gender. 47 The
challenges, by Caucasian women, to programs that inject race into
decisions relating to admissions into public institutions of higher learning
are an ironic occurrence in the current affirmative action controversy in
America. Could it be that white America is comfortable with preferential
treatment based on gender or other factors but cannot stand to accept
preferences based on race? If so, the controversy at the moment relating
to affirmative action has much more to do with the state of race relations
in America and the politics of race than with the programs themselves.
Grutter marks a crucial advance in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on affirmative action. Several factors make the case hugely
significant. First is the fact that this momentous case, standing for
maintenance of affirmative action, came out from the deeply
conservative Rehnquist Court. Justice 0 'Connor's lukewarm attitude
48
toward race-conscious programs prior to Grutter was well-known. Yet
O'Connor wrote the opinion of the court in Grutter and provided the
critical fifth vote upholding the affirmative action program under
challenge. However, Professor Klarman persuasively explained this
mystery: "Justice O'Connor's conservative commitment to preserving
the status quo trumped her ideological aversion to race-conscious

[forty J percent of all managerial or professional jobs in the late 1990s"). See also Andrew Hacker,
Two Nations: Black & White, Separate. Hostile, Unequal 152 (Simon & Schuster 2003 ). The Hacker
book takes its title from the conclusion of the Kerner Commission Report; see supra n. 36.
43. 539 U.S. 306.
44. 539 U.S. 244.
45. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
46. 438 U.S. 265.
47. See480U.S.616.
48. Michael Klarman, Are Landmark Court Decisions All That Important?, Chron. Higher
Educ. BlO (Aug. 8, 2003). Professor Klarman importantly points out that "[b)efore Grutter, [Justice
O'Connor] had never voted to sustain a race-based affirmative-action plan, though she had explicitly
noted that such policies might be acceptable under certain stringent conditions." !d. "Based on her
earlier opinions and votes," Klannan said, "one might easily have predicted that O'Connor would
invalidate the admissions policies of the University of Michigan on the grounds that they relied on
the impermissible stereotype that race correlates with diversity of perspective and that they failed to
adequately consider nonracial alternatives for securing a diverse student body." /d. The fortunate
thing about Grutter, for proponents of race-conscious programs, was that Justice O'Connor chose to
uphold the program in question.
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governmental remedies.',4 Years earlier, in Bakke, five JusticesBlackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and White-stood for the
proposition that the use of race could serve a compelling government
interest, whether based on diversity, as Powell posited, or on the
rationale of remediation of past discrimination. When the Michigan cases
were decided, the number had climbed to seven Justices-Breyer,
50
Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter, Stevens,
plus former Chief Justice
51
52
Rehnquist and Kenne~. The only two holdouts against the use of
54
race were Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Second, the Court announced the Grutter decision while a
Republican administration staunchly opposed to affirmative action was
in office. When he ran for president, George Bush advocated
"affirmative access" which he defined as increasing access for minorities
55
without using quotas.
The President also favored race-neutral
alternatives to affirmative action such as the "~ercentage plans" he
6
unveiled in Texas during his period as governor. Given this lack of
49. Id. As Hensley said of Justice Powell in their text on the Supreme Court, O'Connor may
be seen as a conservative justice who favors conservative outcomes in most cases and seeks "to
balance carefully the competing interests in cases presented to the Court," as opposed to the class of
conservative justices, like Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, who seek "to advance a particular
ideology." See Hensley eta\., supra n. 3, at 67.
50. Recall that Justice Stevens was part of the Burger plurality that struck down the
affirmative action plan in Bakke. The other members of that plurality were Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart. Stevens's vote for affirmative action was an important development
for this sometimes nondescript jurist. See Hensley et a\., supra n. 3, at 67. Professor Baum, in his
primer on the Supreme Court, calls Stevens the Court's "most liberal justice." Lawrence Baum, The
Supreme Court 117 (6th ed., Cong. Q. Inc. 1998). What caused Justice Stevens's tum in favor of
affirmative action? Professor Baum provides a possible explanation: "When a justice's position
shifts relative to that of the Court as a whole, it is usually because new appointments have shifted the
Court's ideological center, while the justice has retained the same general views. This appears to be
the case with John Paul Stevens, who moved to the liberal end of the Court as more liberal justices
were replaced by conservatives." Id. at 158.
51. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 257.
52. Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (despite his dissent based on the
abandonment of a strict scrutiny review, Justice Kennedy wanted to "reiterate [his] approval of
giving appropriate consideration to race in this one [student diversity] context.").
53. Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and stateprovided education is no exception.").
54. !d. at 349-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Scalia, concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating "I would hold that a
State's use of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically prohibited by the
Equal Protection Clause").
55. Bob Kemper, Democrats Hope Court Rulings Bruise Bush, Chi. Trib. News Sec. 17 (June
24, 2003).
56. These plans, adopted in public undergraduate institutions in states like California, Florida,
Texas, and Washington, grant automatic admission to all students above a certain class-rank
threshold, usually the top 10 or 20 percent, of the graduating class. However, as Justice Ginsburg
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sympathy, it is unsurprising that the Bush Justice Department filed briefs
in the Michigan cases urging the Supreme Court to strike down the
57
programs on the ground that they represented "disguised quotas."
Although the Michigan cases were important, they hardly signify a
progressive tum of events in the Supreme Court's disposition toward
affirmative action; substantial residues of hostility toward affirmative
action remain in the high Court, and the Court continues to maintain an
58
orientation of non-solicitude for minority rights.
This Article has two main parts, excluding the introduction and the
conclusion. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's role in the development
of affirmative action policies. The discussion is divided into three
sections, namely: 1) comment on the role of the Court in policymaking;
2) the Court's vacillating role in the African American civil rights
movement; and 3) the role of the Court in affirmative action up to and
including the Michigan cases, with special reference to public education.
Part III isolates and discusses various key indicators drawn from the
Michigan cases that testify of the Court's continuing hostility toward
affirmative action and minority rights.
II. FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES IN AMERICA

This portion of the Article ties the Supreme Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence to its earlier involvement in African American civil
pointed out in her dissent in Gratz, these plans cannot be race-neutral, since they "unquestionably
were adopted with the specific purpose of increasing representation of African-Americans and
Hispanics in the public higher education system." Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303 n. 10 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor, in her opinion for the Court in Grutter, identifies the nature of the
Court's misgiving with respect to these plans: it is not clear what relevance they may have for
graduate and professional schools. Also, assuming for argument's sake, that they are race-neutral,
they may militate against the "holistic," individualized assessment necessary for achievement of a
racially diverse student body. Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 340. See also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Back
Affirmative Action by 5 to 4, But Wider Vote Bans a Racial Point System, N.Y. Times AI (June 24,
2003).
57. Kemper, supra n. 55.
58. See generally Opoku Agyeman, The United States Supreme Court and the Enforcement of
African-American Rights: Myth and Reality, 24 PS: Political Sci. & Pol. 679-84 (1991 ). The
Supreme Court is viewed as a tribunal that, before 1938, failed to distinguish itself as a protector of
minority rights but which, however, turned a "modem chapter" of better protectiveness, following a
"doctrinal direction" beginning in 1938 resulting in "a more generous view of the rights of racial
minorities and a more daring assessment of the Court's capacity to protect them." !d. at 682 (citing
Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 208 (U. of Chi. Press 1960)). Professor
Agyeman disputes this conventional wisdom and demonstrates the tenuousness of the Court's claim
as guardian of minority interests, maintaining that its "more fundamental, enduring role" is "as the
protector of property rights." !d. at 684.
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rights; the two phenomena are intimately related. Affirmative action
evolved as a remedy designed to eliminate the legacy of discrimination
and exclusion of groups based on immutable characteristics such as their
race, ethnicity, or gender, which the Supreme Court, wittingly or
unwittingly, contributed to. Remedial measures became imperative
because, as Justice Brennan and company pointed out in Bakke, the
Equal Protection Clause "was early turned against those whom it was
intended to set free, condemning them to a 'separate but equal' status
59
before the law, a status always separate but seldom equa1." Connecting
civil rights and affirmative action, as this Article does, is sound in that it
constitutes a richer approach that provides the important historical
perspective and depth necessary for a proper understanding of
contemporary affirmative action, both as doctrine and policy. Although
cases dealing with affirmative action in public employment and public
contracting are mentioned, the main emphasis here is on cases relating to
affirmative action in education.
A. The Supreme Court as a Policymaking Institution
60

The judiciary has the "province" to say what the law is. This
61
authority flows from the power of interpretation and judicial review. In
his landmark work on American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville
commented: "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States
62
that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." Because

59. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326-27 (Opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
60. See Marhury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 ( 1803) (ruling a particular provision of an act of
Congress unconstitutional, and in the process, recognizing the power of judicial review for American
courts).
61. In addition to the responsibility of statutory interpretation, U.S. courts are invested with
the greatest of all interpretational responsibilities, namely, the power of judicial review. Statutory
interpretation involves merely interpreting the laws or deciding what the legislature meant when it
enacted a given piece of legislation; in contrast, judicial review is much more. It is the power of U.S.
courts to scrutinize the legality of the laws and actions of the other branches of government and to
declare unconstitutional (and therefore unenforceable) any initiatives of these branches that do not
conform with the Constitution. There is no explicit provision for judicial review in the U.S.
Constitution; instead, the judiciary claimed this power for itself in MarhUfy, 5 U.S. 137. On the
legitimacy of judicial review, including the historical antecedents of this authority, see Gerald
Gunther, Constitutional Law 13-20 (12th cd., Found. Press 1991 ). On the finality of the judiciary's
interpretation of the Constitution, see id. at 21-28; see also Corwin & Pcltason, supra n. 41, at 31
(pointing out that the president, congresspersons, and other public officials have a duty to act
constitutionally and measure their actions against their own readmg of the ConstttutiOn, but only
when there is 110 relevant Supreme Court ruling, and they must abide by the Court's interpretation
where such ruling exists).
62. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 455 (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracv in America
248 (Harper & Row, Publishers \966)).
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of their_ po_w~r of interpretation and judicia_! _review and ~iven that the
federal JUdiciary forms part of the U.S. political process, U.S. judges
play a larger role in public policy-making than judges in most other
. m
. the word.
1 64 Judges (and courts) make policy "whenever
countnes
they interpret the law or the Constitution in a new way, extend the reach
of existing laws to cover matters not previously thought to be covered, or
design remedies for problems in ways that require [them] to act in
65
administrative or legislative ways." This role makes them ~olitical
actors and "policymakers working within a political institution. "6
As the tribunal at the apex of the judicial system and given its special
status as the only federal Court created by the Constitution (the other
67
federal courts were the more lowly handiwork of Congress), the
Supreme Court is a "part of a policymaking s~stem that includes lower
8
courts" and other branches of government; it is also "[t]he most
69
important political force within [the federal] judiciary." Emphasis on
the Court is something motivated by "[m]ore than pedagogical
70
tradition," but rather the reality that the over 500 volumes of reports
the high Court has authored encompass "a remarkable range of
constitutional questions" forming "the richest source of constitutional
71
law." Finally, it is also an acknowledgment of the fact that "[o]n those
questions that do get to court, the Supreme Court's last word makes it
72
obviously the most important judicial voice."
Accordingly, federal judges play a crucial role in (re)shaping "the

63. Baum, supra n. 50, at 4.
64. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 455.
65. James Q. Wilson, American Government, Briel Version 317 (7th ed., Houghton Mifflin
Co. 2005).
66. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 455. What makes U.S. judges, including Supreme Court
justices, political, is that they "make important decisions on major issues; people care about those
decisions and want to influence them." Baum, supra n. 50, at 4. With specific reference to the
Supreme Court, Professor Dahl defines a political institution as "an institution ... for arriving at
decisions on controversial questions of national policy." See also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-making
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957).
67. See U.S. Const. art. Ill, § I (providing "The judicial Power of the United States shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.").
68. Baum, supra n. 50, at 5.
69. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 455.
70. Gunther, supra n. 61, at I.

71. !d.
72. !d. Dismissing the notion that the Supreme Court is the "all-power" tribunal some people
make it out to be, Professor Baum concedes, nonetheless, that the Court is a "remarkable institution"
with an "extraordinary" role "for a single small body that possesses little tangible power." Baum,

supra n. 50, at 273.
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73

contours of affirmative-action law." Attention to the ever-evolving and
ever-changing attitude of the Supreme Court toward affirmative action
and minority rights generally can shed much needed light on the politics
of inclusion and exclusion in America. Few issues in American history
"stand out more dramatically than the ebbing and flowing of our
commitments to dealin9 with the injustices-and the potential richness4
of racial differences." It is not just presidents who engage in the
75
politics of affirmative action; judges, including Supreme Court justices,
do the same, with serious ramifications on minority rights.
B. The Supreme Court and the Zig-Zags ofAfrican American
Civil Rights from Dred Scott to Brown v. Board of Education
76

Emphasis here will be on African American civil rights, not
because black civil rights exhaust the universe of minority rights in
77
America, for they do not,
but rather because African American
experience with all forms of discrimination, including slavery,
segregation, and racism has been one of the most odious endured by any
78
group in U.S. history. This Article characterizes and organizes the
black struggle in terms of a fateful zig-zag journey-from ( 1)
73. Riccucci, supra n. I, at 76, 79; see also id. at 74-75 (Table 6.1) (listing "the chronology
of legal actions around affirmative action;" a chronology of legal activities without question
evidencing the dominant role of the courts).
74. Lee C. Bollinger, My Case, Wall St. J. AS (June 20, 2003).
75. See supra n. 36 (discussing the role of President Nixon).
76. Civil rights is about equality and freedom from discrimination, specifically the rights of
all Americans to equal treatment under the law, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. Schmidt
et al., supra n. 27, at 151. "Essentially, the history of civil rights in America is the story of the
struggle of various groups to be free from discriminatory treatment." !d. Although similar, civil
rights are distinguishable from civil liberties. Civil liberties are basically constitutional limitations
that specify what the government cannot do, whereas civil rights specify things the government must
do to ensure equal protection and freedom from discrimination. !d.
77. See also Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 151 (pointing out other groups besides African
Americans, such as Hispanics, Native Americans, Asian Americans, Arab Americans, and persons
from India also, like African Americans, have engaged or are still engaging in their own struggle for
equality). See e.g. Frank Wu, Yellow: Race in American Beyond Black & White chapter 4 (Basic
Books 2002). (analyzing affirmative action with respect to Asian Americans in a chapter titled
"Neither Black Nor White").
78. E.g. Justice Marshall's opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387--402, in which the distinguished
jurist referred to the forms of discrimination blacks endured "during most of the past 200 years" as
"the most ingenious and pervasive." !d. at 308. Marshall said racism directed against blacks was
so pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact. The
experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in degree. from that of
other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone but also that a whole people
were marked as inferior by the law. And that mark has endured. The dream of America as the
great melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he never even
made it into the pot.
/d. at 400-01 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
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constitutional servitude, to (2) progress toward a condition of
constitutional equality, to (3) reversion to inequality marked by
segregation, and, finally, to (4) progress toward equality. This Article
highlights milestone occurrences that characterize each period or era,
focusing on the role or contribution of the Supreme Court in each era or
period.
1. Constitutional Servitude: "All Men are Created Equal, Except
Negroes"
Constitutional servitude characterized the fate of African Americans
during the antebellum period before 1861. The Declaration of
Independence proclaimed a number of "self-evident Truths," including:
"all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
79
Yet, at the Constitutional Convention in
Pursuit of Happiness."
Philadelphia in 1787, delegates failed to resolve the issue of slavery.
Without mentioning the word slavery, the final document that emerged
from the meeting was marred by several provisions bearin§b directly on
racial matters, namely: the "Three-Fifths" Compromise, the Slave
81
82
Commerce Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause. These provisions
79. Declaration o/ Independence ['I! 2] ( 1776 ). The original draft of the Declaration accused
the King of England of waging a "cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred
rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and
carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation
thither." John H. Franklin & Alfred A. Moses Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of AfricanAmericans 71 (7th ed., Knopf 1997). John Adams called those charges the "vehement philippic
against Negro slavery." The charges were unacceptable to Southern delegates at the Continental
Congress and were stricken from the final document. !d.
80. U.S. Con st. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing, "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons,
including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths
of all other persons"). Like many things in the Constitution, this provision was a compromise
between delegates from the Northern and the Southern states. The North wanted the slaves to count
for taxation purposes, whereas the South wanted them to count for representation purposes. Franklin
D. Gilliam Jr., Farther to Go: Readings and Cases in Ajrican-American Politics 3 (Harcourt Brace
2002).
81. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. I ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to"
1808, "but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person."). This was another one of those compromises, designed to accommodate delegates from
Southern states, and delegates, like James Madison, opposed to slavery and the rest of the
"impending abolitionist movement." See Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 3.
82. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom
such Service or Labour may be due."). For slaves, as Professor Gilliam aptly observed, this clause
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are emblematic of the hard-ball compromises leading up to the adoption
83
of the Constitution. However, they also depict the delegates' low
perception of blacks as humans, and particularly of slaves as part84
property and part-human. "The degradation of American [BJlacks
8
was . . . woven into the very fabric of American government. " The
abolitionist and African American leader Frederick Douglass poignantly
lamented, "Liberty and Slavery-opposite as Heaven and Hell-are both
86
in the Constitution." It was an observation with which Abraham
Lincoln appeared to concur when he sarcastically stated, "All men are
87
created equal, except Negroes."
The Supreme Court first assumed a role in African American
88
inequality when it decided Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sariford in 1857.
Described by one political scientist as "perhaps the most important
89
governmental act concerning race in the 19th century," this case lent
constitutional imprimatur to slavery in America. Dr. John Emerson left
Missouri and went to Illinois, where for four years he served as an Army
surgeon. He took along with him Dred Scott, his slave. Although
meant, "[i]n essence there was no way to flee for freedom." Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 3.
83. See e.g. Wilson, supra n. 65, at 27 (commenting on the relationship between the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, reasoning that the Framers "clearly postponed the
issue of slavery in order to create a union strong enough to handle the issue when it could no longer
be postponed").
84. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 3.
85. ld.
86. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 151.
87. ld. Two views have evolved regarding the "resolution" of the slavery issue in the U.S.
Constitution. The first held by Professor Wilson, supra n. 65, and others, regards the maintenance of
slavery in the original Constitution as simply part of the bargain to adopt the Constitution. The
second view is held by analysts like the Swedish scholar Gunnar Myrdal, author of the seminal book,
An American Dilemma, who attributed the failure to handle slavery well as an attempt to maintain
domination over blacks. Although there were groups other than blacks denied basic rights in
America, slavery was a brand of domination of "overwhelming proportions" in scope and extent,
reserved especially for blacks. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 5. Additionally, in the U.S. slavery was an
institution with a special "racist caste." Denial of fundamental political and human rights to slaves
relegated or condemned them to a subordinate position in the social, political, and economic
hierarchy. Slaves had no rights to their bodies, their offspring, or their fate. The enforcement of
restrictive laws or slave codes directed at blacks was achieved through several social control
mechanisms, including slave patrols, whippings, imprisonment, and lynching. Southern defense of
slavery was based on the view that blacks were not fully developed human beings and they needed
protection, guidance, and discipline. The black condition and situation contrasted from that of white
indentured servants, the majority of whom, by 1800, had bought their way out of servitude and were
accorded rights of citizenship. So slavery was not something merely driven by economic changes
and concerns brought about by the Industrial Revolution, as some writers argue. Rather, in addition
to being critical to the stability of the Southern economy, control of the slave population was also
critical to the very nature of Southern life. See id. See also Justice Marshall's dissent in supra n. 78,
which corroborates this account.
88. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
89. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at II.
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Missouri was a slave state, under the Missouri Compromise of 1850
Congress had prohibited slavery in Illinois. Scott returned to Missouri
and sued for his freedom on the grounds that his residence on free soil
made him a free man. Scott won his suit in the lower court, but lost in the
Missouri Supreme Court. The case was then tried in federal district court
and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In Dred Scott, two issues were presented before the Court: (l)
whether blacks were citizens of the U.S., and (2) the constitutionality of
the Missouri Compromise. In a judgment for the Court written by Chief
91
Justice Taney, the Court answered the first question in the negative. It
held that the slavery commerce and the fugitive slave clauses "point
directly and specifically to the Negro race as a separate class of persons,
and show clearly that they were not regarded as a portion of the people or
92
citizens of the government then formed." Taney reasoned blacks "had
93
no rights which the white man was bound to respect. " Turning to the
second issue, the Court ruled that Congress overstepped its authority by
prohibiting slavery in the territories covered under the Missouri
Compromise. Therefore, the Court declared unconstitutional the very
Compromise under which Scott brought his suit. Dred Scott embodied
underlying differences between the North and South that foreshadowed
94
the start of the Civil War. And far from settling the issue of slavery,
which the Philadelphia Convention left unresolved, the Dred Scott ruling
95
brought that issue to a head. Dred Scott is one of the most wrongly
96
decided cases ever in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court.
90. The Missouri Compromise was an act of Congress that admitted Maine into the Union as
a free state, admitted Missouri as a slave state, and banned slavery in all federal terntories north of
the 30° latitude (the southern border of Missouri). For an informative historical story on this
factually-rich case, see Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, in Quarrels That flave Shaped
the Constitutioll 87-99 (John A. Garraty ed., Harper & Row, Publishers 1987).
91. Roger B. Taney (1777-1864), a Democrat from Maryland, was appointed by President
Jackson, a Democrat from Tennessee (1829-37) and served on the high court from 1836 until his
death in 1864.
92. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411.
93. !d. at 407. Few cases in the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence match Dred Scott
when it comes to deployment of a collection of opprobrious assertions designed to degrade a people.
In addition to having no rights that were respected, Taney branded blacks an "article of property,"
who "might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit." !d. at 407-08. "They were at
that time considered as a subordinate and interior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race ... ."!d. at 404-05
94. See Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 11--12. Some of the manifestations of these fundamental
differences that the Dred Scott decision brought to a head were that Northern states sought to
increase the number of free states admitted to the Union, while Southern states sought to extend
slavery into the territories under the control of the federal government. !d.
95. !d. at 12.
96. See McCloskey, supra n. 58, at 94 (assessing the decision as "the most disastrous opinion
the Supreme Court has ever issued"). Abraham Lincoln opposed the decision "in a certain way"
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2. Progress Toward a Condition of Constitutional Equality

While the first period covers the era before the Civil War, the second
period encompasses the era of Reconstruction, "[t]he period between the
freeing of the slaves in 1863 and the return of Southern white supremacy
97
It took the pains of a
after the presidential election of 1876."
tormenting civil war from 1861 to 1865 and numerous Reconstruction
98
initiatives to correct the constitutional defects of the formative years
and move African Americans to the condition of constitutional equality.
Emancipation
These initiatives include President Lincoln's
Proclamation, the Civil War Amendments, and the Civil Rights Acts of
1865 to 1875, designed to enforce these amendments.
The Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 abolished slavery in the
99
Confederate States, but protected it in the Union States. In practical
terms, this presidential decree freed no slaves, even though it helped
Lincoln politically by securing him black support for the federal side.
The proclamation also had important symbolic value in that it set the
ground for the movement toward constitutional equality that the
Thirteenth Amendment and the other Civil War amendments solidified.
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments made further

during his campaign for the U.S. Senate in 1858. "We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if
we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject," he indicated. Gunther, supra n. 61, at
23. There were also white public officials at that time who viewed the decision with lividness. For
example, Senator Seward of New York called upon the people of the United States to defy the
unconstitutional and abhorrent principle, embedded in the decision, that one man can own another
man. He stated that the "people of the United States never can, and they never will, accept principles
so unconstitutional and so abhorrent. Never, never!" Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., I st Sess. 943 (1858).
He also threatened to help "reorganize the Court and thus reform its political sentiments and
practices, and bring them into harmony with the Constitution and the laws of nature." !d.
97. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 24. The Reconstruction is so named because the central political
question that characterized that period involved the conditions for the re-entry of the seceding
Confederate States into the Union. !d. These conditions included "a clear directive to abolish
slavery." !d.
98. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in a statement he released before the celebration of the
Constitution's 200th anniversary in September 1987, indicated he was unimpressed by the Framers'
wisdom and foresight. He would not credit to them the fact that the Constitution today no longer
enslaves. Rather, he said, that credit belongs "to those who refused to acquiesce in outdated notions
of 'liberty,' 'justice,' and 'equality,' and who strived to better them." Thurgood Marshall,
Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United Constitution, 101 Harv. L. Rev. I (1987) (text of a
speech given at a seminar in Maui, Hawaii). A recent echo of Justice Marshall's position was made
by the Reverend Jesse Jackson who contends that the Founders' vision left many out. The
constitutional republic the Founders gave us, the civil rights leader said, was a republic "designed to
protect the rights of the few, particularly property holders and creditors, from the passions of the
many, particularly working people and debtors." Accordingly, "[t]he America we celebrate today is
not the America of the Founders. It is the America of Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King."
Jesse Jackson, Founders' Vision Left Many Out, Chi. Sun-Times 37 (July 5, 2005).
99. Text of this document can be found in Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 21-22.
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progress in correcting Constitutional inequalities.
The Thirteenth
101
Amendment not only abolished slavery throughout the United States,
it also granted Congress the authority, through legislation, to enforce the
102
Amendment.
"[I]t represents the first national attempt at broad-scale
103
In one impressive swoop, the Fourteenth Amendment,
racial reform."
ratified in 1868, accorded citizenship to "all persons born or naturalized
104
in the United States," effectively overturning Dred Scott;
struck down
105
and provided for privileges and
the "Three-Fifths" Compromise;
immunities of citizenship, due process, and equal protection under the
106
laws.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment made blacks "whole" by
striking "three-fifths," it was only for the purpose of calculating their
numbers for representation in the House of Representatives; it did not
give them the right to vote. The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870,
107
granted that right,
effectively extending the right to vote to black
108
males.
I 00. The three amendments, collectively, are called the Civil Rights Amendment because
"[t]hey were, so to speak, the victory terms dictated by the North to the South." Corwin & Peltason,
supra n. 41, at 184. For example, the federal government conditioned the withdrawal of federal
troops from Southern states and restoration of their right to full participation in Congress upon their
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. /d. The federal troops which occupied Southern states
during the Reconstruction era were withdrawn in 1877.
101. U.S. Cons!. amend. Xlll, § l ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."). Some slaves had been freed
during the Civil War. This Amendment freed the rest and abolished slavery. The Thirteenth
Amendment takes its significance from the fact that it effectively eliminated all provisions in the
Constitution that allowed slavery, such as the Slave Commerce Clause, id. at art. l, § 9, and the
Fugitive Slave Clause, id. at art. IV, § 9. By also making illegal the notion that human beings could
be held as private property, the Amendment completed and gave constitutional footing to prior
initiatives like the Emancipation Proclamation.
l 02. /d. at amend. Xlll, § 2. It is hard to minimize the huge irony the Thirteenth Amendment
signified for Southern States who fought hard to maintain slavery. Before the war, a bedrock
constitutional principle was that the national government should not interfere with slavery in the
states. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 93. In fact, Congress proposed an ill-fated Thirteenth
Amendment, quickly ratified by Illinois, Maryland, and Ohio, and personally signed by President
Lincoln, that prohibited any amendment to the Constitution granting Congress the power to interfere
in any way with slavery in any state. See Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 189. However, the
Thirteenth Amendment not only interfered with slavery, it abolished the institution altogether and in
doing so, also effectively abolished the rule, later formally eliminated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, discussed below, by which three-fifths of the slaves were counted when apportioning
seats in the House of Representatives. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 93.
I 03. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 22
104. U.S. Cons!. amend. XIV,§ I.
I 05. /d. at amend. XIV, § 2.
l 06. /d. at amend. XIV,§ I.
l 07. !d. at amend. XV, § l ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.").
l 08. Notably, the right to suffrage did not include women, black or white. Only with the
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As earlier indicated, the Civil Rights Acts, about eight in all, were
meant to enforce the Civil War Amendments. Three of these were
109
particularly important, namely: the Enforcement Act of 1870,
which
laid out specific criminal penalties for interfering with the right to vote as
110
protected by the Fifteenth Amendment; the Civil Rights Act of 1872,
otherwise known as the Anti-Ku Klux Klan Act, which made it a federal
crime for anyone to use law or custom to deprive an individual of any
right secured by the Constitution or federal law; and the Second Civil
111
Rights Act of 1875,
which made it a federal crime for an owner or
operator of any public accommodation, including schools, churches,
cemeteries, hotels, places of amusement, and common carriers, to deny
any individual "the full enioyment of the accommodations thereof' on
. . 1 f2
groun d o f race or re l1g10n.

3. Reversion to Inequality: "The Strange Career ofJim Crow"
Southern states resisted the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment
with the "black codes." These laws were ostensibly designed to govern
"the status and conduct" of the newly freed slaves and, therefore, provide
social and economic stability in these states. In actuality, these codes
were restrictive and punitive measures that, in many ways, returned
blacks to bondage-like conditions. Two infamous Supreme Court
113
114
17
. .
dectswns,
th e c·zvz'tR·zghts Cases,
an dPlessy v. rerguson,
are more
illustrative of this period than any other event.
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court struck down the Second Civil

passage of the Nineteenth Amendment fifty years later, in 1920, did women win this right. /d. at
amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex."). Although Mrs. Abigail Adams pled with her
husband, John Adams "to remember the ladies," see Steffen W. Schmidt et al., American
Government & Politics Today 163 (2003-04 ed., Wadsworth/Thomson Learning 2003) [hereinafter
Schmidt et al. 2003-04 ed.] (quoting Letters o/a Nation: A Collection of" Extraordinary American
Letters 60 (Andrew Carroll ed., Kodansha America, Inc. 1997), the Constitution that the Framers
wrote did not give women the right to vote, but rather left the matter to the states who limited the
franchise to adult white males who owned property. Nor did the limitation seem unusual to the
Framers, given that the prevailing view then appears to have been that "the people who own the
country ought to govern it," as John Jay said. Noam Chowsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism
and Global Order 46 (Seven Stories Press 1999).
109. Ch.lll4, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
110. Ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871).
Ill. Ch.ll4, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
112. Schmidt et al. 2003-04 ed., supra n. I 08, at 148-49.
113. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The lawsuit consisted of five cases originating from California,
Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, and Tennessee, which were consolidated and decided together. At
issue in the five cases was the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, hence the
designation of the cases as the Civil Rights Cases.
114. 163U.S.537(1896).
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Rights Act of 1875, which made it a federal crime to deny blacks full
115
It ruled that the Fourteenth
enjoyment of public accommodation.
Amendment only protected against discrimination by states, not
116
Put differently, the Supreme
discrimination by private individuals.
Court regarded discrimination by white citizens against blacks as a
private affair against which the law and Constitution provided no
recourse. The Court also ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment "[did] not
invest Congress with power to lefislate upon subjects which are within
11
the domain of state legislation."
118
Only one justice, Justice Harlan
dissented from the judgment of
119
the Court.
He disagreed that the Fourteenth Amendment could not
reach the discrimination complained of in the cases and found the rights
involved to be legal rights, not social intercourse, as the Court
120
claimed.
He was also certain that the Thirteenth Amendment
121
applied.
He said that today it is "the colored race" whose rights are
being violated "by corporations and individuals wielding ~ublic
22
authority;" who knows which other race's tum it will be tomorrow?
The ruling in the Civil Rights Cases signified a major setback in
African American civil rights. "Less than two decades after the Civil
War, the Supreme Court had seriously weakened the Fourteenth
Amendment and neutralized the efforts of Congress to pass civil rights
123
laws to protect black citizens."
These cases and their antecedents
placed the civil rights of blacks "back in the hands of the States, their
124
staunchest oppressors."

I 15. See text accompanying supra n. 112.
116. 109U.S.at3.
117. !d. at II.
118. John Marshall Harlan ( 1833-1911 ), a Republican from Kentucky, was appointed by
President Hayes, a Republican from Ohio and President from 1877 to 1881. He served on the high
court from 1877 until his death in 1911.
119. Civil Rights Cases, I 09 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
120. !d. at 59.
121. See id. at 35 (contending that "since slavery ... was the moving or principal cause of the
adoption of that Amendment, and since that institution rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race,
of those held in bondage, their freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against,
all discrimination against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to
freemen of other races.")(emphasis added). !d.
122. !d. at 62.
123. Agyeman, supra n. 58, at 682; see also Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 153 (stating that the
other civil rights laws that the Court did not specifically invalidate became dead letters in the statute
books, although they were never repealed by Congress).
124. J. Owens Smith et al., Blacks & American Government: Politics, Policy, & Social Change
65. (Kendall/Hunt Publg. Co. 1987). Those antecedents include The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
36 (1873) (ruling that state and national citizenships are distinct, applying the principle of duality of
citizenship the Court established in Dred Scott); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (ruling that
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Plessy v. Ferguson involved a challenge to an 1890 Louisiana law
that mandated "equal but sevarate accommodations" for white and black
25
passengers in railroad cars.
Homer A. Plessy, reportedly one-eighth
black, was arrested and convicted for sitting in a seat in a coach for
whites rather than the one reserved for "Colored Only." Plessy appealed
his arrest and conviction to the Supreme Court. He argued that the
Louisiana statute violated his civil rights under the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In an opinion for the Court by Justice Brown,
the Court stated-just like it did in the Civil Rights Cases thirteen years
before-that the law in question did not violate the Thirteenth
Amendment because it did not "reestablish a state of involuntary
126
servitude."
Nor, it said, did the law violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. True, the object of the Fourteenth Amendment "was
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the
law;" nonetheless, "in the nature of things, it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social ...
127
equality."
The Court maintained that racial segregation was not
discriminatory and did not "necessarily imply the inferiority of either
race to the other," but rather a reasonable exercise of the state police
power "for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance
128
At any rate, "[i]f one race be
or oppression of a particular class."
inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the U.S. cannot put them
129
upon the same plane."
the rights of black litigants, including the right to peaceful assembly, infringed upon by a group of
Louisiana whites, were not nationally protected rights that Congress could punish violation of); and
U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (ruling that the Fifteenth Amendment did not guarantee all citizens
the right to vote but rather simply listed grounds that could not be used to deny that right).
125. 163 U.S. 537,540 (1896).
126. !d. at 543. Not until Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 (1968), involving a developer
who refused to sell a home to a black couple, did the Supreme Court use the Thirteenth Amendment
to reach discrimination perpetrated by private individuals. In that case, a majority of the Court, with
only two justices dissenting, construed section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to bar private
discrimination, stating that "[ w]hen racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their
ability to buy property tum on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery." See Corwin &
Peltason, supra n. 41, at 185-86.
127. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
128. !d. at 550.
129. !d. at 552. In Cummings v. County Bd. ojEduc., 175 U.S. 528 ( 1899), three years later, the
Court extended the separate-but-equal doctrine to public schools. The separate-but-equal doctrine
presumed that the constitutional requirement of equal protection was served so long as facilities were
equal, even if they remained separate. The problem, however, was that under the doctrine,
'"[s]eparate' was indeed the rule, but 'equal' was never enforced, nor was it a reality." Schmidt et
al., supra n. 27, at 154; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326-27 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun,
JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (describing separate but equal as "a status always
separate but seldom equal"). Thus, in Mississippi, as late as 1950, black schools received $32.55 in
educational funding per pupil, compared to $122.95 per pupil for white schools. See Hilary Herbold,
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As in the Civil Rights Cases thirteen years before,
once again,
only one justice, John Marshall Harlan, dissented from the ruling of the
131
Court.
As in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan believed the
discrimination involved in Plessy violated both the Thirteenth
132
He contended that the
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Louisiana law prescribing separate coaches for blacks and whites was
133
designed to exclude blacks from coaches assigned to white persons;
134
therefore, he said, it "interferes with the personal freedom of citizens."
In language that still resonates today, he wrote, the eye of the law and
135
To the contrary, "[o]ur Constitution
Constitution recognizes no caste.
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
136
citizens."
He darkly predicted that the Court had rendered a decision
137
and stated,
that would, in time, be as pernicious as Dred Scott,
significantly, that "[t]he thin disguise of 'equal' accommodations ... will
138
not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done."
After
observing that the decision would defeat "the beneficent purposes"
Congress and the people had in mind in adopting the Civil War
139
he advised that it served the collective interests of
Amendments,
whites and blacks that "the common government of all shall not Bermit
40
He
the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law."
added, "What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly
create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state
enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens
are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public
141
coaches occupied by white citizens?"
It is hard, he said, to reconcile
the portraiture of America as a land of freedom "with a state of the law
which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a
142
large class of our fellow-citizens."
Given the belief of Justice Harlan

Never a Level Playing Field: Blach and the G.!. Bill, 1994-95 J. Blacks Higher Educ. I 06 (Winter
1994-95).
130. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
131. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
132. /d.at554-55.
133. !d. at 557.
134. !d.
135. !d. at 559.
136. !d.
137. !d.
138. !d. at 562.
139. !d. at 560.
140. !d.
141. !d.
142. !d. at 562.
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in the "beneficent purposes" of the Civil War Amendments and the
significance of the remedies those amendments envisage for the sin of
slavery and exclusion of blacks, it is ironic that anti-affirmative action
forces today should use his color-blind language to support their
opposition to these remedial measures.
Less than twenty years after the Civil War, the white majority "was
all too willing to forget about the Civil War Amendments and the civil
143
Judges "generally tend to
rights legislation of the 1860s and 1870s."
avoid issuing decisions that they know will be noticeably at odds with
144
public opinion;" in particular, the Supreme Court is ever apprehensive
that it "may lose stature if it decides a case in a way that markedly
145
diverges from public opinion."
So, it is of little surprise that at the
time it was decided, the Civil Rights Cases reflected white public
146
opinion.
But none of this, including the regain of governmental power
147
by many former pro-slavery secessionists in the Southern states,
absolves the Court or minimizes the opprobriousness of this decision.
148
Plessy provided "the judicial cornerstone"
of Jim Crow laws that
149
prevailed all over the country, especially in the South.
These were
segregation laws, similar to the future policy of apartheid or separateness
in South Africa, that provided for separate facilities for blacks and
whites. These laws encompassed schools, playgrounds, swimming pools,
beaches, parks, hotels, hospitals, libraries, restaurants, cemeteries, water
fountains, toilets, buses and street cars, interracial sex, marriage, and
150
love,
and numerous other aspects of American life. They were strictly
151
enforced by both legal and extra-legal means,
and maintained by

143. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 153.
144. !d. at 477.
145. !d.
146. See id. at 153.
147. See id. at 153, 154.
148. !d. at 155.
149. "Jim Crow" was a derogatory term for a black person.
150. See C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (2d rev. ed., Oxford U. Press
1966). The "strange career of Jim Crow" that the Plessy decision legitimized, in some places
bordered on the absurd. For example, Alabama prohibited blacks and whites from playing checkers
together; in some states schoolchildren of different races could not use the same books; Louisiana
established separate districts for black and white prostitutes; in Oklahoma, blacks and whites could
not use the same public telephone; in North Carolina, young children could be arrested for interracial
kissing; in Georgia and several other states, blacks were required to use separate polling places,
separate courthouse doors, separate record rooms, separate record books, separate pens and ink, and
separate color-coded tax receipts-white for white taxpayers and pink for black taxpayers. See
Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 20 (citing Woodward, supra).
151. Lynching, sometimes preceded by torture, and riots were extra-legal measures of choice
in many Southern states. See Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 155. Newspapers covered stories of
lynchings like sporting events are covered today, and the practice itself was so widespread that in
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custom, depending upon the region of the country in question. Well into
the first half of the twentieth century, "blacks were forced to receive food
from the back of restaurants, drink from separate water fountains, and
ride in the back of the bus," among numerous other degradations. 152
More seriously, especially in the South, blacks faced the constant threat
of death for perceived crimes like a black male looking a white woman
in the eye (known as "familiarity"), failing to yield the right of way to a
white yedestrian, or addressing a white person in an "impertinent"
15
Avoiding the formal use of race, the South used manx other
tone.
154
55
the grandfather clause,
poll
measures, including white primaries,
156
taxes,
race riots designed to stamp out economic competition from
157
to disenfranchise blacks and reinforce acts
blacks, and literacy tests,
of separation. Thus, along with the Civil Rights Cases, Plessy "destroyed
the movement toward complete equality" that the Reconstruction
.
d .158
maugurate

1881, the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama (Tuskegee University today) began issuing annual reports
on the incidents of lynching. Not until 1952 did it report that there were no lynchings to document in
a given year. See Barker et al., supra n. 13, at 17. By 1914, more than 1,100 African Americans were
estimated to have been lynched, sometimes for crimes as minor as a black man looking a white
woman in the eyes in "familiarity," or "insulting" a white person. Franklin & Moss, supra n. 79, at
311-17. Although lynching was illegal in many states, Southern authorities rarely prosecuted these
cases, and white juries would not convict. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 155. With about 200
descendants of lynching victims and a ninety-one-year-old man believed to be the only living
survivor of a lynching attempt listening from the visitors' gallery, the United States Senate, in June
2005, apologized for its role in blocking anti-lynching legislation. See Jim Abrams, Senate
Apologizes.fiw Lynching-Ban Delays, Associated Press (June 13, 2005).
152. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 41.
153. See also Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 154.
154. The Democratic Party used this device to keep black voters out of its primaries under the
guise that political parties were private organizations. The Supreme Court upheld the white primary
until 1944 when, in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944), it ruled that these primaries
violated the Fifteenth Amendment.
155. This clause restricted voting to those who could prove that their grandfathers had voted
before 1867. But few black grandfathers voted before 1867. In fact, the Fifteenth Amendment
extending the right to vote to black males was ratified only in 1870. So, this requirement effectively
nullified the voting rights of blacks.
156. Poll taxes require a voter-black or white-to pay a fee in order to vote. But fewer blacks
than whites had jobs and could afford to pay such taxes; so, the requirement effectively chilled black
voting. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964, abolished these taxes as a precondition for
voting. Also, in 1966, the Supreme Court declared poll taxes unconstitutional in all elections, Harpa
v. Va. St. Bd. ofE/ections, 383 U.S. 663,666 (1966).
157. These tests required potential voters to read, recite, or interpret complicated texts, such as
a section of the state constitution, to the satisfaction of local registrars in order for them to vote.
Many local registrars were never satisfied with the responses of African Americans and used those
as excuses to prevent them from voting.
!SR. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 402 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Had the
Court been willing in 1896, in Plessy, to hold that equal protection forbids differences in treatment
based on race," Justice Marshall recounted ruefully in Bakke, "we would not be faced with this
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"Separate Educational Facilities Are

A landmark decision that marks and colossally dominates this era is
160
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.
Like the Civil Rights Cases
more than seventy years earlier, Brown was a consolidated opinion,
involving cases from the States of Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina,
and Virginia, "premised on different facts and different local conditions,"
yet tied together by a common legal question justifying their
161
It was the last in a progression of cases that attacked
consolidation.
162
separate but equal,
yet contrasted from those cases that limited
themselves to proving that separate but equal was all separate but not
equal, in that it signified a frontal attack or "re-examin[ation]" of the
doctrine itself, as Chief Justice Warren said in his opinion for the
Court.l63

In Brown, the plaintiffs contended that segregated public schools are
not equal and cannot be made equal; accordingly, they maintained, their
constitutional rights to equal protection under the laws, had been
164
violated. The Supreme Court agreed, stating,
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others
dilemma in 1978." !d. at 401. Instead, for 60 years until Brown, the U.S. was a Nation where, by
law, blacks were marked as inferior, while white persons received special treatment based on skin
color. !d. at 400. This "legacy of unequal treatment," he said, is the reason we must now consider
race "in making decisions about who will hold the positions of influence, affluence, and prestige."
!d. at 401.
159. Characterization or designation of the current era as such is a figure of speech that should
not be taken to mean that the African American's vacillating struggle for equality has finally been
resolved in favor of equality. This is why this Article instructively speaks of a progress or movement
toward equality, as opposed to equality standing by itself. An alternative way to look at things is to
view each progress in the African American struggle for equality as a series of far-reaching
"revolutions" that can also run their tide. In that case, the current phase starting with Brown, an event
"far from complete," "inaugurate[d) the progressive destruction of the racial caste system in the
United States" as well as of black integration into the social, economic, and political fabric of
American society. See Alfred H. Kelly, The School Desegregation Case, in Quarrels That Have
Shaped the Constitution, supra n. 90, at 310.
160. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
161. !d. at 486. The cases include Gebhart v. Belton, 344 U.S. 891 (1952) (Delaware), Briggs
v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350 (1952) (South Carolina), and Davis v. County School of' Prince Edward
County, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952). The Court extended its ruling in Brown to Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), dealing with school desegregation in the District of Columbia. The
case was decided under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
162. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 491-92 (identifying six Supreme Court cases, the results of the
court's labor "for over half a century" with the separate but equal doctrine).
I 63. See id. at 402.
164. !d. at 488.
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similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the 6§ual
1
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

In other words, segregating children in public schools solely based on
their race, even if the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors m'bt
1 0
be equal, deprive minority children of equal educational opportunities.
167
The Court reached this verdict unanimously.
The Court's holding was preceded by extensive insightful analysis
on "public education in the light of its full development and its present
168
The Court first
place in American life throughout the Nation."
assessed that "[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function
of state and local governments," adding
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of
our most basic public responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days,
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be exRected to succeed in
69
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.

Given this importance, the Court said, "[s]uch an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be available to
170
all on equal terms."
It briefly summarized its ruling in two cases
involvinr, educational opportunities in professional and graduate
1
schools,
adding,
Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and

165. /d. at 495.
166. !d. at 493. Like in Brown, the Court ruled in the companion case, involving the District of
Columbia, that "[s]egregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper government
objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes
an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause." Bolling, 347 U.S. at
500.

167. As a law clerk for Robert Jackson, one of the justices who decided Brown, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist wrote a memorandum regarding the pending case, in which he argued in favor of
maintaining separate but equal schools. Confronted with this infonnation during his Senate
confirmation hearing, Rehnquist responded that these were not his views; rather, he said, he was
following Jackson's instructions to prepare a memo arguing the segregationist position. See Hensley
et al., supra n. 3, at 64. Jackson (1892-1954), a Democrat from New York and appointed by
President Franklin Roosevelt, served on the Court from 1941 until his death in 1954.
168. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
169. /d. at 493 (ellipsis added).
170. !d.
171. See id.
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high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that way affect their
1
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
The Court cited approvingly a finding in one Kansas case regarding
the devastating psychological effect of segregation on black children
from a court, which, despite the profundity of that finding, "nevertheless
173
felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs."
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the [N]egro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children and
to deprive them of some of the f,enefits they would receive in a
1 4
racial[ly] integrated school system.
Following the main case, Chief Justice Warren issued a second
175
Brown decision,
focusing on implementation, in which the Court
ordered district courts to ensure that African American children are
admitted to schools on a nondiscriminatory basis with "all deliberate
176
speed."
They should consider devices in their desegregation orders
that might include "the school transportation system, personnel, [and]
revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a
177
It took fifteen long years for the Court to finally
nonracial basis."
178
demand that the states desegregate the schools at once.
This circumspectness did not avert the fierce opposition from
Southern states that Brown elicited. These states fought off desegregation
and integration of African Americans into formerly segregated schools
with all manners of tactics, which in states like Arkansas and Mississippi
included violence. In order to quell the violence that attended the
integration of Central High School in Little Rock in 1957, a reluctant
President Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas National Guard and

172. !d. at 494.
173. !d.
174. /d. (quoting McLaurin. 347 U.S. 483 ( 1954)).
175. Brown v. Bd. ofEd., 349 U.S. 294 ( 1955) (Brown![).
176. !d. at 301.
177. !d. at 300-0 I.
178. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. o{Ed., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (I 969).
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179

deployed the Army's lOlst Airborne Division.
Mississippi was the
epicenter of the fireball of violence in opposition to integration. There,
the attempt ofthe African American student, James Meredith, in 1962, to
enroll at the University of Mississippi led to violent riots by whites that
resulted in two deaths and 375 military and civilian injuries, many from
180
Order was restored and the University of Mississippi in
gunfire.
Oxford integrated after President John Kennedy sent in 30,000 federal
combat troops, more force, reportedly, than the U.S. then had stationed in
181
Korea.

179. See Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 155. In 1958, the Little Rock School Board applied to
the U.S. District Court for a twenty-two year postponement of its desegregation plan. It contended
that intense public hostility that would attend desegregation would prevent them from adequately
ensuring public safety or providing public education. In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958), the
Supreme Court rejected the claim, stating that the conditions the School Board depicts "are directly
traceable to the actions of legislators and executive officials of the state of Arkansas, taken in their
official capacities, which reflect their own determination to resist this Court's decision in the Brown
case." !d. at 15. In other words, in rejecting the plaintiffs claim to suspend the Little Rock
desegregation plan, the Court saw the violence and disruption surrounding the integration of Central
High as a direct result of state action.
180. See William Doyle, An American Insurrection: James Meredith and the Battle of Oxford,
Mississippi, 1962 67-<i8, 280 (Anchor Books 2001).
181. !d. at 278. Because desegregation took place conterminously with the civil rights
movement, it is difficult to segregate acts of violence isolable to desegregation and those that
attended the peaceful protests of the civil rights movement. Besides the killings of Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr. and Malcolm X, these would include the unleashing of police dogs and deployment of
electric cattle prods against unarmed protesters in spring of 1963 involving Police Commissioner
Eugene "Bull" Connor in Birmingham, Alabama; the murder of four little black girls inside the
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in, again, Birmingham, Alabama, on Sept. 15, 1963; and coldblooded killings in Southern states of Caucasians perceived as sympathizing or working with blacks.
In Alabama, "[b]ombings of homes and churches of black leaders were so common that Birmingham
[was] nicknamed 'Bombingham' [and] [t]he city's best black neighborhood was known as
'Dynamite Hill."' David B. Oppenheimer, Martin's March, 80 ABA J. 54 (June 1994).
As for those whites who died because they tried to help blacks, championship of black
freedom or equality, going back into the past, has, unfortunately, been nothing short of hazardous for
courageous whites who thrust that challenge on their shoulders. This was the fate of Senator Charles
Sumner who served in the U.S. Senate from 1852 until his death in 1874. A most outspoken
champion of black freedom, Sumner gave a speech in 1856, one year before the issuance of Dred
Scott, in which he bitterly attacked two of his colleagues for their support of slavery. Two days later,
one Preston Brooks, a Congressman, entered the Senate chamber and nearly beat Sumner to death on
the ground that his remarks libeled the South. It took three years before Sumner recovered and
returned to the Senate to, incredibly, resume his struggle for black freedom. With another
Congressman, Thaddeus Stevens, Sumner led the fight in Congress for civil rights legislation and
passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The two were also responsible for the idea of
"forty acres and a mule," legislation designed to confiscate the slave-holders' plantations, divide
them up, and give them to the slaves as compensation or reparation, and punish the slave-holders for
treason. At the time of his death, Sumner was fighting for a civil rights bill that would have banned
discrimination and segregation in the use of public accommodations. On his deathbed, surrounded
by the African American leader, Frederick Douglass, and other African American leaders, Sumner's
last words were reported to have been, "Take care of my civil rights bill~take care of it~you must
do it." Douglass most appropriately praised Sumner "as the greatest friend the Negro people ever
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Today, integration devices, such as busing, which in the past enjoyed
some measure of support among Americans as legitimate remedial
182
measures, have been all but abandoned.
The result has been a
183
"resurgence of minority schools,"
and a growing fear that racial
184
separation has become inevitable and lega1.
More than fifty years after
Brown, the dream of "a common, universal school ~stem for all
18
Americans without regard to race" remains just a dream.
Several "beachhead" cases leading up to the frontal attack on
.
. B rown me
. 1ude M.zssoun. ex re l. Games
.
segregatiOn
m
v. Cana d a, 186
187
188
Sweatt v. Painter,
and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents.
First,
in Gaines, the Supreme Court ruled that equal protection under the
Constitution required Missouri to provide separate but equal legal
education facilities for blacks. Lloyd Gaines was a black applicant who
was refused admission to the University of Missouri Law School because
of his race. Since Missouri could not provide separate but equal facilities
189
for him, it had to admit him to the law schoo1.
The Court found
untenable Missouri's defense that it would pay Gaines's tuition in an outof-state school, pending the establishment of a separate law school for
190
blacks.
Next, in Sweatt, the University of Texas Law School (UTLS) denied
admission to Marion Sweatt, a black applicant, on the ground that blacks
had separate and equal legal educational opportunities in a hastily-

had in public life." See Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 178 (drawing on Frederick Blue, Charles
Sumner & the Conscience of the North (Harlan Davidson1994)).
182. See e.g. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEd., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding
that race-based admission quotas could no longer be imposed constitutionally).
183. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 157 (pointing out that "[t]oday, one out of every three
African American and Hispanic students goes to a school with more than [ninety] percent minority
enrollment. In the largest U.S. cities, fifteen out of sixteen African American and Hispanic students
go to schools with almost no non-Hispanic whites").
184. See Georgia Persons, Is Racial Separation Inevitable and Legal?, 33 Society 19-24
(Mar./ Apr. 1996).
185. Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 215. See also Gloria J. Browne-Marshall, Crumbs from the
Table of Plenty: A Commentary on Brown and the Ongoing Struggle .fiJr Educational Equity in
American School. Paper Commemorating the 50'h Anniversary ofBrown (Word for Word Publg. Co.
2004) (giving an equally unoptimistic analysis of immense historical depth that assesses the raceconscious gains of Cruller as "crumbs from a table of plenty"). q: Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at
157 (stating "[t]he goal of racially balanced schools envisioned in" Brown "is giving way to the goal
of better education for children, even if that means educating them in schools in which students are
of the same race or in which race is not considered").
186. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
187. 339 u.s. 629 (1950).
188. 339 u.s. 637 (1950).
189. Gaines, 305 U.S. at 352.
190. !d. at 350.
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191

constructed law school.
In a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice
192
Vinson,
the Court found no "substantial equality in the educational
opportunities" Texas offered to black law students, compared to the
opportunities it provided to white law students and ruled that Sweatt be
193
Besides listing the many tangible and
admitted into the UTLS.
intangible features which importantly distinguish the UTLS from the
194
Houston-based law school hastily set up for blacks,
the Court also
stated that a law school "cannot be effective in isolation from the
195
individuals and institutions with which the law interacts."
It
importantly observed that the newly established law school for blacks
"excludes from its student body members of the racial groups which
number [eighty-five] percent of the population of the State and include
most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with
whom petitioner would inevitably be dealing when he becomes a
196
member of the Texas Bar."
In McLaurin, George W. McLaurin, a black student, was admitted to
197
but was
the University of Oklahoma Graduate School of Education
required to sit in a roped-off section of the classroom away from white
198
students and in a separate area of the library and cafeteria facilities.
Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court, found that the restrictions
impaired the student's "ability to study, to engage in discussions and
exchange views with other students and, in general to learn his
199
These cases, along with Brown, formed part of a
profession."
coordinated desegregation litigation plan of attack, by the NAACP Legal

191. Texas state law reserved the University of Texas for white students. See Sweatt, 339 U.S.
at 631 n. I.
192. Frederick M. Vinson ( 1890-1953) was Chief Justice of the United States until his death in
1953.
193. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633.
194. !d. ("In terms of number of faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization,
size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar activities," not to
mention key intangible qualities for greatness in a law school, like "reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community,
traditions and prestige," the University of Texas Law School is superior.). !d. at 634. Ridiculing the
claim of the Texas government that the fly-by-night law school established for blacks has anything
resembling substantial equality with the UTLS, Chief Justice Vinson stated that "[i]t is difficult to
believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would consider the question
close." !d. at 633-34.
195. !d. at 634.
196. !d. Sweatt withdrew from the law school in 1951 without graduating, after enduring a rash
of cross-burnings, tire slashings, and racial slurs from UTLS students and faculty. See Hopwood v.
Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 555 (W.O. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
197. The University admitted McLaurin while his suit was still pending.
198. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640.
199. !d. at 641.
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Defense Fund, against separate but equal, which began with showing that
separate facilities for blacks provided by states were never equal with
200
whites and ended in Brown with a frontal attack on the doctrine itself.
C. The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action from DeFunis to the
Michigan Cases with Special Reference to Public Education

I. The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action Up to Bakke
The first-ever affirmative action lawsuit to reach the U.S. Supreme
201
The suit involved the
Court was DeFunis v. Odegaard in 1974.
University of Washington Law School. The law school had an
affirmative action program that targeted and benefited minority
applicants, including African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native
Americans, and Filipinos. Marcos DeFunis Jr., a Caucasian male, was
denied admission to the school and blamed his rejection on the
affirmative action 8:rogram-something he alleged violated the Equal
2 2
Protection Clause.
The law school defended the program by pointing
out that factors other than grades and test scores were taken into
consideration in its admissions decisions and that the use of race was
compellingly necessary to expand opportunities for minorities to enter
203
A state trial
the legal profession, given their lack of access in the past.
court ruled in favor of DeFunis and ordered his admission to the law
204
school in 1971.
The state supreme court reversed that ruling, and

200. Two other cases identified as forerunners to Brown are Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590
(Md. 1936), and Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 ( 1948). Of the two, only
Sipuel is a Supreme Court decision, and a per curiam decision at that. In Pearson, the court ordered
the admission of Pearson, a black, to the University of Maryland Law School. Given that "in
Maryland now the equal treatment can be furnished only in the one existing law school," the court
said, "the petitioner, in our opinion, must be admitted there." Pearson, 169 Md. at 594. In Sipuel, the
Supreme Court ruled, per curiam, that the state of Oklahoma must provide legal education for the
petitioner, Ada Louis Sipuel, a black woman, "in conformity with the Equal Protection Clause ...
and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group." Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 632~33.
Numerous studies chronicling the NAACP "fighting segregation through litigation" strategy include
Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court. 1936~61
(Oxford U. Press 1994); Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts: How a Dedicated Band of
Lawyers Fought for the Civil Rights Revolution (Basic Books 1994); Mark Tushnet, The NAACP's
Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, 1925~50 (U. of N.C. Press 1987); and Richard
Kluger, Simple Justice: The History (Jj' Brown v. Board of Education (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1977).
Attack on Jim Crow schools was only one of many fronts in the NAACP's campaign against
segregation. Other fronts, also entailing litigation, include white primaries, restrictive covenants
impeding black access to housing, and Jim Crow transportation.
201. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
202. !d. at 314.
203. Jd.at346-47
204. 1d.at314~15.
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DeFunis appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted review.
DeFunis was allowed to remain in school, pending disposition of the
appeal. By the time the Court considered the case in 197 4, he was in his
final year of law school and expected to graduate. Therefore, the Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, dismissed the suit on the grounds
205
that the case had become moot.
Four justices, Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White, dissented
206
They asserted that the Court should have given the
from the judgment.
case full consideration and warned that the controversy would inevitably
207
Of the dissenters, Justice Douglas
wind its way back into the Court.
08
wrote a separate opinion in which he reached the merits.Z The opinion
contained strong language opposing the use of race in admissions
decisions. Justice Douglas believed "[t]he Equal Protection Clause
209
commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation."
He
contended that "[t]he purpose of the University of Washington cannot be
to produce black lawyers for blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish
lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be to produce good
lawyers for Americans. . . . A segregated admissions process creates
suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a segregated
210
He supported consideration of applications in a
classroom.... "
racially neutral way, which he believed the Law School Admission Test
(LSA T) works against, in that it is racially biased in favor of white law
11
applicants.Z He said abolition of the LSAT would be a ~ood "start" in
21
Law schools
the design of such a racially neutral admission regime.
ought to find other ways to ensure diversity without the LSAT.
The dissenters' prediction in DeFunis that the Court would
inevitablj rule on affirmative action came true four years later in
21
Bakke.
The decision is significant as the first Supreme Court decision
to address the constitutionality of affirmative action. The case involved
the University of California at Davis Medical School. Aiming to increase
205. !d. at 319-20.
206. !d. at 348-50 (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, & White, JJ., dissenting).
207. !d.
208. See 416 U.S. at 321-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas, a Democrat from Connecticut
appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933--45) and who sat on the Court for a record
thirty-six years from 1939 to 1975, retired after this case and was replaced by Justice John Paul
Stevens, who has been on the Court since 1975.
209. !d. at 342.
210. !d. at 342-43.
211. !d. at 334 (stating that "minorities have cultural backgrounds that are vastly different from
the dominant Caucasian" and that they "come from such disparate backgrounds that a test sensitively
tuned for most applicants would be wide off the mark for many minorities.").
212. !d. at 340.
213. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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its minority enrollment, the medical school set up a special admissions
program, which reserved sixteen out of one hundred seats in the entering
214
class for minorities.
The school identified various purposes the
affirmative action program was designed to serve, including (i) reducing
the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical
schools and in the medical profession, (ii) countering the effects of
societal discrimination, (iii) increasing the number of physicians who
will practice in communities currently under-served, and (iv) obtaining
the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student
15
body? In the case, Allan Bakke, a Caucasian male, was denied
admission twice to the medical school and subsequently challenged the
affirmative action program on the grounds that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
·~
. c
. . 216
Ca1 110m1a onstttutwn.
The trial court agreed with Bakke and ruled that the special
admissions program was a racial quota, insofar as minority applicants
were rated only against each other and sixteen out of one hundred seats
217
were reserved for them.
The California Supreme Court affirmed.
While it found the goal of integrating the medical profession a
compelling state interest, the court found that the means chosen to attain
218
that goal were not narrow]~ tailored
and race may not be a factor in
the admissions decision?' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the case.
The Court issued a complex five-to-four decision, with Justice
Powell's vote determining the outcome. Powell joined a plurality
consisting of Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and
Stewart (the Burger plurality) in holding the special admissions program
was a quota and therefore invalid. However, Powell also agreed with the
other plurality of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and White (the
Blackmun plurality) that race or ethnicity could be a leffitimate factor in
22
admissions decisions. In other words, Justice Powell
provided a fifth
214. !d. at289.
215. /d. at305-06.
216. /d. at 277-78. For a newspaper story on plaintiff Allan Bakke, see Robert Lindsey,
White/Caucasian-and Rejected, N.Y. Times Mag. 42-47 (Apr. 3, 1977). For case studies of the
lawsuit that include oral presentation of counsels on both sides before the Supreme Court, see
Hensley et al., supra n. 3, at 712-14; see also May It Please the Court (Peter Irons & Stephanie
Guitton, eds., New Press 1993).
217. !d. at278-79.
218. !d. at 279-80.
219. !d.
220. Lewis F. Powell Jr. (1907-98), Democrat from Virginia, appointed by President Richard
Nixon, served on the high court from 1972 until his retirement in 1987. As a justice on the Burger
Court (1969-86 ), he was a moderate with conservative leanings and a swing voter who cast the
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vote both for invalidating the University's special admissions program
and for taking race into account in admissions decisions for purposes of
diversity in a public university's student body. Justice Powell stated that
"race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular
applicant's file, yet this does not insulate the individual from comparison
221
with all other candidates for the available seats."
His main complaint
with the Davis medical school program was that it "focused solely on
ethnic diversity" and effectively indicated to non-minority applicants that
"[n]o matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative and
extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to
educational diversity, they are never afforded the chance to compete with
applicants from the preferred groups for the [set-aside] special
,222
admissions seats.
One unmistakable feature of Bakke was the lack of agreement among
the justices as to an appropriate standard of review for affirmative action
cases. Justice Powell and the Blackmun plurality both decided the case
223
while the Burger plurality, avoiding the
on equal protection grounds,
equal protection question altogether, decided the case on statutory
grounds, holding that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits racial
24
discrimination in programs receiving federal financial assistance?
Additionally, Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny as the standard of
225
review,
while the Blackmun pluralit~ viewed intermediate scrutiny as
26
the appropriate and applicable standard.
Examining the various purposes the medical school listed for its
affirmative action program and applying strict scrutiny, Justice Powell
identified diversity, or "obtaining the educational benefit that flow from
0

0

decisive vote in a Court closely divided between liberals and conservatives. Hensley et al., supra n.
3, at 66. Although Powell tended to favor conservative outcomes in most cases, he differed from
conservative justices such as Rehnquist and Scalia in the sense that he "sought to balance carefully
the competing interests in cases presented to the Court rather than to advance a particular ideology."
!d. at 67.
221. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. As Justice O'Connor clarifies for the record in Grutter a quarter
century later, "The only holding for the Court in Bakke was that a State has a substantial interest that
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive
consideration of race and ethnic origin." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322-23 (internal quotes omitted).
222. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315, 319.
223. !d. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
224. !d. at 408 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Steward and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
225. !d. at 299 (stating that when government decisions "touch upon an individual's race or
ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on
that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest").
226. !d. (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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an ethnically diverse student body," as the only purpose or interest, under
the Constitution that in a proper case could justify a race-conscious
227
preference plan.
He would also give deference to a university or
professional school's judgment that diversity is crucial to its educational
mission. "The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to
22
Justice Powell
education includes the selection of its student body."
grounded his analysis in the academic freedom that "long has been
229
The "nation's
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas
230
and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples." And
a university seeks "to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in
the fulfillment of its mission" when it seeks the "right to select those
students who will contribute the most to the robust exchange of
"d
,231
1 eas.

2. The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action Since Bakke and Before
the Michigan Cases
The Court's decision in Bakke provided helpful insight into the
validity of affirmative action, but did not resolve the controversy over
232
What is more, in Bakke's
affirmative action as doctrine and program.
aftermath, the Supreme Court imposed severe limitations on affirmative
33
action? Two cases which signified this trend-as well as the Court's
hostility toward affirmative action-were City of Richmond v. J.A.
234
- 235
Croson Co.
and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.
Croson marks
227. See id. at 306--10. Justice Powell views the first purpose, relating to the reduction of the
historic deficit of minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession, as an unlawful interest
in racial balancing. !d. at 306--07. He considered the second purpose, related to countering the
effects of societal discrimination, as also an unlawful interest because it could lead to measures that
could place burdens on innocent third parties "who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the
beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered." !d. at 310. He also
found the third purpose, related to the increase of the number of physicians who will practice in
under-served communities, unacceptable and rejected it, indicating that even if an interest based on
that policy could be compelling in some circumstances, the program under review was not "geared
to promote that goal." !d. at 306, 310.
228. !d. at 312.
229. !d. An important exception is that "constitutional limitations protecting individual rights
may not be disregarded." !d. at 314.
230. !d. at 313 (internal quotes omitted).
231. !d. (internal quotes omitted).
232. Hensley et al., supra n. 3, at 714.
233. See Riccucci, supra n. I and corresponding text; see also Thomas Boston & Usha NairReichert, Affirmative Action: Perspectives Ji"om the United States, India, and Brazil, 27 W. J. Black
Stud. 3 (2003).
234. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion).
235. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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the first time that a majority of the Court subjected an affirmative action
program to strict scrutiny, its highest standard of review for questions
involving constitutional violations. Adarand is crucial because, here, the
Court made the decision that it would henceforth apply strict scrutiny to
every racial classification and affirmative action program, regardless of
the intention underlying that classification, and regardless of what entity,
236
federal, state or local, designed that program.
In Croson, the Richmond City Council adopted an affirmative action
program known as the Minority Business Utilization Plan in 1983, after
studies indicated that, although the city's population was fifty percent
African American, minority contractors received only .67 percent of the
237
city's major contracts.
The Plan required major contractors, who were
awarded city contracts, to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar
amount of the contract to minority business enterprises (MBEs), defined
as businesses owned by African Americans, Hispanics, Asians, Native
38
It was patterned after the federal
Americans, and Eskimos.Z
239
government program upheld by the Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick
and, like the program in Fullilove, a contractor could receive a waiver if
no qualified MBEs could be found.
In an opinion for the Court by Justice O'Connor, the plurality struck
down the affirmative action plan as unconstitutional on the ground that it
did not meet strict scrutiny-even though the Court said it had "no doubt
that the sorry history of both private and public discrimination in this
country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black
240
entrepreneurs."
It said that, unlike Congress, which "has a specific
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
241
a state or local government seeking to implement a
Amendment,"
remedial action to address discrimination "must identify that
discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may
242
Richmond's evidence lacks specificity, it
use race[-]conscious relief."
said; also, the program was so "gross[ly] overinclusive[ ]" it "strongly

236. !d. at 227 (stating that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or
local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny").
237. 488 U.S. at 479 (plurality opinion).
238. !d. at 477.
239. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (overruled in part, Assoc. Builders &Contractors v. Sewerage &
Water Bd., 996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3978 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 1996)) (upholding the constitutionality,
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, of a federal government's ten percent set-aside
program established in 1977).
240. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion).
241. /d. at 490.
242. /d. at 504.
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243

impugn[ed] the city's claim of remedial motivation."
Finally, the
city's thirty percent goal was a quota of the type outlawed in Bakke; but,
the majority made it clear that what it did was kill the affirmative action
244
program in question, not the principle of affirmative action.
Three Justices-Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall-dissented from
the judgment of the Court in a strongly reasoned opinion by Justice
245
Marshall accused the majority of "constitutionalizing its
Marshall.
246
wishful thinking,"
and he called their vision of equal protection
247
"cramped."
He found the evidence Richmond provided adequate.
Besides statistics showing that minority-owned businesses have received
virtually no city contracting dollars and testimony that discrimination has
been widespread in the local construction industry, Marshall said that the
Richmond City Council also provided "the same . . . federal studies
248
relied on in Fullilove. "
Yet still, he pointed out, the affirmative action
program the Court struck down "is indistinguishable in all meaningful
respects from-and in fact was patterned upon-the federal set-aside
249
plan which the Court upheld in Fullilove."
Marshall could not comprehend why the Court should apply strict
scrutiny to race-conscious programs, like Richmond's, designed to
eliminate past discrimination, as distinguished from classifications that
discriminate against minorities. He contended, "A profound difference
separates governmental actions that themselves are racist, and
governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism or to
prevent neutral government activity from perpetuating the effects of such
250
racism."
He added,
In concluding that remedial classifications warrant no different
standard of review under the Constitution than the most brute and

243. /d. at 506.
244. /d. at 509 ("Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking action to
rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction.").
245. /d. at 528-{) I (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
246. /d. at 552.
247. !d. at561.
248. /d. at 529.
249. !d. at 528. Reinforcing Justice Marshall's argument regarding the adequacy of evidence is
that the affirmative action program upheld in Metro Broadcasting embodied a definition of minority
similar to the one the Court considered grossly overinclusive in Croson. See Metro Broadcasting v.
Fed. Commun. Commn., 497 U.S. 547, 565-66 (1997) (upholding the constitutionality, under the
Fifth Amendment, of the F.C.C.'s set-aside policy with a history of long-standing support from
Congress). The F.C.C. defined "minority" to include "those of Black, Hispanic Surnamed, American
Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at
554 n. I.
250. Croson, 488 U.S. at 551-52 (plurality opinion) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
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repugnant forms of state-sponsored racism, a majority of this Court
signals that it regards racial discrimination largely as a phenomenon of
the past, and that government bodies ~led no longer preoccupy
themselves with rectifying racial injustice?

Conversely, Justice O'Connor, in her opinion for the Court, asserted that
even if the Court did not believe generally in strict scrutiny of race-based
remedial measures, "'the circumstances of this case' require the Court to
look upon the Richmond City Council's measure with the strictest
252
253
Justice Marshall considered the assertion racist,
and
scrutiny."
contended that "such insulting judgments have no place in constitutional
254
He said the sole such circumstance the majority
jurisprudence."
pointed to was the fact that blacks in Richmond form a "dominant racial
group" in the city. He said he agrees that the numerical and political
supremacy of a given racial group is a factor bearing upon the level of
scrutiny to be applied, but that the Court has never held that numerical
inferiority, standing alone, makes a racial group "suspect" and thus
entitled to strict scrutiny review. Rather, the Court has identified other
"traditional indicia of suspectness" such as whether a group has been
"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
255
majoritarian political process."
Marshall believed whites (or non-minorities) in Richmond had no
256
Additionally, they did not
"history of purposeful unequal treatment."
have "any of the disabilities that have characteristically afflicted the
257
Indeed, he said, the numerical
groups the Court had deemed suspect."
and political dominance of non-minorities in Virginia and the Nation as a

251. !d. at 552.
252. !d. at 495.
253. /d. at 554 ("The majority's view that remedial measures undertaken by municipalities
with black leadership must face a stiffer test of equal protection scrutiny than remedial measures
undertaken by municipalities with white leadership implies a lack of political maturity on the part of
this Nation's elected minority officials that is totally unwarranted."). While Justice Marshall did not
use the term racism, the word describes what he meant here. Racism is "the predication of decisions
and policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and
· t · · g control over it." See e.g. Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 6 (citalion omitted). The set of
mam amm
.
f h.
m cy or black
ideas used in the U.S. to justify and maintain racism is the Jdeology o w Jte supre a
.
inferiority. !d. For an exhaustive analysis on the nature of racism and wh1te supremacy m Amenca,

consult Hacker, supra n. 42.
2 54 . Croson, 488 u.s. at 555 (plurality opinion) (Marshall, J.,joined by Blackmun & Brennan,
JJ ., dissenting).
255. Jd. at 553 (citing San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973)).
256. !d. at 553.
257. !d.
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whole provides an enormous political check against the "simple racial
258
"If
politics" at the municipal level which the majority fears.
anything," he said, "the 'circumstances of this case' [the majority refers
to] underscore the importance of not subjecting to a strict scrutiny
straitjacket the increasing number of cities which have recently come
under minority leadership and are eager to rectify, or at least prevent the
259
perpetuation of, past racial discrimination."
Following Croson, Adarand further exemplified the Court's hostility
toward affirmative action. Adarand involved a federal affirmative action
program in federal contracts for highway construction. The program
provided monetary bonuses to prime contractors who subcontracted at
least ten percent of the overall amount to "disadvantaged business
60
enterprises" (DBE)? These DBEs were defined to include small
businesses owned and operated by minority groups, such as African
Americans, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans. Like in Croson,
Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court. Also like in Croson,
the Court acknowledged, "the unhappy persistence of both the practice
and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups
261
in this country is an unfortunate reality."
Still, again like in Croson, it
applied strict scrutiny, but here the case was decided under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, since a federal program was
involved. The Court overruled its previous decision in Metro
262
Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission;
not only
would all race-conscious preferential programs, regardless of which level
of government that designed them, now be subject to strict scrutiny,
Justice O'Connor said, "the standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
263
The Court remanded the case
benefited by a particular classification."
to the lower court for reexamination consistent with that review standard.
Besides joining the judgment of the Court, Justices Scalia and
Thomas authored separate concurrences in which the~ contended that
2 4
Justice Scalia
affirmative action programs are never permissible.
stated that "government can never have a 'compelling interest' in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

!d. at 554.
!d.
Adarand, 515 U.S. 200,208.
!d. at 237.

497 U.S. 547 (1990). See infra n. 295 and accompanying text.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222.
See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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265

He said that "under our
discrimination in the opposite direction."
Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor
266
He maintained that pursuit of "the concept of racial
race."
entitlement ... is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of
267
thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred."
He concluded "In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
26 8
Justice Thomas denounced race-conscious preference
American."
269
He said preferences designed to
programs as a "racial paternalism."
270
help people are as noxious as preferences that oppress.
"In each
271
instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple."
Also, he said,
affirmative action programs, such as the one here at issue, are "at war
with the princ!Jile of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our
2
Constitution,"
and that they "undermine the moral basis of the equal
273
What is more, he said, this "governmentprotection principle."
sponsored racial discrimination" suggests minorities cannot compete
.
274
275
Without help,
provokes resentment from people not favored,
stamps
276
"a badge of inferiority" among beneficiaries,
and engenders
277
among other ills. In a
dependency on government assistance,
statement meant specifically to counteract language in Justice Stevens's
dissent, he wrote
I believe that there is a "moral [and] constitutional equivalence"
between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute
benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of
equality. Government cannot make us equal:2 kt can only recognize,
7
respect, and protect us as equal before the law.

Four Justices, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, rejected the
application of strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action pro~ams.
79
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, each authored a separate dissent.
In

265. !d. at 239 (Scalia, J ., concurring).
266. !d.
267. !d.
268. !d.
269. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring).
270. !d. at 241.
271. !d.
272. !d. at 240.
273. /d.
274. /d. at 241.
275. !d.
276. !d.
277. !d.
278. !d. at 240.
279. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 270---76 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at
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her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court itself acknowledged
the unfortunate reality embodied in the unhappy persistence of both the
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against
80
minority groups in this country? "Those effects, reflective of a system
of racial caste only recently ended, are still evident in our workplaces,
281
Remedial programs like the affirmative
markets, and neighborhoods."
action programs at issue, which the Court disapproved of, were adopted
282
by Congress to respond to these unhappy effects
and to help finally
realize the equal protection of the law that the Fourteenth Amendment
283
The effects remain because, for most of its
had promised since 1868.
284
history, the U.S. did not embrace the idea that "we are just one race."
Instead, "[f]or generations, our lawmakers and judges were unprepared
to say that there is in this land no superior race, no race inferior to any
285
She said barriers still exist, products of "traditional and
other."
unexamined habits of thoughts," needing to be eradicated in order for
"equal op~ortunity and nondiscrimination" to genuinely take root in this
country.
She pled that the divisions in this case would "not obscure
the Court's recognition of the persistence of racial inequality" and the
Court's very own acknowledgment of Congress's authority to act
affirmatively to end racial discrimination and counteract its lingering
87
effects?
In his dissent, Justice Souter indicated that an affirmative action plan
may still be constitutionally permissible, though it may have a negative
effect on innocent parties who bear no :flersonal responsibility for the
88
discriminatory conduct, if it is temporary.
"[I]f the justification for the
preference is eliminating the effects of a past practice, the assumption is
that the effects will themselves recede into the past, becoming attenuated
289
and finally disappearing. "
Finally, Justice Stevens, in his own dissent, complained that the
Court "ignore[d] a difference, fundamental to our constitutional system,
290
And it also
between the Federal Government and the States."
264-70 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 242-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
280. !d. at 273 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting).
281. !d.
282. /d.
283. /d. at 274.
284. !d. at 275.
285. !d. at 272.
286. !d. at 274.
287. /d.
288. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 270 (Souter, J.,joined by Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ, dissenting).
289. /d.
290. !d. at 264 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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"ignore[ d] a difference, fundamental to the idea of equal protection,
291
between oppression and assistance."
He stated:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate
racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of
oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the
power of the majority. Remedial race-based prefer~~~es reflect the
opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society.

Before Croson and Adarand, the Supreme Court applied
intermediate scrutiny in evaluating challenges to affirmative action
programs designed by Congress. Under this review standard, raceconscious measures, designed to remedy past discrimination, were
considered constitutional if they "serve[ d] important governmental
interest and [were] substantially related to the achievement of those
293
purposes."
Unlike strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny does not
require the entity setting up an affirmative action program to establish
specific findings of discrimination. Such intermediate review was
294
applied in Metro Broadcasting.
There, speaking for the Court, Justice
Brennan ruled that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by
Congress ... are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve
important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are
295
substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
Intermediate
review was also the standard applied in Fullilove, where the Court ruled
that Congress need not establish specific findings of discrimination
because it has broad authority and an affirmative du~ to react to and
6
address discrimination as a matter of national concern.
There, too, the
Court acknowledged that "Congress, not the courts, has the heavy burden
297
of dealing with a host of intractable economic and social problems,"
and that no organ of government, whether state or federal, possesses a
more comprehensive constitutional power "competence and authority to
298
enforce the equal protection guarantees."
Perceptive legal scholars, such as Professor Wu and Professor Pillai,
view Adarand negatively. Wu assessed that Adarand "render[ed]

291. !d. at 264.
292. !d. at 243.
293. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519.
294. 497 U.S. 547.
295. !d. at 564-65.
296. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517-23 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment).
297. !d. at 486.
298. !d. at 483.
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affirmative action the constitutional equivalent of invidious racial
299
discrimination."
Pillai argues that by its "shifting and unprincipled"
interpretation in Adarand and other cases, the Supreme Court deprives
Congress of its "significant remedial and enforcement power" under the
300
Fourteenth Amendment.
He warns that this "indiscriminate and
unprincipled restructuring of the Fourteenth Amendment" risks
"undermining the integrity of the constitutional process of
301
adjudication."
Soon after Croson, a debate ensued over whether the
ruling created insuperable obstacles to creation of affirmative action
programs by state and local governments. It took reassurance embodied
in a statement released by a group of leading constitutional scholars
before state and local governments became encouraged to resume their
.
.
302
a ffi1rmat1ve actwn programs.
3. The Michigan Cases
Grutter and Gratz involved challenges to the affirmative action
programs of the University of Michigan, a public educational institution
owned and funded by the State of Michigan. The challenges came from
both disgruntled Caucasian men and women, a departure from earlier
challenges undertaken only by white males. The cases were sponsored by
the Center for Individual Rights (CIR), a Washington D.C. public policy
law firm and an organization that, before now, scouted for and sponsored
plaintiffs in cases challenging affirmative action in Texas and
03
Washington?
Grutter involved the University of Michigan's Law

299. Frank H. Wu, The Pragmatism of Bakke, 64 Black Issues in Higher Educ. (back cover),
(June 25, 1998).
300. K. G. Jan Pillai, In Defense of Congressional Power and Minority Rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 68 Miss. L.J. 431, 519 (1998). The other ruling Professor Pillai refers to is
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), where the Supreme Court invalidated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994) enacted by Congress,
pursuant to its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.
30 I. /d. at 519 n. 430. Pillai recalled the wisdom of the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin who
advised the Court not "to nourish the cynical views ... that constitutional law is only a matter of
which President appointed the last few justices." /d. (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The
Moral Reading of the American Constitution 57 (Harv. U. Press 1996)).
302. See Tribe et al., Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After Croson, 98
Yale L.J. 1711 ( 1989).
303. See June Kronholz, Does A White Mom Add Diversity?, Wall St. J. 83 (June 25, 2003).
Although it bears a deceptively liberal-sounding name, the CIR is a conservative advocacy
organization which, along with other groups, had been conducting a nationwide campaign of
lawsuits to dismantle race-conscious preferences. See Vernon Jarrett, Beware! Old Race War Still
On'. Chi. Defender (May 10, 2003). The tactics, of these conservative advocacy groups, of using the
courts reminds one of the NAACP's own "fighting segregation through litigation" strategy, see
supra n. 200. The main difference, however, is that the NAACP turned to the courts because its
leaders felt relatively powerless in the ordinary politics of lobbying Congress and the President.
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School affirmative action program. Gratz concerned the University's
undergraduate affirmative action plan, specifically that of the College of
Liter~ture, Science, and the Arts. Although they may look different,
standmg for two diametrically different outcomes, certain key factors
link the cases. First, the Supreme Court "repudiated the argument in both
cases that racial classifications are always odious" and "rejected the
304
claim that race no longer matters. " Instead, in Grutter, as well as in
Gratz, the high court gave its "imprimatur to holistic considerations of
race" by universities for purposes of realizing the benefits of diversity. 305
Second, the two decisions, between them, "reinforce the importance of
employing flexible and individualized considerations of race in
306
admissions."
In both, as Professor Guinier points out, the Supreme
Court drew a line between "considerations of race that are nuanced, on
one hand, and 'mechanistic,' on the other. The former are permissible,
307
the latter suspect."
(i) Grutter v. Bollinger

The University of Michigan Law School maintained an admissions
policy that sought to achieve student body diversity based on Justice
308
Powell's opinion in Bakke.
The policy emphasized applicants'
academic ability and a flexible assessment of their talents, experiences,
and potentials. It required admissions officials to evaluate each applicant
based on all the information available in the file, including a personal
statement, letters of recommendation, an essay describing how the
These right-wing groups, in contrast, are turning to the courts in their opposition to affirmative
action, even though they have powerful friends in Congress and enjoy the advantage of being on the
same emotional wavelength with the President. One scholar dubbed the tactics of these groups "legal
guerilla warfare." Boston & Nair-Reichert, supra n. 233, at 4. However, except for the
circumspectness in their names, there is little that is subterranean or non-regular about the tactics and
operations of these groups. The activities of these conservative advocacy groups cannot but call to
mind the method of operation of so-called Redeemers who, hiding under the cover of their equally
innocent-sounding name, worked hard during the Reconstruction to undo black civil rights. See
Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 35.
304. Guinier, supra n. 9; see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court "acknowledges" that educational institutions "are not barred from
any and all consideration ofrace when making admissions decisions").
305. Guinier, supra n. 9.
306. See Kerstin Forsythe, Student Author, Racial Preference and Affirmative Action in Law
School Admissions: Reactions from Minnesota Law School.~ and Ramifications for Higher Education
in the Wake of'Grutter v. Bollinger, 25 J. Pub. L. & Policy 157, 158 n. 5 (Fall2003).
307. Guinier, supra n. 9. As Professor Guinier elegantly puts it, "[a)s long as the decision
maker is 'hand picking' rather than machine sorting, the decision maker is free to consider race as
one of many factors in order to realize the benefits of diversity." !d.
308. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312-16, 318-20, for an encapsulation of the history and features
of the policy in question.
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applicant would contribute to law school life and diversity, and the
applicant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and law school
admission test score (LSAT). The policy also required officials to look
beyond grades and scores to so-called "soft variables," such as
recommenders' enthusiasm, quality of undergraduate institution(s)
attended, the applicant's ess~, and the areas and difficulty of
3
undergraduate course selection.
The policy did not define diversity solely in terms of racial and
ethnic status, and did not "restrict the types of diversity contributions
310
eligible for substantial weight."
However, it reaffirmed the law
school's longstanding commitment to one particular type of diversity,
namely, "racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the
inclusion of students from groups which have been historically
discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native
Americans, who, without this commitment, might not be represented" in
the law school's student body in a critical mass or meaningful
311
number.
In short, as part of its goal of "assembling a class that is both
exceptionally academically qualified and broadly diverse," the law
school seeks to enroll a "critical mass" of under-represented minority
students who will contribute to the law school's character and to the legal
. 312
pro fiesswn.
In Grutter, the law school denied admission to Barbara Grutter, a
white Michigan resident with a GPA of 3.8 and an LSAT score of
313
161.
Ms. Grutter challenged the admissions policy, alleging that the
law school discriminated against her based on her race, contrary to the
314
She contended that the
U.S. Constitution and applicable federallaws.
law school's use of race as a predominant factor gave minority applicants
a significantly greater chance of admission than students with similar
credentials from disfavored racial groups, and that the law school had no
compelling interest to justify its use of race in making admissions
. .
3"'15
deClSlOnS.
309. !d. at 336--39.
310. Jd. at 316.
311. ld. at 313-16.
312. !d. at 316. "Critical mass" means that under-represented groups are enrolled at a variable
or unspecified, meaningful number that promotes participation in the classroom by members of these
groups without making them feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race. /d. at 318-19.
313. 539 U.S. at 316-17. For more information on this applicant, by the admissions officer of
the law school at the time Ms. Grutter applied for admission and who reviewed her application, see
Dennis J. Shields, A View from the Files: Law School Admissions and Affirmative Action, 51 Drake
L. Rev. 731-52 (2003).
314. See supra n. 20 for a highlight of the constitutional and statutory provisions involved in
this and other affirmative action challenges.
315. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317,329.
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
found the law school's use of race as a factor in decision-making relating
316
· h c·trcmt
· c ourt ofA ppea1s, stttmg
· · en
to admissions unlawful.
T h e Stxt
bane, reversed, holding that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was
binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling state interest. It
also ruled that the use of race by the law school was narrowly tailored,
given that race was merely a "potential 'plus' factor" in admissions
decision, and the affirmative action program under challenge was
"virtually identical" to the Harvard admissions program that Justice
17
Powell endorsed and appended to his opinion in Bakke?
The
petitioners requested Supreme Court review and the Court granted
.
. 318
cert10ran.
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals;
19
Justice O'Connor authored the judgment of the Court? Two questions
were presented before the Court. The first was whether diversity of a
school's student body was a compelling governmental interest that
justified the use of race in admissions decisions. The second was whether
the use of race was narrowly tailored to further the interest in diversity
the law school sought to achieve. The Court answered these two
320
questions in the affirmative,
anchoring its holdings on Justice

316. !d. at 321. The district court did not consider the law school's asserted interest in a diverse
student body compelling because "the attainment of a racially diverse class ... was not recognized
as such by Bakke and it is not a remedy for past discrimination." !d. at 321 (quoting the District
Court). The court said, assuming diversity was a compelling use ofrace, it was not narrowly tailored
to further that interest. For example, it took the law school to task for failing to consider race-neutral
alternatives, such as "using a lottery system" or "decreasing the emphasis for all applicants on
undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores." !d. at 340.
317. !d. at 321.
318. Grutterv. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002).
319. Sandra Day O'Connor ( 1930--2006), the first woman to serve on the Supreme Court, is a
Republican from Arizona appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981. Her appointment ended
191 years of male exclusivity on the high court. She replaced another Republican, Justice Potter
Steward, appointed by President Dwight Eisenhower. Steward served on the Court from 1958 to
1981. True to the expectations of the Reagan administration, which appointed her, Justice O'Connor
has maintained a generally conservative voting record on issues relating to civil rights and liberties.
For one account on Justice O'Connor's background, voting record before this case, and judicial
philosophy, see Hensley et a!., supra n. 3, at 69-71. After twenty-four years on the high court,
Justice O'Connor retired on July I, 2005, pledging in a letter to President George W. Bush
announcing her decision, "I will leave (the court] with enormous respect for" its integrity "and its
role under our constitutional structure." Supreme Court Justice 0 'Connor Retiring, Associated Press
(July
I,
2005)
(available
at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8430976/page/2/print/l/displaymode/1 098/) (accessed Oct. 7, 2005).
320. To get to the substantive issues, Justice O'Connor disposed a number of underbrush
matters. There was first the matter of whether the petitioner had standing to sue. Yes, she said, citing
the Supreme Court's opinion in Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors ofAmerica
v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993). Jacksonville, discussed below, lowered the requirement for
"injury in fact" in equal protection cases. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317. Next was whether Justice
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321

Powell's opinion in Bakke.
Like Justice Powell in Bakke, the Court
gave deference to the law school's judgment that attainment of a diverse
322
student body is at the heart of its educational mission.
The "important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and
323
thought associated with the university environment,"
among other
things, justified the deference.
The Court insisted that the benefits of diversity are real and
substantial, not theoretical, pointing to the plentiful amicus curiae briefs
324
that the case garnered in support of the law school.
"[T]he diffusion of
knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher
education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or
325
ethnicity."
The Court referred back to its decision in Brown, in 1954,
where it reco~nized that "education ... is the very foundation of good
3 5
citizenship."
Elite public educational institutions, like the University
of Michigan, form "the training ground for a large number of our
327
Nation's leaders."
"Effective participation by members of all racial
and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream
328
of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized."
"[T]o cultivate a set of
leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that
the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
329
individuals of every race and ethnicity."
With particular reference to

Powell's diversity rationale was binding precedent under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188
(1977). Marks came up because of the fractured nature of the Court's decision in Bakke. As Justice
O'Connor stated, "in the wake of [the] fractured decision ... [lower] courts have struggled to
discern whether Justice Powell's diversity rationale, set forth in part of the opinion joined by no
other justice, is nonetheless binding precedent under Marks." Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 325. Marks stands
for the proposition that "[ w ]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Marks, 430
U.S. at 193 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But the test the Court set up in that case
is more "easily stated than applied," O'Connor conveyed, and it was not necessary for the resolution
of the present case to decide whether Powell's opinion was binding precedent under Mark~. Gruffer,
539 U.S. at 325.
321. Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 322-27,334-44.
322. Jd. at 328-29.
323. !d. at 329.
324. /d. at 330-31.
325. /d. at 331. Amazingly, given its opposition to race-conscious programs, the United States
agreed with this position. Its brief, quoted by the Court, stated that "ensuring that public; institutions
are open and available to all segments of American society, including people of all races and
ethnicities, represents a paramount government objective." !d. at 331-32. Citing this statement,
Justice O'Connor pulled through a clever masterstroke that reinforces her point.
326. /d. at 331 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
327. /d. at 332 (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634 ).
328. !d.
329. !d.
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law schools, access to legal education and the legal profession "must be
inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may
participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and
. necessary to succee d m
. Amenca.
. ,330
e ducatwn
The Court ruled that the law school did not give too much weight to
or make race too decisive in decision-making relating to student
admissions. Instead, the Court held that the admissions program
"adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to student body
diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions
331
decisions."
Put differently, the law school "seriously weighs many
other diversity factors besides race that can make a real and dispositive
332
difference for non-minority applicants as well."
The Court also said
the law school's goal of enrolling a critical mass of under-represented
minority is a concept "defined by reference to the educational benefits
333
that diversity is designed to produce"
that does not, therefore, rise to
334
335 Th
. . 1 rac1a
. 1 b a1ancmg
.
. b etween
or quota.
e connectiOn
unconstJtuttona
critical mass and educational benefits of diversity is borne out by the fact
that when a critical mass of under-represented minority students is
present, racial stereotypes lose their force because non-minority students
learn there is no "minorit~ viewpoint" but rather a variety of viewpoints
36
among minority students.
Finally, the race-conscious program under
challenge was a "highly individualized, holistic review of each
applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the wa;s an applicant
33
might contribute to a diverse educational environment."
In Bakke, Justice Powell said race could constitutionally be used to
form a plus factor to promote diversity in a public university's student
body, given a proper case. ln Grutter, the Court found that proper casean affirmative action plan narrowly tailored, without quotas, that used
338
race as a plus factor in the context of individualized consideration,
339
possessed "a logical end point,"
was attentive to race-neutral

330. !d. at 332-33.
331. !d. at 337.
332. !d. at 338.
333. !d. at 330.
334. !d. at 329-30; see also id. at 336 (rebutting Chief Justice Rehnquist's contention).
335. !d. at 335-36.
336. See id. at 319-20.
337. !d. at 337.
338. !d. at 341-42; see also id. at 337 (stating that the law school program is a "highly
individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.").
339. !d. at 342-43.
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alternatives (which is not to suggest that every conceivable race-neutral
340
and was not unduly harmful to innocent
alternative be exhausted),
.
341
parties.
In addition to joininf the majority opinion, Justices Ginsburg wrote a
34
She agreed with the Court that there must be a
separate concurrence.
logical endpoint to preferential programs, something she said "accords
with the international understanding of the office of affirmative
343
However, Justice Ginsburg did not agree with the application
action."
of strict scrutiny to inclusive affirmative action programs such as the one
here at issue, but saw no basis for objection, given that the admissions
344
policy under challenge withstood strict scrutiny.
She also had a
problem with the Court's idea of a phase-out date for affirmative action.
Regarding the Court's observation that "[i]t has been twenty-five years
since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further an interest"
in diversity in public higher education, she pointed out that the law was
not settled during much of the period. As for the next twenty-five years,
within which the Court speculated that affirmative action would not be
necessary to further an interest in diversity, she said "well documented"
evidence exists of discrimination and biases in many areas, including
access to public education, that "imped[e] realization of our highest
345
values and ideals."
Accordingly, "[t]rom today's vantage point, one
may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation's span,
progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will
346
make it safe to sunset affirmative action."
Four justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas, each separately dissented from the judgment of the
340. /d. at 339.
341. !d. at 341.
342. !d. at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring).
343. The two global human rights treaties that Justice Ginsburg cited, id. at 344, are the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forrns of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), and
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forrns of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W). The
ICERD stipulates that preferential measures "shall in no case entail as a consequence the
maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which
they were taken have been achieved." The CEDA W stipulates that "temporary special measures
aimed at accelerating de facto equality ... shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of
opportunity and treatment have been achieved." The ICERD was ratified by the U.S. in 1994; the
CEDAW in 1980. For texts of these documents, see 25+ Human Rights Documents (2001) at 37-44
(the ICERD) and 45-53 (the CEDA W). Following this concurrence and her dissent in Gratz, Justice
Ginsburg wrote a piece published in a law review amplifying the value of a comparative perspective.
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective,
22 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 329 (2004).
344. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (unnumbered footnote preceded only by asterisk).
345. !d. at 345-46.
346. /d. at 346.
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Court? 47 In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that the
Court's strict scrutiny was not strict enough. Not only did the Court give
"unprecedented" deference to the law school's educational
judgment as
348
it also "casually
to the educational benefit of a diverse student body,
subverted" the duration of relief, an important component of strict
assurances" that its
scrutiny, by accepting the law school's "vaguest of349
The Chief Justice
affirmative action program would not be permanent.
also opined that the law school discriminated against minorities (in favor
350
.
. or smok escreen of cntlca
. . 1 mass.
of black app 11cants)
un der th e gmse
Justice Kennedy, in his own dissent, echoed the views of the Chief
Justice, maintaining that the Court's deference to the law school's
educational judgment is of a magnitude so inconsistent with352strict
scrutin/ 51 that it works an "abandonment" of the review standard.
Justice Scalia mockingly questioned the educational benefit
embedded in diversity-which he says "is a lesson of life rather than
law" taught to children, such as Boy Scouts and kindergartners, as
353
opposed to full-grown adults at law schools.
He also poured scorn on
concepts like critical mass which throughout his dissent he enclosed in
354
"fabled" (citing
quotes and alternately referred to as "mystical, "
355
Justice Thomas approvingly),
and "a sham to cover a scheme of
356
racially proportionate admissions. "
He believed the case raised

347. ld. at 378-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Kennedy, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); id.
at 387-95 (Kennedy, J ..' dissentmg); id. at 346-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.,
concurrmg m part and dissentmg m part); id. at 349-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.,
concurnng In part and dissenting in part).
" 348. See id. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Kennedy, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting)
( Although the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that
review is unprecedented in its deference.").

349. !d. at 386-87.
350. !d. at 379-86, including id. at 379, where the Chief Justice wrote, "stripped of its 'critical
mass' veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing."
35 I. !d. at 394 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) ("Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not
consistent with it.").
352. !d. Justice Kennedy does not think anything, including the Court stipulation of a possible
phase-out date for race-conscious programs affirmative, mitigates any imaginary damage done to
strict scrutiny. /d. ("[N)either petitioner nor other rejected law school applicants will find solace in
knowing the basic protection put in place by Justice Powell will be suspended for a full quarter of a
century.").
353. !d. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
354. /d. at 346.
355. /d. at 347.
356. ld. During oral arguments in the case, Scalia characterized critical mass as a euphemism
for quota. As he reportedly put it, "once you use the terms 'critical mass,' you're in Quota Land."
(cited In Charles Lane, O'Co~nor Questions Foes ofU-Michigan Policy, Wash. Post AOI (Apr. 2,
2003)). Scaha beheved Michigan brought the problem upon itself by creating an elite law school.
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numerous questions, relating to issues like critical mass and
individualized consideration, among others, that would form the basis for
357
future litigation.
He concluded, "[t]he Constitution proscribes
government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided
. .
. ,358
educatwn 1s no exceptwn.
Justice Thomas's dissent was by far the most wordy of all the
359
dissents, matching the judgment of the Court in length.
Thomas began
with a quote attributed to the black abolitionist, Frederick Douglass
(1817-95), delivered in Boston in 1865, regarding "What the Black Man
Wants." Douglass urged white people to "Do nothing" with blacks
because their interference was doing blacks positive injury. Thomas said,
"Like Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of
360
American life without the meddling of university administrators."
He
361
said Douglass's message was "lost on today's majority,"
whom he
accused of "uphold[ing] the Law School's racial discrimination, not by
interpreting the people's Constitution, but by responding to a faddish
362
slogan of the cognoscenti."
Thomas had a problem not just with the
majority but also with the Powell opinion in Bakke, upon which the
majority based its judgment. "Both," he said, "rest on the fundamentally
flawed proposition that racial discrimination can be contextualized so
that a goal ... can be compelling in one context but not in another. This
'we know it when we see it' approach to evaluating state interests is not
363
Thomas said there was no
capable of judicial application."

Why not achieve diversity, he quizzed, by making the state school less "exclusive," rather than
"hav[ing] a super-duper law school?" See Gary Wasserman, Politics in Action: Cases in Modern
American Government 33 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2006) (citing Linda Greenhouse, Justices Look for
Nuance in Race-Preference Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 2003). The university's counsel replied, "I
don't think there's anything in this [C]ourt's cases that suggests that the law school has to make an
election between academic excellence and racial diversity." /d. at 33-34.
357. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348--49 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
358. /d. at 349.
359. His opinion was twenty-nine pages long, compared to the Court's little more than thirtytwo-page opinion. /d.
360. /d. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Some analysts have criticized Thomas for his reference to Douglass. Douglass, who worked
for black equality, wanted whites to do nothing to keep blacks in bondage and would not mind
preferential programs designed to achieve that purpose. In contrast, Thomas is no abolitionist in any
sense and categorically opposes all kinds of preferential programs for blacks. See e.g. Jarrett, supra
n. 39, who accused Thomas of "stab[bing] Douglass in [the] grave" by comparing himself to
Douglass. See also Thomas Shows !lis True Colors on Affirmative Action Ruling, supra n. 39.
361. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
362. /d. at 350.
363. /d. at 357.
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"articulated legal principle" to support the holding in Grutter, other than
"the benighted notions that one can tell when racial discrimination
benefits (rather than hurts) minority groups. . . and that racial
364
discrimination is necessary to remedy general societal ills."
He was
disappointed that "the majority still cannot commit to the principle that
racial classifications are per se harmful and that almost no amount of
365
benefit in the eye ofthe beholder can justify such classifications."
Justice Thomas said the Constitution forbids racial classifications
"not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are
based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the
government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to
366
the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us al1."
Thomas
claimed darkly: "[c]ontained within today's majority opinion is the seed
367
of a new constitutional justification for ... racial segregation."
He
said Michigan "tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a
University of Michigan degree and all of the opportunities that it offers.
These overmatched students take the bai~ only to find that they cannot
68
succeed in the cauldron of competition."
He claims "the majority of
blacks" admitted to the law school based on affirmative action "all are
tarred as undeserving," adding:
This problem of stigma does not depend on determinacy as to whether
those stigmatized are actually the 'beneficiaries' of racial
discrimination. When blacks take positions in the highest places of
government, industry, or academic, it is an open que:rJ~on today
whether their skin color played a part in their advancement.

The only portion of the majority opinion Thomas partially agreed
with was the part about affirmative action not being necessary in twentyfive years. However, even here he could not completely agree with his
colleagues: "I believe that the Law School's current use of race violates
the Equal Protection Clause and that the Constitution means the same
370
thing today as it will in 300 months."
He accused the Court of
granting the law school "a [twenty-five]-year license to violate the
. . ,371
C onstitutwn.

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

!d. at 3 71.
!d.
!d. at 353.
!d. at 365-66.
!d. at 372.
/d. at 373.

370. /d. at 351. See also id. at 375 ("While I agree that in (twenty-five] years the practices of
the Law School will be illegal, they are, for the reasons I have given, illegal now.").
371. !d. at 370.
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Although his dissent tracks those of the other dissenters, he went far
beyond them, and his criticism was more thorough and biting. Thomas
believed the Court deferred too much to the law school's educational
372
judgment.
He believed not just that strict scrutiny was
373
compromised,
but that the program under review could never
withstand strict scrutiny since, according to him, the school's claimed
compelling government interest was a "fabricated" one, designed to
374
He questioned the interest in
maintain its own elite image and status.
375
He mocked diversity alternately as
diversity and critical mass.
376
377
"aesthetic"
and "trivial."
Thomas called preferences not based on
race, such as "legac( preferences elite schools extend to the children of
78
379
alumni, "unseemly" but said the Constitution does not forbid them.
He claimed, however, that "[w]ere this court to have the courage to
forbid the use of racial discrimination in admissions, legacy preferences
380
He
(and similar practices) might quickly become less popular. ... "
opined that extension of special preferences for black students to law
schools like Michigan gave them little incentive to prepare for and
381
In
achieve high scores on the law school admissions test (LSAT).
sum, in Grutter, Justice Thomas elaborated, in many words, the
declamation embodied in his concurrence in Gratz that the Constitution
382
"categorically" forbids racial preferences.
(ii) Gratz v. Bollinger

In Gratz, the Supreme Court invalidated the University of Michigan

372. See id. at 350, 362-64.
373. See id. at 351-54, 357-62.
374. See id. at 357, 360--{)1.
375. !d. at 354, 374-78.
376. See id. at 355 n. 3, where Thomas explained: 'That is, the Law School wants to have a
certain appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of the
students sitting at them." See also id. at 372 where he maintained that "[t]he Law School seeks only
a facade-it is sufficient that the class looks right, even if it does not perform right." He also posited
that diversity "does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher education
and therefore presents only an illusory solution to the challenges facing our Nation." !d. at 355 n. 3.
377. !d. at 357.
378. !d. at 368.
379. !d. ("[W]hile legacy preferences can stand under the Constitution, racial discrimination
cannot.").
380. !d. at 368 n. 10.
381. !d. at 377. Note that this statement is at variance with the views of legal educators and
jurists who regard the LSA T as biased in favor of white law applicants. In De Funis, Justice Douglas
argued that "a good start" in the design of a racially neutral law school admissions regime would be
to abolish the LSAT. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 340 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
382. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring).

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

1]

57

College of Literature, Science, and the Arts undergraduate admission
system that awarded twenty points to under-represented minorities made
up of African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans. Two
Caucasian applicants, Jennifer Gratz, female, and Patrick Hamacher,
male, were denied admission into the program and challenged this race(or point-) conscious admissions system. As in Grutter, the petitioners
alleged that the University's use of race violated their rights to
nondiscriminatory treatment under the U.S. Constitution, Title VI of the
383
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Section 1981.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
384
granted the petitioners' motion for a class-action lawsuit,
designating
385
The district court ruled not only
Hamacher as the class representative.
that the University could use race to diversify its student body, but that it
also presented "solid evidence" that its use of race was designed to
386
achieve a compelling governmental interest.
The court next turned to
whether the use of race was narrowly tailored to achieve the interest the
University sought to achieve. The University changed its admissions
387
guidelines a number of times during the period relevant to the lawsuit.
The court found that the use of race embodied in the University's
admissions guidelines for the periods 1999-2000 were narrowly
388
389
tailored,
but those of 1995-1998 were not.
Regarding the years
1999-2000, the district court concluded that the award of twenty points
.
d th e
.
. . was not a quota390 an d reJecte
to un d er-represente d mmontles
petitioners assertion that the program at issue operated like the two-track
391
system Justice Powell found objectionable in Bakke.
It also rejected
their assertion that the admissions system was a tool for achieving racial
392
balancing.
The University did not seek to achieve a certain proportion
of minority students, it said, "let alone a proportion that represents the
393
What made the guidelines for 1995-1998 problematic,
community. "
compared to those of 1999-2000, the district court said, related to the
University's prior practice of "protecting" or "reserving" seats for underrepresented minorities, which effectively precluded non-protected
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

See supra nn. 20, 314.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 253.
!d. at 253-54.
!d. at 258.
!d. at 253-57.
!d. at 258.
!d. at 259.
!d. at 258.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 258--59.
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394

This system, it said,
applicants from competing for those slots.
operated as the functional equivalent of the kind of quota Justice Powell
95
found constitutionally objectionable in Bakke?
Each side appealed its negative ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals that heard the case en bane but had not let issued its decision by
39
the time the Supreme Court granted review.
The petitioners argued
that the University did not base its use of race in undergraduate
admissions on remediation of identified discrimination but rather on
diversity which, they maintained, "is simply too open-ended, ill-defined,
and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest capable of supporting
397
narrowly-tailored means."
But, they said, assuming the Court ruled
the University's interest in diversity constitutes a compelling state
interest, it did not narrowly tailor its use of race because its
undergraduate admissions guidelines do not "remotely resemble the kind
of consideration of race and ethnicity that Justice Powell endorsed in
398
Bakke."
The University refuted this allegation, claiming that its
program "hew[ ed] closely" to both the admissions program Justice
Powell described in Bakke and the Harvard College admissions program
399
that Powell endorsed.
400
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the judgment of the Court.
Allan
Bakke, in the Bakke case, single-mindedly sought a medical education
from the University of California at Davis, and Barbara Grutter, in the
Grutter case, sought to attend the University of Michigan law school and
no other. But the petitioners in Gratz enrolled at other schools before

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

!d. at 259.
!d.

Gratz v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. I 044 (2002).
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268.
!d. at 269.
!d.

400. Rehnquist (1924-2005), a Republican from Arizona, appointed by President Richard
Nixon, joined the Court in 1971. He was promoted Chief Justice in 1986 by President Reagan. Many
civil rights and liberties groups strongly opposed his confirmation by the Senate. See Hensley et al.,
supra n. 3, at 64. He eventually won confirmation by a vote of sixty-eight in favor and twenty-six
against because of "his impressive academic credentials, his intellectual abilities, and his
performance in the Justice Department" under Nixon. !d. As a young law clerk for Justice Robert
Jackson in 1954, Rehnquist wanted to maintain the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson. !d. Rehnquist's "conservative legal and political views were well known before he came
to the Court." !d. at 63. His consistently conservative voting record in civil rights and liberties cases
bore out the apprehension of civil rights groups that he would be anti-civil rights. !d. at 64; see also
Baum, supra n. 50, at 149-50. Rehnquist had a judicial philosophy made up of a hierarchy of values,
which ranks federalism as the highest value, followed by property rights in the second level, and
individual rights occupying the lowest rung of his hierarchy. Hensley et al., supra n. 3, at 65. The
Chief Justice was part of a solid "conservative voting bloc" on the Court that included Justices Scalia
and Thomas. /d.
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they filed their complaint. Gratz enrolled at the University of Michigan at
Dearborn, where she graduated in 1999; Hamacher, who applied to the
University as a transfer student rather than as a freshman, enrolled at
401
So, a
Michigan State University, where he graduated in 2001.
preliminary issue important in every case, but more so here, was standing
to sue, particularly for injunctive or prospective relief. The Court
402
citing a series of
determined that such standing nevertheless existed,
cases that included Northeastern Florida Chapter, Associated General
403
Contractors of America v. Jacksonville.
There, the decision changed
404
the requirem~nt for "injury in fact" in equal protection cases.
Under
the standard established by that case, a party challenging a set-aside
program need only prove that she was denied the opportunity to compete
on an equal footing, rather than the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit
or the loss of the contract.
Having thus found standing to seek relief under Article III, the Court
moved to the merits of the case and addressed two issues. The first was
whether the use of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment; the Court
ruled that it did not, citing its opinion in the companion Grutter case for
405
Finding that the Constitution does not categorically preclude
support.
the use of race, it next considered whether the University narrowly
tailored its use of race to achieve the educational diversit¥ it sought. The
4
Citing Justice
Court found that the use was "not narrowly tailored."
Powell's opinion in Bakke it said there was no "individualized
407
consideration" of applicants.
Instead, "[t]he only consideration that
accompanie[d]" the award of twenty points to applicants from underrepresented minority groups was "a factual review of an application to
determine whether an individual is a member of one of these minority

°

401. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 260-D8.
402. !d.
403. Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors ()fAm. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S.
656 (1993).
404. !d. at 666.
405. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268; see also id. at 257.
406. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. The petitioners contested Michigan's argument that diversity rose
to a compelling government interest warranting the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions.
They said that the Court only sanctioned the use of race to remedy identified discrimination. !d. at
268. Diversity, they said, "is simply too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a
compelling interest." !d. As indicated, the Court disagreed. With respect to the use of race as a
remedy for identified discrimination, the Court simply stated that the University never relied on this
as justification for its use of race. !d. It is amazing that the petitioners would point to past
discrimination, given that the only interest warranting a constitutional use of race that Justice Powell
approved in Bakke was diversity. Bakke 438 U.S. at 306-10; see also Part ll(C)(l), supra (discussing
the Supreme Court and affirmative action up to Bakke).
407. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269-97 (discussing the Harvard College plan which Powell endorsed
and attached to his opinion in Bakke).
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408

groups."
Also, the Court said the bonus points made race a "decisive"
factor, rather than a plus factor, contrary to Justice Powell 's prescription
. B akke. 409
m
The Court disagreed with the University that tl~§ing certain
applicants for review by an admissions review committee
amounts to
411
It also disagreed with the University that
individualized consideration.
the large volume of applications to the undergraduate school renders
impractical an admissions system not based on points. Rather, it said,
"The fact that the implementation of a program capable of providing
individualized consideration might present administrative challenges
412
At
does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system."
any rate, "[n]othing in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke signaled that a
university may employ whatever means it desires to achieve the stated
goal of diversity without regard to the limits imposed by" strict
413
scrutmy.
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion wherein she
maintained that the admissions P.Olicy in Gratz was "a non[4 1
]individualized, mechanical one" P: that did "not provide for a
415
meaningful individualized review of applicants."
She distin§uished
16
The
the program in Gratz from the one the Court approved in Grutter.
plan in Gratz "ensures that the diversity contributions of applicants
417
cannot be individually assessed."
And it "stands in sharp contrast" to
the program in Grutter, "which enables admissions officers to make
nuanced judgments with respect to the contributions each applicant is
418
likely to make to the diversity of the incoming class. "
She said, "The
only potential source of individualized consideration appears to be the
419
Unfortunately, available evidence
Admissions Review Committee."
0

408. !d. at 271-72.
409. !d. at 272.
410. !d. at 256-57 (flagging system described).
411. For example, Rehnquist said, "The flagging program only emphasizes the flaws of the
University's system as a whole when compared to that described by Justice Powell," and what little
individualized review does takes place occurs after the fact, after points have been distributed to
benefited groups. !d. at 273.
412. !d. at 275.
413. !d.
414. !d. at 280 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
415. !d. at 276.
416. ld.at276-77.
417. !d. at 273 n. 29. The Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, quoted this statement
approvingly in rebutting Justice Souter's contention that "applicants to the undergraduate college are
not denied individualized consideration."
418. ld.at279.
419. !d.
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"reveals very little about [how] the review committee actually functions.
And what evidence there is indicated that the committee is a kind of
after-thought, rather than an integral component of a system of
420
individualized review."
She said she shared the opinion of the Court
that the committee "reviews only a portion of all the applications,"
421
In
leaving the majority of admissions decisions to be based on points.
short, she said, the flagging system did little "to offset the apparent
422
absence of individualized consideration. "
Justice Thomas, in his own concurring opinion, stated that the
factoring of race in higher education admissions "is categorically
423
He was also of the view
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause."
that a constitutionally permissible affirmative action plan should
"sufficiently allow for the consideration of non-racial distinctions among
under[-]represented minority applicants," an ingredient, he said, the
424
affirmative action plan under review lacked.
Justice Breyer joined in the judgment of the Court, but not its
425
He joined Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, except the
opinion.
426
and he agreed with the dissent of
part relating to the Court's opinion,
Justice Ginsburg to the effect that the Court should have properly
distinguished between policies of inclusion, which should be acceptable
under the Constitution, and f:olicies of exclusion, which should be
27
constitutionally impermissible.
Three Justices-Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens--dissented from the
428
Justice Ginsburg complained that the Court applied
Court's judgment.
strict scrutiny to all racial classifications both classifications that exclude
42 9
She said the Court's insistence
people, as well as those that include.
on one uniform standard of review for all classifications "would have
been fitting were our Nation free of the vestiges of rank discrimination
430
which it was not. Instead, the "effects of
long reinforced by law,"
centuries of law-sanctioned inequality ... remain painfully evident in our

420. !d. at 279-80.
421. !d. at 280.
422. !d.
423. !d. at 281 (Thomas, J ., concurring).
424. !d.
425. !d. at 281-82 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
426. !d. at 282; see also id. at 276-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
427. !d. at 282.
428. !d. at 298-309 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 291-98
(Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 282-91 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J.,
dissenting).
429. !d. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting).
430. !d.
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431

communities and schools."
These unwholesome effects are made
evident in the large disparities between whites and minority groups that
still exist in employment, wealth, access to health care, and education,
432
among other sectors,
"in the wake of a system of racial caste only
433
recently ended."
This is not to mention irrational prejudice, as well as
conscious and unconscious biases, that must come down before equal
434
opportunity and nondiscrimination take root in America.
Justice Ginsburg counseled that "[a]ctions designed to burden groups
long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures
taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its
435
aftereffects have been extirpated."
She explained that Supreme Court
jurisprudence ranks race a suspect category "not because [race] is
inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is one which
usually, to our national shame has been drawn for the purpose of
43 6
maintaining racial inequality."
But where race is considered to make
437
people equal, "no automatic proscription is in order."
In short, she
said, the Constitution, is both color blind and color conscious-color
blind in that, to avoid conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, a
classification that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden
must not be based on race; color conscious to prevent discrimination
438
being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.
She
argued that contemporary international human rights documents
distinguish between policies of oppression and measures designed to
439
accelerate de facto equality.
Applying that distinction, Justice Ginsburg saw no constitutional
440
infirmity in the program under review.
The petitioners did not dispute
that every applicant admitted under the current plan was qualified to
attend the College, there was no suggestion that the College adopted its
current policy in order to limit or decrease enrollment by any particular
racial or ethnic group, there were no seats reserved based on race, and

431. !d.
432. See id. at 299.
433. !d. (internal quotes omitted).
434. See id. at 300-0 I.
435. !d. at 30 I.
436. !d.
437. !d.
438. !d. at 302. Justice Ginsburg contended that arguing for non-application of strict scrutiny
for inclusive program does not mean insulation from careful judicial inspections. This is because
close review is needed to fish out malign classifications masquerading as benign, and to ensure that
preferences are not so large they unduly hurt innocent parties. !d.
439. !d. at 302 (citing the ICERD and the CEDA W). See also supra n. 343.
440. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303.
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there was no demonstration that the program in question unduli'
4
constricted admission opportunities for non-favored students.
Ginsburg disputed the contention in the brief of the United States that
"race-neutral alternatives" such as "percentage plans," which guarantee
admission to state universities for a fixed percentage (usually the top ten
to twenty percent) of students from the high school of an affected state,
would result in the enrollment of a meaningful number of minority
442
students.
These plans, experimented with in states like California,
Florida, Texas, and Washington, depend on continued racial segregation
443
at the secondary school level for their effectiveness.
And, since they
were designed to increase minority representation in the public higher
education system of the affected states, they were not race-neutral to
. wtt
"h444
begm
.
In removing "[t]he stain of generations of racial oppression" in our
society, Justice Ginsburg observed that institutions of higher learning
445
will seek to maintain their minority enrollment.
The issue is whether
they can do so in full candor through affirmative action programs such as
the one at issue here. Otherwise, schools may resort to all kinds of
446
camouflage designed to disguise their use of race in admissions.
"If
honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan's accurately described, fully
disclosed College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving
447
similar numbers through winks, nods, and disguises."
Responding to
Chief Justice Rehnquist's accusation that she suggests "changing the
Constitution so that it conforms to the conduct of the universities,"
Ginsburg maintained that "the Constitution, properly interpreted, permits
government officials to respond openly to the continuing importance of
race," and that, "[a]mong constitutionally permissible options, those that
candidly disclose their consideration of race seem to [her] preferable to
448
those that conceal it."
Justice Ginsburg noted the Court's
acknowledgment, in Gratz as well as in Grutter, that educational
institutions "are not barred from any and all consideration of race when
.
d . .
d . .
,449
rnak mg a mtsswns ectswns.
Justice Souter, like Justice Stevens, raised a standing issue in his

44!
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

!d.
!d. at 303 n. I 0.
!d.
See id. at 303-04 n. 10.
!d. at 304.
See id. at 304-05 for specification of these underhanded measures.
!d. at 305.
!d. at 305 n. I I.
!d. at 298.
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dissent. He believed Patrick Hamacher, one of the petitioners, who
applied to the University as a transfer student, had no standing to
challenge the "freshman's admissions policy that [would] never cause
. Stevens, he viewed
.
. any harm. ,450 L"k
h1m
1 e Justlce
the two as different
admissions policies. For example, the transfer policy used race, rather
than a points system, in assessing an applicant's contribution to diversity.
Such use of race, he said, permitted the inference that the University
engaged in a "holistic review" of transfer applicants consistent with the
451
program the Court upheld in Grutter.
In short, he would vacate the
c
lac k o f Juns d"Ictlon. 452 souter regarded the majority's
JUdgment 10r
th eory on stan d mg as mdu lgent, ,453 but he contended that not even its
"new gloss on the law of standing" should permit it to reach the issue it
dec1"ded .454
However, if a plaintiff with standing were to bring a similar case
requiring him to reach the merits, Souter would have affirmed the
judgment of the District Court and granted summary judgment to the
455
The University's freshman admissions system, the focus
University.
of attention in the dispute, "is closer to what Grutter approves than to
what Bakke condemns, and should not be held unconstitutional on the
l
457 mstead , the pan
l
current record." 456 Here, there was no quota m pace;
"lets all applicants compete for all places and values an applicant's
offering for any place not only on grounds of race, but on grades, test
scores, strength of high school, quality of course of study, residence,
alumni relationships, leadership, personal character, socioeconomic
458
disadvantage, athletic ability, and quality of a personal essay."
This
means that "[a] non[-]minority applicant who scores highly in these other
categories can readily garner a selection index exceeding that of a
mmonty app 1cant who gets the twenty-pomt bonus. ,459
According to Souter, the university policy in Gratz was almost
identical to the one envisioned by Powell in Bakke. Justice Powell's
description of a constitutionally permissible admission process is one
0

0

0

0

o

W

°

0

0

)"

°

0

450. !d. at 291 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 292.
451. !d. at 292 n. 2.
452. !d. at 298.
453. !d. at 292.
454. !d. at 290.
455. !d. at 298.
456. !d. at 293.
457. !d. See also id. at 296-97 ('The point system cannot operate as a de facto set-aside if the
greater admissions process, including review by the committee, results in individualized review
sufficient to meet the Court's standards.").
458. !d. at 293-94.
459. !d. at 294.
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which considers "all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the
particular qualifications of each applicant" and places each element "on
the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according
460
The only sense in which the program under
them the same weight."
challenge departed from this description was that it assigned an extra
.
.
. . . 461 H owever, Justlce
twenty pomts
to un der-represented mmontles.
Souter said this assignment did not set race apart from all other weighted
consideration, given that non-minority students may receive twenty
points for athletic ability, socioeconomic disadvantage, attendance at a
socio-economically disadvantaged or predominantly minority high
. . 462
sc h oo1, among oth er cntena.
Justice Souter contended that the Court's objection to the program
under challenge went to the use of points to quantify and compare
characteristics or to the number of points awarded due to race. But on
either reading, he said, the objection is mistaken. Concerning the use of
race for quantification, college admission is not something left entirely to
"inarticulate intuition," so there was nothing inappropriate in assigning
some stated value measured in numbers to a relevant characteristic, be it
463
reasoning ability, writing style, running speed, or minority race.
Justice Powell's plus factors were something colleges could reduce into
values in numbers; the college simply did by a numbered scale what the
464
Numbers therefore do
law school accomplishes by its holistic review.
465
not and should not spell denial of individualized consideration.
Additionally, assigning twenty points to race did not convert race
into an unconstitutional quota, but rather made it merely a plus factor. It
is possible to conceive of a points system where the "plus" factor
becomes so extreme it turns race into a decisive factor for minorities. But
the petitioners could not prove the freshman admissions system operated
466
Rather, the record shows that non-minority applicants may
this way.
achieve higher selection point totals than minority applicants due to
467
Also, the petitioners' contention in
characteristics other than race.
their brief that the University admitted "virtually every qualified underrepresented minority applicant" is unavailing because the occurrence
may reflect nothing more than the likelihood that very few qualified

460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.

/d. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).

!d.
/d. at 295.
/d.
/d.
See id.

!d. at 295~96.
!d. at 296.
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468

In short, there are no set-aside seats of the
minority applicants applied.
kind the Court disallowed in Bakke, and "consideration of an applicant's
whole spectrum of ability is no more ruled out by giving twenty points
for race than by giving the same points for athletic ability or
.
. d"1sadvantage. ,469
sociOeconomic
Souter believed the use of race was narrowly tailored to achieve the
interest in diversity the University aimed to achieve-even though the
award of a plus factor of twenty points, compared to, for example, ten
470
In the record, the
points, may make some observers suspicious.
absence of information about the actual working of the University's
admissions review committee charged with responsibility of conducting
individualized reviews did not mean individualized consideration did not
471
take place.
Without knowing more about how the admissions review board
actually functions, Souter said, "it seems especiall,t unfair to treat the
72
The University is
candor of the admissions plan as an Achilles' heel."
"forthright in saying just what plus factor" it gives to race, compared to
supposedly "race-neutral" alternatives like percentage plans, which
guarantee admission to a fixed percentage of the top students from each
473
While constitutional, he said, these plans deliberately
high school.
474
obfuscate
and they might be pointless in a state like Michigan where
minorities are a much smaller fraction of the population than they are in
475
At any rate, these plans are also just as
California, Florida, or Texas.
race-conscious as the point scheme, only they get their racially diverse
results without saying directly what they are doing or why they are doing
476
it, compared to Michigan, which "states its purpose directly."
"Equal
protection cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones
477
so Michigan deserves a pat on the back, not a
who hide the ball,"
478
rebuke, for its frankness.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens said he would have dismissed the suit
for lack of standing because, based on the Court's standing precedents,
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

!d.
!d.

See id.
!d.
!d. at 297.
!d.
!d.
See id. at 297 n. 4.
!d. at 298.
477. !d.
478. !d. at 298. "[I]fthis were a doubtful case for me. I would be tempted to give Michigan an
extra point of its own for its frankness." !d.
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neither of the two petitioners had a personal stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit. Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, each attended and
received their undergraduate degrees from other universities after
479
Michigan failed to extend them offers of admission.
"Neither
petitioner was in the process of reapplying to Michigan through the
freshman admissions <Process at the time this suit was filed, and neither
48
has done so since."
The decision of these two petitioners to obtain a
college education elsewhere distinguished them from the petitioners in
Grutter and Bakke, neither of whom attended any other school but the
481
one whose affirmative action policies they challenged.
Justice Stevens
examined in detail-and dismissed every aspect of-Hamacher' s
contention that his intention to apply to the University as a transfer
student gave him personal stake to challenge the freshman admissions
. 482
po1Icy.
Like Justice Souter, Stevens considered the Court's theory of
483
standing exceedingly indulgent.
He faulted the Court's contention that
the petitioners' challenging "any use of race" in undergraduate
admissions by Michigan, freshman and transfer alike gave them a
484
personal stake over the freshman admissions policy.
He likewise
regarded as mistaken its assumption that "the University's use of race in
undergraduate transfer admissions does not implicate a significantly
different set of concerns than does its use of race in undergraduate
485
freshman admissions."
Justice Stevens said the fact that the action
here is a class-action lawsuit does not change the fact that the petitioners
486
lacked standing,
given that "neither [petitioner] has standing to seek
prospective relief on behalf of unidentified class members who may or
487
may not have standing to litigate on behalf ofthemselves."
In both Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court recognized the
benefits of diversity and importance of a university's ability to consider
race in admissions decisions in order to achieve diversity. However, the
Court held that this consideration of race must be individualized,
flexible, and narrowly tailored to achieve diversity; and, universities may
not use quotas.

479. !d. at 282-83 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting).
480. !d. at 282.

Id at 282 n. I; and 284-85 n. 4.
!d. at 285-89.
See id. at 287 n. 6.
!d. at 287-88.
485. !d. at 288; see also id. at 265.
486. !d. at 289-90.
487. !d. at 290-91.

481.
482.
483.
484.
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III. ANALYZING THE MICHIGAN DECISIONS: NINE INDICATORS OF
HOSTILITY AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BY THE REHNQUIST COURT

Although Grutter and its companion cases signify a major
advancement in the Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence,
the decisions also reveal substantial evidence of hostility against
affirmative action by the Rehnquist Court, as doctrine and as
governmental policy. This part of the Article articulates and analyzes, in
tum, nine of these indices or indicators of hostility, namely: (a) the
narrow margin of victory in Grutter, (b) the defeat of affirmative action
in Gratz, (c) the subjection of the programs under review to strict
scrutiny, (d) the insistence on individualized consideration, (e) the colorblind argument, (f) the anchor of Grutter on diversity, (g) the
undependability of Justice Kennedy as a swing or middle justice, (h) the
acerbic rhetoric of the conservative bloc, and (i) the tinkering with the
"injury in fact" requirement for standing in equal protection. As the
ensuing discussions make abundantly clear, although analytically
separable, several of the indicators are closely interconnected rather than
mutually exclusive.
A. The Narrow Margin of Victory in Grutter.

The narrow victory in Grutter, in the face of a wave of
endorsements, indicates the Rehnquist Court's hostility toward
affirmative action. As stated earlier, only five of the Court's nine justices
stood up for affirmative action in Grutter. This endorsement was an
improvement upon the plurality decision in Bakke twenty-five years
before. However, the improvement on Bakke was built on one fragile
vote; Grutter and affirmative action were only one vote away from
defeat. This margin of "victory" came despite the enormous endorsement
evident in the more than one hundred amicus briefs from a multiplicity of
educational institutions, corporate businesses, and governmental agencies
like the U.S. military, and other organizations, testifying to the
substantial benefits of diversity and the necessity for maintenance of
race-conscwus programs. 488 u nsurpnsmg1y, sueh testimony to the
benefits of affirmative action was not presented during Bakke because
there was not yet enough experience with the practice of affirmative
action to draw on. These organizational endorsements of the University
of Michigan Law School's race-conscious program and support for
affirmative action should have led to, but did not result in, a decisional
margin better than the five-to-four achieved. Imagine just what the fate
0

0

488. Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 330-31.

0

0
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of affirmative action would have been had it not been for the
groundswell of support and the deluge of organizational endorsement.

B. The Defeat of Affirmative Action in Gratz
Another indicator, related to the narrow margin of victory in Grutter,
is the defeat of the program in Gratz-and by a wider, more impressive,
six-to-three majority. Gratz is unsettling for several important reasons.
The Court's misrepresentation of the facts and poor reasoning in Gratz
indicate hostility toward the policy of affirmative action.
Justice Powell in his approach to inclusiveness draws the line at
individual rights; for him "constitutional limitations protecting individual
489
rights may not be disregarded," even in an effort to include minorities.
In Gratz, the program in controversy lacked any resemblance to the
impermissible two-track or quota system that Powell, in Bakke, said
"disregard[ed] ... individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
490
The law on affirmative action, as laid down in Grutter,
Amendment."
is that, to be constitutional, a race-conscious program must "giv[e]
serious consideration to all the w~s an applicant might contribute to a
1
diverse educational environment."
In practical terms, this means such
a race-conscious program must "adequately ensure that all factors that
may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered
492
and must also "seriously
alongside race in admissions decisions"
weigh many other diversity factors besides race that can make a real and
493
dispositive difference for non-minority applicants as well. "
Instead of being a quota or making race the decisive factor, the
undergraduate admissions system the Court struck down in Gratz
considers all applicants for places based not only on race, but also on a
multiplicity of other factors that include "grades, test scores, strength of
high school, quality of course of study, residence, alumni relationships,
leadership, personal character, socioeconomic disadvantage, athletic
494
In more practical terms, this
ability, and quality of a personal essay."
means that "[a] non-minority applicant who scores highly in these other
categories can readily gamer a selection index exceeding that of a
. .
.
mmonty
app 1'1cant who gets the [twenty]-pomt
bonus."495 Put

489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
Century,

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
!d. at 320.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (emphasis added).
!d.
Id. at 338.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 293-94 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
!d. at 294. For accord, see Norma M. Riccucci, Affirmative Action in the Twenty-First
in Public Personnel Management: Current Concerns, Future Challenges 51, 53 (Norma M.
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differently, the plan in Gratz simply does by a numbered scale what the
law school program approved in Grutter accomplished by its "holistic
496
In short, as Justice Souter argued in his dissent, the point
review."
system does not operate as a de facto set-aside system if the greater
admissions process, including review by the committee, results in
497
individualized review sufficient to meet the Court's standards.
In the
final analysis, the undergraduate college lost because it chose to be
forthright about just what plus factor it assigns to race in admission
decisions when it could have chosen to make itself a winner by hiding
498
the ball.
The decision in Gratz also contradicts the Court's claim to
499
"It is ironic indeed," as the
conservatism and judicial restraint.
constitutional law expert Professor Sunstein contends, "that
conservatives, who have been ... skeptical of judicial activism, now
embrace an extreme form of judicial activism in their attack on
500
affirmative action."
This is why Sunstein considers Gratz "a big
501
mistake."
The defeat of affirmative action in Gratz minimized the overall
"sweetness" of the victory for race-based programs emanating from
Grutter. The Court was so disturbed by its contradictory rulings in two
admissions policies arising from the same University, neither of which
involved a Bakke-type set-aside, that Justice O'Connor, whose "swing"
or majority initiative gave birth to Gruffer, felt impelled in Gratz to write
an unpersuasive concurring opinion explaining the ways in which the
program struck down in Gratz departed from the one approved by the

Riccucci ed., 4th ed., Longman 2006) (pointing out that the University awarded up to 20 points at
the Provost's discretion, and up to 10 points for Michigan residency, among other non-academic
criteria).
496. /d. at 295.
497. !d. at 296-97.
498. See id. at 298 (stating that "[e]qual protection cannot become an exercise in which the
winners are the ones who hide the ball.").
499. Judicial restraint is a doctrine that teaches that "the courts should not thwart the
implementation of legislative acts and agency rules unless they are clearly unconstitutional."
Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 471. The doctrine "rests on the assumption that the courts should defer
to the decisions made by Congress, the President, and administrative agencies, because members of
Congress and the President are elected by the people" (while federal judges are not) and
administrative agencies have expertise. !d. Judicial restraintists are distinguishable from judicial
activists who believe that judges should use their power of interpretation and judicial review to
checkmate "the activities of Congress, state legislatures, and administrative agencies when those
governmental bodies exceed their authority." !d. Unlike the Gratz majority, conservatives tend to be
judicial restraintists.
500. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Why Grutter was
Correctly Decided, J. Blacks in Higher Educ., 80 (Oct. 31, 2003).
50 I. !d.
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C. The Subjection of the Programs under Review to Strict Scrutiny

A third indicator of the Supreme Court's hostility toward affirmative
action is the subjection of the two Michigan programs under review to
strict scrutiny. Of the three standards of Constitutional review, strict
scrutiny is the most exacting, followed by intermediate scrutiny and the
rational test. The race-conscious program in Grutter survived strict
scrutiny, while the one in Gratz did not. Because programs subjected to
strict scrutiny are most often struck down, some scholars appropriately
503
The Court
consider the test "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."
probably would have found the program in Gratz constitutional if it had
been assessed under the less onerous stricture of intermediate scrutiny.
In past cases, the Court made a distinction between racial
classifications that oppress (invidious) and those that are meant to assist
504
It also distinguished
minorities or promote de facto equality (benign).
between programs a~~roved by Congress and those designed by state and
5
local governments.
Race-conscious programs determined to be
benign, as were affirmative action plans designed by Congress, received
the more lenient intermediate scrutiny; all others were subjected to strict
506
scrutiny.
Programs assessed using strict scrutiny pass constitutional
muster "only if they are narrowl):6-jtailored measures that further
5
For programs assessed under
compelling governmental interests."
intermediate scrutiny, the constitutional test is met if the affected
measures "serve important governmental objectives and are substantially
508
Another important
related to achievement of those objectives."
distinction is that race-conscious programs subjected to strict scrutiny
require specific findings of discrimination, whereas programs assessed
under the intermediate standard need no such specific findings. That was

502. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
503. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: in Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changin Court· A
g
·
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
504. See e.g. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228-29.
505. !d. at 229.
506. ld. at 225 (citing Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547).
507. ld. at 227. In determining whether a pro ram is narr 1
·
·
measures or criteria that include (I) The necessity gfor the relie~~~dt~~~r::fic~~urt~/:~e::~~~;
remedies, (2) the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of w~ver r · · .
(3) ~e relatiOnship of numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and (4) the impact
~h:is:~~;f

~~St, ;2~~~t:t~~~n~~~~;thud parties. Engr.

:r

Contractors Assn. of S. Fla. v. Dade County, 12 2 F.3d

508. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,517-22 (1980) (Mar h 11 J · · db
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
s a • ·• JOme Y Brennan and
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the case, for example, in Fullilove, involving the challenge of an
affirmative action program enacted by Congress. There, the Supreme
Court ruled that there is no requirement to establish specific findings of
discrimination because, more than any other organ of government,
Congress is vested with the most comprehensive constitutional authority
509
to enforce the equal protection guarantees,
along with an "affirmative
510
duty" to combat discrimination "as a matter of national concern."
This
dual system of review in equal protection cases prevailed until Adarand
in 1995. Beginning with the Adarand case, the Court applied one
uniform assessment standard, all in the name of consistency and
congruence, to "all racial classifications," irrespective of the motivations
underlying them and regardless of the governmental actor, federal, state,
511
or local, that designed the classification.
Given that the standard applied has serious practical consequences
for the programs under examination, debate on the proper standardbetween intermediate or strict scrutiny-to apply in affirmative action
and related equal protection cases has divided the Court. In Bakke, in
1978, Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny to the race-conscious
program under review, whereas Justice Brennan argued that intermediate
512
scrutiny was the appropriate approach.
More than ten years later,
Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Croson, lamented that: "[t]oday, for the
first time, a majority of this Court has adopted strict scrutiny as its
standard of Equal Protection review of race-conscious remedial
513
514
measures."
He adjudged the occurrence "unwelcome,"
reasoning
that "[a] profound difference separates governmental actions that
themselves are racist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy the
effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral government activity from
515
perpetuating the effects of such racism."
For subjecting remedial
classification to strict scrutiny, Marshall accused his colleagues of
"regard[ing] racial discrimination as lar~e~ a phenomenon of the past,"
1
a position he vehemently disagreed with.
Then, years later Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Adarand, accused
the majority of "ignor[ing] a difference, fundamental to our
509. !d. at 483. See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion) (denoting that Congress
"has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment").
510. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517-523 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment).
511. Adarand,5J5U.S.at227.
512. See supra nn. 225-226 and corresponding text.
513. Croson, 488 U.S. at 551 (plurality opinion) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
514. /d.
515. /d.at551-52.
516. /d. at 552.
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constitutional system, between the Federal Government and the
517
and "ignor[ing] a difference, fundamental to the idea of equal
States,"
" 518 He post'te d, "There IS
.
. an d assistance.
.
.
protection, b etween oppresswn
no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed
to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial
519
subordination."
Most recently, in Gratz, the very same line of
argument has resurfaced. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that the
Court should have "properly" and "sensiblY.'' distinguished between
520
policies that include and those that exclude,
between policies that
521
promote de facto equality and those that oppress.
The former should
be assessed under intermediate scrutiny, the latter under strict
.
522 I
. . Justice
. Breyer also sh are d .523
scrutmy.
twas a position
In Adarand and Gruffer, Justice O'Connor attempted to dispel the
524
conventional notion regarding the fatalities caused by strict scrutiny,
saying, "Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict
525
scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it."
Narrowly tailored race-based
action necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, she said,
. scrutmy.
. 526 Context matters. "Not every dectston
..
wt'11 pass stnct
influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is
designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance
and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decision527
For all the nervemaker for the use of race in that particular context. "
calming assurances, Gruffer is one of those rare instances in the equal

517. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 264 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
518. !d.
519. !d. at 243.
520. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, J.,joined by Souter, J., dissenting).
521. !d. at 301-02. Justice Ginsburg noted importantly, in distinguishing between policies that
oppress and policies designed to promote de facto equality, that the centuries of struggle for the most
basic of civil rights in America have been about freedom from racial oppression, instead of just
merely freedom from racial categorization. See id. at 301 (quoting Stephen L. Carter, When Victims
Happen to Be Black, 97 Yale L.J. 420, 433-34 (\ 988)). She also instructively pointed out, citing her
concurrence in Grutter, and the relevant multilateral human rights treaties designed to eliminate
racial discrimination and discrimination against women, that contemporary human rights documents
distinguish "between policies of oppression and measures designed to accelerate de facto equality."
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302.
522. Justice Ginsburg also had a problem with the Court's application of strict scrutiny in the
program under review in Gruffer but saw no need to pursue that argument since the program under
examination survived the test. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J.,
concurring) (asterisked footnote following last sentence in concurrence).
523. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 282 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
524. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
525. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
526. !d.
527. !d.
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protection jurisprudence of the Supreme Court where a racial
classification withstood strict scrutiny. However, by applying strict
scrutiny to all racial classifications, the Supreme Court has sealed the
fate of and revealed its hostility towards the majority of affirmative
action programs.

D. The Insistence on Individualized Consideration
Another indicator of the abiding hostility of the Supreme Court
toward affirmative action is the insistence on individualized
consideration. The reason for this emphasis, the Court explains, is that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the
government to treat people as individuals rather than as groups. In Bakke,
Justice Powell indicated "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when
528
applied to a person of another color."
Powell disapproved the raceconscious program of the University of California at Davis Medical
School under review, ruling it an unconstitutional set-aside, because, in
his view, the plan disre<farded individual rights guaranteed by the
52
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Grutter, the Supreme Court laid out the elements of a properly
"individualized" race-conscious program that meets constitutional
muster. Such a program must give "serious consideration to all the wa1.3s
0
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment;"
it must adequately ensure "that all factors that may contribute to student
body diversitr are meaningfully considered alongside race in
53
admissions;"
and it must "seriously weigh many other diversity
factors besides race that can make a real and dispositive difference for
532
non[-]minority applicants as well."
In short, as the Court explained, an
affirmative action program "must be flexible enough to ensure that each
applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an
533
applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or application."
Using this standard, the Court upheld the plan in Grutter because it
found it sufficiently individualized, compared to the one in Gratz, which
it
adjudged
insufficiently
individualized,
and,
therefore,
1534
unconstltutwna .
0

528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.

0

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289.
/d. at 320.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322.
!d. at 337.
!d. at 338.
ld .at 336-37.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
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The insistence on individualized consideration would have been
adequate if our society sufficiently treated and regarded people as
individuals. Unfortunately, it does not; instead, group factors and
considerations have played and continue to play a major role in the
treatment and assessment of blacks and other minorities in this society.
For several hundred years in this country, blacks were "discriminated
against not as individuals, but rather solely because of the color of their
535
skins."
And for sixty years, until Brown in 1954, the U.S. was a
Nation where, by law, one group was singled out for inferior treatment
while the other group was accorded special treatment, each based on
536
their race.
Insistence on individualized consideration in the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence ignores these occurrences or realities.
Such insistence also turns a deaf ear to the still lingering disparities
between whites and minorities in numerous life measures, embedded in
537
group consciousness.
As Justice Ginsburg aptly observed in her
dissent in Grutter, "conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank
discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land, impeding
538
realization of our highest values and ideals."
Independent study after
study corroborates these findings. These include the Advisory Board on
Race, set up by former President Clinton, which after a year-long
investigation, found that at the end of the twentieth century, "the color of
one's skin continues to affect an individual's opportunities to receive a
good education, acquire the skills to get and maintain a good job, have
access to adequate health care, and receive equal justice under the
539
law."
In sum:
Race consciousness continues to divide African Americans and white
Americans. Whether we are talking about college attendance, media
stereotyping, racial profiling, or academic achievement, the black
experience is different from the white one .... African Americans view
the [N]ation a~1 many specific issues differently than their white
0
counterparts do.

Evidence of widespread prevalence of group consciousness in
American society today is a reason why many blacks view the stress on
535. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
generally Francis D. Adams & Barry Sanders, Alienable Rights: The Exclusion of Ajrican Americans
in a White Man's Land, 1619~2000 (Harper Collins 2003).
536. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 394 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
537. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-301 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting); Grutter,
539 U.S. at 344-45 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring). See also Adams & Sanders,
supra n. 535, at xiii (instructively describing the exclusion of African Americans as "continuing").
538. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring).
539. John Hope Franklin et al., One America in the 21st Century 35 (McGraw-Hill 1998).
540. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 163.
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individualized consideration as little more than another disingenuous
541
designed to prevent
device, no different from color-blindness,
inclusiveness for blacks and other minorities. In Bakke, Justice Marshall
was at a loss that anyone could ignore the fact that "for several hundred
years Negroes have been discriminated against, not as individuals, but
542
And he considered it
rather solely because of the color of their skins."
"more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-based
discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a
543
Similarly,
class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible."
the African American literary giant, Richard Wright (1908-60), once
rebuked U.S. conservatives whom, Wright said, seek "to smother the
Negro problem as a whole" when they insist "upon regarding Negroes as
individuals and making individual deals with individual Negroes,
ignoring the inevitable race consciousness which three hundred years of
Jim Crow living has burned into" the collective heart of American
544
blacks.
Last but not least among critics of insistence on individual treatment
when faced with overwhelming evidence of group consciousness is
Professor Jeremiah Moses. Moses provides an interesting and eloquent
understanding of the roots of black nationalism in America. He contends
that in Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney, ironically, presented an argument
545
Taney said the Constitution did not recognize
for black nationalism.
African Americans as citizens, or even as individuals, but as a class of
persons "whose ancestors were Negroes of the African race ... [and]
were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the
546
The Chief Justice of the United States defined African
Constitution."
Americans as a people both "subordinate and inferior," proclaiming, in
effect, that in the e:res of the founding fathers, a free black individual
54
was an anomaly.
To the Framers of the Constitution, Taney said,
blacks were "a subject people, a nation in bondage, a class eternally
541. See supra Section E, dealing with the color-blind argument.
542. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Adams
and Sanders also expressed a similar indignation when in the introduction to their book on the
exclusion of African Americans in American life, stated that "[i]n our willingness to dismiss the
manifold social disadvantages that most [B]lacks endure as simply the result of their own personal
failures, we all share in the responsibility for America's continuing exclusion of its black citizens."
Adams & Sanders, supra n. 535, at xv.
543. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
544. Richard Wright, Introduction, in St. Clair Drake & Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis:
A Study ofNegro Life in a Northern City xxix (U. of Chi. Press 1993).
545. See Classical Black Nationalism: From the American Revolution to Marcus Garvey 25
(Wilson Jeremiah Moses, ed., N.Y. U. Press 1996).
546. !d.; see also Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403--04.
547. Classical Black Nationalism, supra n. 545, at 25; see also Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05.
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separate from the American people, and in a state of subordination to
548
them. "
Moses looked at both sides of the argument as to whether
federal law dealt with African Americans as group rather than as
individuals and concludes that, generally, American law dealt with
African Americans as a "subordinate and inferior class," rather than as
..
549
. d.tvt.dua I citizens.
equaI m
Recent occurrences in the aftermath of the Michigan cases serve,
unfortunately and disconcertingly, to reinforce black apprehension and
suspicion regarding individualized consideration. These occurrences
revolve around some schools that are using the requirement of
"individualized consideration" as a guise to scrap programs formerly
550
Individualized consideration prevented
reserved for minorities.
progress designed to remedy the effects of discrimination.
E. The Color-Blind Argument

Another indicator of the Supreme Court's hostility to affirmative
action is its support of the color-blind argument. The argument takes the
form of claims that our laws must be "color-blind" or that data relating to
551
race "is no longer relevant to public policy." Color-blindness traces its
roots to the dissent of Justice Harlan in Plessy, in 1896, to the effect that
the law recognizes no caste, but instead, "[ o ]ur Constitution is color552
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."
Professor Jan Pillai explains that "[ e]ncoded in the principle of color[]blindness is the concept of neutrality that mandates absolute government
impartiality toward individuals and groups without regard to their race,
55
color, ethnicity, gender or disabilities."
The color-blind doctrine manifested itself in two important ways in
the Michigan cases. The first is in the context of Justice O'Connor's
projection regarding a possible date for the sunset of race-conscious

548. Classical Black Nationalism, supra n. 545, at 25.
549. !d. at25-26.
550. See Minority Programs for All, Chi. Trib. Red Eye Ed. 6 (Sept. 29, 2004). This story
embodies the views of Sharon Jones, President of the Black Women Lawyers' Association of
Greater Chicago, whose association was among the groups that submitted briefs to the Supreme
Court supporting the University of Michigan. Ms. Jones believes universities are unnecessarily
caving in to legal threats. "Nothing requires the schools to get rid of those programs," she said.
"However," she also observed, "you have to be willing to be sued, litigate it and spend a lot of
money to win. And a lot of institutions aren't willing to." !d.
551. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
552. Ples.1y, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
553. K.G. Jan Pillai, Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause, 27 Hastings Cons!. L.Q. 89, 89
(1999).
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programs. The second relates to so-called "race-neutral" alternatives to
affirmative action such as percentage plans. This Article discusses race
neutral alternatives here and saves O'Connor's sunset date for the next
section dealing with diversity, where the topic more properly belongs.
There were color-blind statements focused on race-neutral
alternatives to affirmative action in the Michigan cases, all of them made
in Gratz, where the Court disapproved the program under challenge. One
of these statements was by Justice Ginsburg; the other by Justice Souter.
Justice Ginsburg criticized the percentage plans the United States
advocated in its amicus curiae brief to the Court on several grounds: the
plans depend on continued racial segregation at the secondary school
level for their effectiveness; they link college admission to a single
criterion, namely high school class rank; they create perverse incentives;
they encourage parents to keep their children in low-performing
segregated schools and discourage students from taking challenging
classes that might lower their grade point avera§es; and they have little
54
Most fundamentally
relevance in graduate and professional schools.
for our purpose here, such programs are not race-neutral since "they
unquestionably were adopted with the specific purpose of increasing
representation of African Americans and Hispanics in the public higher
555
Justice Souter expressed a similar view regardins§
education system."
5
the lack of race-neutrality, in addition to the "deliberate obfuscation,"
557
558
of these programs,
to name just these problems.
Justice O'Connor,
in her opinion for the Court in Grutter, also criticized these so-called
race-neutral programs, stating they may work against individualized
consideration and that they have little applicability in graduate and
559
professional schools.
Percentage plans were not the only "raceneutral" alternatives to race-conscious programs mentioned in the
Michigan cases. Others include the use of a lottery system and
decreasing the emphasis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and
LSAT scores as suggested by the United States District Court for the
560
Eastern District of Michigan in Grutter.
The ideal of a society where race has no bearing on decisions
relating to hiring, promotion, school admission and distribution of other
554. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303--{)4 n. 10 (Ginsburg, J.,joined by Souter, J., dissenting).
555. !d.
556. !d.
557. !d. at 298 (Souter, J ., joined by Ginsburg, J .• dissenting).
558. See id. at 297.
559. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
560. !d. See also supra n. 356 for the suggestion by Justice Scalia, during oral argument in
Grutter, on how the University of Michigan law school could achieve diversity by making itself less
exclusive or elitist.
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scarce societal resources, is a value no American quarrels with.
However, we are not there yet. Color-blindness "must be seen as
561
aspiration rather than as description of reality."
As Justice Blackmun
counseled in Bakke, "to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
562
H ostl·1·1ty to affiIrmattve
. action or the premature retirement of
race. "
these programs will serve only to deJa~ the date of our true evolution into
5 3
Headlong insistence on colora color- and gender-blind society.
blindness glosses over the continuing cost of racism on blacks and other
minorities. Moreover, like "individualized consideration," and related
564
requirements like the insistence on "merit,"
color-blindness is a
disingenuous tool that opponents of affirmative action use to maintain
the status quo and prevent or contain demands from blacks and other
565 A
.
. . fior me
. Ius1veness.
.
mmontles
s one ana1yst, wh o goes as f:ar as to
label this orientation a modem-day Jim Crowism, points out, colorblindness calls to mind people in the Nineteenth century "who would do
in the Negro [yet] were absolved from their heinous acts so long as they
566
did not proclaim their intentions to the world in so many words."
Not
too long ago, color-blindness was an outlook the Rehnquist Court
employ:ed as a cover to ignore the Court's own precedents on affirmative
.
567
actiOn.
561. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
562. !d. at 407 (Blackmun J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
563. See K. G. Jan Pillai, Affirmative Action: In Search of a National Policy, 2 Temp. Pol. &
Civ. Rights L. Rev. 6 (1992) (stating "By helping to raise the disadvantaged to a position where they
can compete on a level playing field with the rest of society, affirmative action clearly has a central
role to play in society's progress toward the ultimate goal of a color-blind society where racism does
not exist.").
564. One understanding of the proper meaning of merit is by Professor Frank Wu who points
out that interjecting race as a factor in admissions decisions "compel[s] us to realize that merit comes
in many forms, and the distribution of rewards can be made more just." Wu, supra n. 77, at 151. For
accord, see the views of California Supreme Court justice Paul Turner who reportedly said, "[l]fyou
decide you are going to have a merit-based selection system-if it's really going to be merit-basedit's going to be diverse." Greg Mitchell, No Place at the Table, Recorder (San Francisco) 12 (Sept.
18, 1998). Justice Turner was commenting on the hiring of law clerks.
565. See Molly Townes O'Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet: The Plessy
Dissenter's Color-Blind Constitution, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rights J. 754 (1998); Linda Greene,
Jim Crowism in the Twenty-First Century, 27 Capital U. L. Rev. 51 (1998). See also David Kairys,
Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race, Am. U. L. Rev. 748-49 (1996) (importantly
portraying color-blindness as a "rationalization for halting and reversing the process of integration of
African Americans into the economy and society," as well as a disguise for a "society in which
people value only themselves and those close to or like them.").
566. Greene, supra n. 565, at 51.
567. See A Court Running in the Wrong Direction, N.Y. Times A20 (July 6, 1995) (editorial).
See also Affirmative Action Without Fear, N.Y. Times Al6 (Sept. 19, 1994) (editorial) (commenting
on the cutback on anti-discrimination enforcement that took place during the Reagan and first Bush
presidencies).
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"[T]he color of one's skin continues to affect an individual's
opportunities to receive a good education, acquire the skills to get and
maintain a good job, have access to adequate health care, and receive
568
Accordingly, as Professor Pillai points
equal justice under the law."
out, color-blindness, with the neutrality it conjures, is "an amorphous
569
concept in equal protection jurisprudence."
From a practical point of
view, "[ e ]nding affirmative action is not color-blind. It is blind to
centuries of discrimination, blind to the racism that is still deeply
embedded in our society, blind to the barriers that continue to confront
generation u;on generation of African Americans and other
57
minorities."
Putting all these factors together, as the House of
Representatives stated, after defeating an attempt in 1998 to implement a
proposal that would have banned public colleges and universities from
using race or gender in admissions decisions, the notion that "we live in a
571
color-blind society in which only merit counts ... is a cruel hoax."
The Supreme Court, unwittingly, does not dispute this conclusion
regarding the still-pervasive influence of race in America matched
against the din of advocacy for color-blindness. In Adarand, the Court
called "the unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this
country ... an unfortunate reality," yet imposed strict scrutin~ of all
2
Also,
race-conscious programs, including those designed by Congress.
in Croson, the high court said it had "no doubt that the sorry history of
both private and public discrimination in this country has contributed to a
573
yet ruled the racelack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs,"
conscious program for minorities at issue in the case unconstitutional.
It is hard to reconcile the persistence of racism and insistence on
retirement of remedial programs. The two simply do not go hand in hand.
For as long as racism persists and group consciousness grips our society,
color-blindness is an impulse that should never be interpreted to bar race574
In sum, the best answer yet to the color-blind
conscious measures.
568. Franklin et al., supra n. 539, at 35.
569. Pillai, supra n. 553, at 89.
570. Charles Dervarics, Anti-Affirmative Action Bill Defeated, 15 Black Issues in Higher Educ.
5 (May 28, 1998) (statement of Rep. John Lewis (D-Ga.)). In defeating the measure, the House
rejected the argument of Rep. Frank Riggs (R-Ca.) who sponsored the proposal. Rep. Riggs
acknowledged "that discrimination continues to exist in our society and that it is morally wrong," but
believes "we will never end discrimination by practicing discrimination." /d.
571. /d. (statement of Rep. William Clay (D-Mo)).
572. 515U.S.at237.
573. 488 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion).
574. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 239 (Harv. U. Press 1977). Professor
Dworkin counsels instructively that we must "take care not to usc the Equal Protection Clause to
cheat ourselves of equality." /d.
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argument is the one Justice Ginsburg proffered when she said our
Constitution is both color-blind and color conscious, elaborating: "To
avoid conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, a classification that
denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be based on
race. In that sense, the Constitution is color-blind. But the Constitution is
also color conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to
575
undo the effects of past discrimination."
F. Grutter 's Anchoring on Diversity

A sixth indicator of the Supreme Court's abiding hostility to
affirmative action is the anchoring of the race-conscious program the
Court approved in Grutter on diversity, rather than, for example, on the
eradication of the lingering effects of past discrimination against blacks
and other minorities. In his opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell examined
various options before settling on diversity as a constitutionally
permissible basis for a race-conscious program. In the same vein, the
Supreme Court rationalized its judgment in Grutter on diversity, ruling
that striving for diversity in the student body of a public institution rises
to the level of a compelling government interest that survives strict
scrutiny. The Court made abundantly clear that its decisions
constitutionalizing affirmative action plans had no basis in the legacy of
past discrimination. Justice O'Connor said, "[i]t is true that some
language in" the Court's cases since Bakke "might be read to suggest
that remedying past discrimination is the only permissible justification
576
for race-based governmental action."
She quoted Croson, where the
Court stated that, unless classifications based on race are "strictly
reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
577
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."
She then indicated,
But we have never held that the only governmental use of race that can
survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination. Nor, since
Bakke, have we directly addressed the use of race in the context of
public higher education. Today, we hold that the L~'J: School has a
8
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.

In Gratz, the Court responded to two arguments asserting the legacy
of past discrimination as basis for affirmative action by saying that the
University of Michigan did not found its program on that basis. The first

575. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Judge J.
Wisdom in U.S. v. Jefferson County Bd. ofEd., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966)).
576. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
577. !d. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion)).
578. !d.
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argument asserted by parties intervening on the side of the University
(respondent-intervenors) contended that the University had a compelling
interest in remedyin? the University's past and current discrimination
57
In a supplemental opinion and order, the United
against minorities.
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan considered and
580
on the ground that respondent-intervenors
rejected this argument,
"failed to present any evidence that the discrimination alleged by them,
or the continuing effects of such discrimination, was the real justification
581
for the [University's] race-conscious admissions programs."
The
Supreme Court, in agreement with the district court, and to the extent
respondent-intervenors reasserted this justification which they had failed
to introduce earlier in the litigation process, affirmed the district court's
582
The other argument was offered by the petitioners who
decision.
contended that the only ground for the use of race the Court permits is
for the remedy of "identified discrimination," not diversity, which they
583
The Court replied
called "too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite."
simply that the University "never relied" on identified discrimination as a
rationale, and that it has approved diversity, which the University relied
. Grutter. 584
on m
The interest in diversity the Supreme Court constitutionalized in
Grutter is narrow indeed. Recall the Court's concept of individualized
585
based on its understanding of what Justice Powell said
consideration,
in Bakke regarding the use of race in attaining diversity, as Justice
O'Connor painstakingly articulated in Grutter. Part of that what Powell
said was that race "is only one element in a range of factors a university
proper~ may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student
86
body."
O'Connor explained that the use of race the Constitution
permits is "not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified
percentage of the study body is in effect guaranteed to be members of
587
selected ethnic groups."
"Simple ethnic diversity" means not only no

579. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 257.
580. !d. at 257 n. 9 (citing 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001 )).
581. /d.( citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790,795 (E.D. Mich. 2001)).
582. !d.
583. !d. at 268. It is not clear whether the "identified discrimination" the Gratz petitioners
asserted here is the same as the legacy of past discrimination. If it is, this is disingenuous because
societal discrimination was among the interests constituting a basis for an appropriate use of race
that Justice Powell dismissed in Bakke, before settling down for the interest in diversity that the
petitioners contend, obviously insincerely, to be amorphous.
584. ld.
585. See supra nn. 530533-534.
586. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324.
587. !d.
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quota, but also mandates that the percentage of minority students
admitted from year to year vary. Phrased differently, "the diversity that
furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a
588
single though important element."
Grutter singularly and palpably highlights Justice O'Connor's
tremendous unease with race-conscious measures: there are serious
problems of justice connected with the idea of preference itself, and racebased governmental action needs to be subjected to "continuing
oversight to assure that it will work the least harm possible to other
589
innocent persons competing for the benefit."
In short, the diversity the
Court constitutionalized is so stringent it is a surprise that the affirmative
action program under review in Grutter made it. It is simply amazing
that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
590
would find the law school's use of race not narrowly tailored;
things
just do not get any more stringent than this. The same is true of the four
591
judges who dissented in the Court of Appeals.
The narrow
constitutionalization of diversity accomplished in Grutter justifies
Professor Klarman's characterization that "Justice O'Connor's
conservative commitment to preserving the status quo trumped her
. I aversiOn
.
.
1'deo Iog1ca
to race-consciOus
governmenta1 reme d'IeS, ,592
although Klarman also suggested the "entrench[ment of] the notion that
all of our social, political, and economic institutions should 'look like
593
America"' also shaped O'Connor's action.
Diversity necessarily became a basis for constitutionalization of
affirmative action programs because these programs have become almost
impossible to justify based on the legacy of past discrimination. The
difficulty of justification is due to the Supreme Court's assessment of all
race-conscious programs, discussed above, using strict scrutiny.
However, the problem with constitutionalization of diversity as an
anchor for a race-conscious program is that it "has very little in common
594
with the original motives for affirmative action in the United States."
Specifically, as Professor Walters puts it, a constitutionalization rooted in
588. /d. at 325 (quoting Justice Powell).
589. /d. at 341.
590. /d. at 321.
591. /d. at 321-22.
592. Klarman, supra n. 48.
593. /d. The attentiveness to societal realities serves to reinforce Justice O'Connor's
credentials as a conservative justice, favoring conservative outcomes, who strives to balance
competing interests in cases before her, rather than seek to promote a particular ideology. See supra
n. 49.
594. Boston & Nair-Reichert, supra n. 233, at 4.
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diversity "does not value, when it should, the special history of blacks
who have experienced slavery and post-slavery racism to the extent that
in only a few places in the country are blacks enrolled in a white
institution of higher education in numbers proportional to their
percentage m the state popu1atiOn. ,595
Analyzing the issue carried over from the discussion in the previous
section on color-blindness, there are two problems with Justice
O'Connor's pronouncement of a possible sunset date for affirmative
action. First, few disFute that affirmative action programs must have "a
59
logical end point."
However, this should not happen until "after the
597
objectives for which they were taken have been achieved;"
sunset of
race-conscious programs should be predicated upon "progress toward
598
nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity"
that are still not
present in American society. Instead, large-scale "conscious and
unconscious race bias" along with "rank discrimination based on race"
599
remain alive, "impeding realization of our highest values and ideals,"
and warranting the conclusion that "[f]rom today's vantage point, one
may hopeb but not firmly forecast," retirement of race-conscious
6 0
programs.
Justice Ginsburg properly reminded her colleagues that for
part of the twenty-five years following Bakke in 1978, the law relating to
the practice of affirmative action was anything but settled. A second
problem with pronouncing a date when racial preferences will no longer
be necessary, is that affirmative action programs based on diversity,
compared to those focusing on remedying the legacy of past
discrimination, do not lend themselves to sunset dates. As one analyst
aptly puts it, "diversity is a continual compelling interest" that is not
601
time-sensitive.
As with individualized consideration analyzed before, "diversity"
could be used in an abusive manner that works against minority
inclusiveness. Part of the result of the new stress on diversity is that
programs formerly reserved for minorities are thrown to whites who are
0

0

0

0

0

595. Walters, supra n. 15.
596. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
597. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (citing the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified by the
U.S. in 1994).
598. !d. at 346.
599. !d. at 345-46.
600. !d. at 346.
601. Christopher J. Schmidt, Caught in a Paradox: Problems with Grutter's Expectation that
Race-Conscious Admissions Programs Will End in Twenty-Five Years, 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 753,
762--65 (2004).
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displacing groups for which these programs were initially targeted.
Concluding the discussion on diversity as an indicator of hostility are
two parenthetical observations. The first is that Gruffer is not the first
time the Supreme Court has talked about a possible sunset of affirmative
action. In his opinion in Bakke, Justice Blackmun expressed an "earnest
hope" that the day comes when the United States reaches "a stage of
maturity" where affirmative action programs are unnecessary and "in
603
truth, only a relic of the past."
Blackmun hoped "that we could reach
this stage within a decade at the most." Blackmun stated, "But the story
of Brown, . .. decided almost a quarter of a century ago, suggests that that
604
hope is a slim one."
While both projections embody dates, Justice
Blackmun's was more tentative than Justice O'Connor's. At any rate, as
Justice Ginsburg said in her dissent, there is little basis to make firm
insistence on what should remain only a hope or forecast. The second
observation is that, in actuality, diversity and legacy of past
discrimination are so intermingled that the line between them can be hard
to pinpoint. The program upheld in Gruffer was based on a policy that
explicitly reaffirms the law school's longstanding commitment to
diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from racial
and ethnic groups that have been historically discriminated against, like
African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans. Without this
commitment, these students might not be enrolled in the law school in a
605
critical mass or meaningful number;
in other words, the law school's
affirmative action program inextricably intermingles diversity and the
legacy of past discrimination. Also, critics of Michigan's anchorage of its
defense of its affirmative action program on diversity point out, not
unpersuasively, that the University in the past discriminated against
606
Blacks.
This inter-linkage means that the hostility relating to diversity
is as much about the narrow constitutionalization of the concept as it is
about the anchor of affirmative action on diversity, in opposition to the
legacy of past discrimination.

G. The Undependability ofJustice Kennedy as a Swing or Middle Justice
A seventh indicator of the Supreme Court's lingering hostility to

602. See Minority Programs jiJr All, supra n. 550 (reporting on how undergraduate
scholarships and programs once restricted to minority students "are offered to anyone who adds to
'the overall excellence and diversity of the university community."').
603. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 403 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
604. !d.
605. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-39.
606. See George E. Curry, Supreme Court Ignores University of Michigan's Racism, Stand.
Newsps. (Chi.) 9 (Mar. 27, 2003).
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affirmative action is Justice Kennedy's undependability as a swing
justice. The Rehnquist Court was a tribunal defined by Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy as "the two justices in the
607
Analysts predicted that the result of the Michigan cases
middle."
608
would turn on the votes of these two middle justices.
This is because
before the cases, as Professor Klarman explains, the "justices' votes in
affirmative-action cases have followed fairly predictable political lines."
The three most conservative justices, namely Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas, "have insisted on a nearly absolute ban on government raceconsciousness" and "have never voted to sustain an affirmative-action
plan;" whereas the four most liberal justices, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter,
and Stevens, "have rarely (or never) voted to invalidate an affirmative609
action plan."
Kennedy's stature as a swing or middle justice derives
partly from the fact that he replaced another swing justice, Lewis Powell,
and "partly because he isn't as dug-in and as certain as some of his
610
colleagues."
In the Michigan cases, Justice O'Connor lived up to her billing as a
justice in the middle, voting to uphold the race-conscious program-and
lending critical backing to affirmative action-in Grutter, but giving a
thumbs-down to the program in Gratz. In fidelity to her role as a swing
justice, O'Connor voted with the liberal wing of the Court in one case
611
To deflect a possible
and with the conservative bloc in the other.
charge of inconsistency, she wrote a concurrence in Gratz, defensively
explaining why her votes varied in the two cases.
In contrast, Justice Kennedy stood against affirmative action in both
cases. Kennedy was part of the six-three majority that struck down the
program in Gratz, and he filed a dissent in Grutter in which he
complained that there was not enough scrutiny in the strict scrutiny
standard the Court applied in its review. He accused the law school of
"engag[ing] in racial balancing," and he lambasted the majority's review
as "perfunctory" for deferring too easily to the law school's "assurances"

607. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Court Confounds Critics. Chi. Trib. at 18 (June 29,
2003).
608. Klarman, supra n. 48.
609. !d.
610. Joan Biskupic, The Distinct Voices <d"Justice, Dallas Morn. News 26A (May 3, !998).
611. Justice O'Connor was praised effusively, and deservedly, in the popular media by
commentators who viewed her as a voice of reason on the Court because of her support for
affirmative action in Grutter. See e.g. Stanley Fish, One Man's Opinion, N.Y. Times A21 (June 30,
2003) (assessing O'Connor as "alert ... to the real-world consequences of what she decides."). See
also Thomas Shows His True Colors on Affirmative Action Ruling. supra n. 39. (praising O'Connor
as "an unabashed conservative" who "refuse[s] to be typecast by her ideological disposition.")
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of the constitutionality of its own admissions policy.
Justice Kennedy
was not persuaded that the twenty-five years the Court projected for the
sunset of affirmative action minimizes any imaginary damage that would
attend what he regards as the Court's failure to give strict scrutiny full
scope. "If it is intended to mitigate the damage the Court does to the
concept of strict scrutiny, neither petitioners nor other rejected law
school applicants will find solace in knowing the basic protection put in
place by Justice Powell will be suspended for a full quarter of a
613
century. "
In his dissent in Gruffer, Kennedy indicates that he would support a
race-conscious program in the context of diversity, given a proper
614
case,
but the assertion can have value only as a face-saving statement
given the narrowness, discussed already, of the diversity concept the
Court constitutionalized in Gruffer. It will be hard to find a raceconscious program more narrowly tailored than the one in Grutter that
Kennedy can lend his support.
Despite his negative votes in the Michigan cases, Justice Kennedy is
not anti-civil rights. To the contrary, Kennedy has authored decisions
615
and constitutional guarantees for juveniles in
supporting gay rights
616
capital punishment.
There is, therefore, nothing yet detracting from
Kennedy's reputation as a swing or majority maker and his status as
swing justice remains intact. It is just that Justice Kennedy draws the line
in his pro-civil rights orientation at affirmative action. His antipathy to
civil rights, to the extent that antipathy exists, is something limited to
race-conscious programs. Judging by his record, Kennedy is a middle
justice whose swing balance, compared to Justice O'Connor's, shifts
little, if at all, when it comes to affirmative action. With swing friends
like Kennedy, affirmative action needs no enemy. Kennedy's proven
non-solicitude for affirmative action, coupled with Justice O'Connor's
retirement from the Court, creates a dire need for a middle justice not
opposed to affirmative action. Will Judge Samuel A. Alito Jr., who
replaced O'Connor, be that will middle justice? Although Alito's
conservative orientation, based on his records both as a judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and as a lawyer for the Reagan
612. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
613. !d. at 394.
614. See id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("reiterat[ing] my approval of giving appropriate
consideration to race in this one [student diversity] context .... ").
615. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), a challenge of a Georgia sodomy law, where the Supreme Court ruled that the right to
privacy does not include the right of homosexuals to consensual sex).
616. See Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 2248 (2005) (ruling unconstitutional the imposition of
death sentences on juveniles under 18).
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administration, leave little hope of solicitude for affirmative action, 617 the
jury is still out and it is much too early to tell.
H. The Acerbic Rhetoric of the Conservative Bloc

An eighth indicator of the Supreme Court's hostility to affirmative
action is the acerbic rhetoric of the Court's conservative bloc, made up of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Although
Rehnquist portrayed the race-conscious program in Grutter as an
618
his
unconstitutional racial balancing in favor of African Americans,
commentary directed at affirmative action, when it comes to deployment
of venomous language, is otherwise restrained. Therefore, the discussion
is limited to the verbal attacks on affirmative action by Justices Scalia
and Thomas.
Justice Scalia dismissed the law school program the Court approved
619
and mockingly, yet severely, questioned the
in Grutter as a "sham"
educational benefit of diversity, which he regards as something better left
620
He
for public school kindergartners and children in the Boys Scouts.
equated the manner in which black students network among themselves
621
Scalia has a reputation for
on college campus to "tribalism."
622
but some of these comments
"unrestrained sarcasm" on the Court,
raise question of appropriate language and good taste in legal
jurisprudence.
Thomas repeatedly referred to the affirmative action program the
623
and berated the
Court upheld in Grutter as "racial discrimination,"
Grutter majority for upholding "the Law School's racial discrimination .
624
. . by responding to a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti."
He
maintained that the school's compelling governmental interest claim was
625
a "fabricated" one
designed to maintain its own elite image and

617. See e.g. Jesse J. Holland, Alita Appears Headed for Confirmation, Associated Press (Jan.
12, 2006) (conveying, among other things, concern by Democratic legislators, during Senate
confirmation hearings, that Alito's background and record are replete with opposition to women and
minority rights).
618. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
619. 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
620. !d. at 34 7-48.
621. !d. at 349.
622. Biskupic, supra n. 610.
623. 539 U.S. 350 (Thomas, J.,joined by Scalia J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
624. !d.
625. !d. at 375.
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626

status.
He also questioned its interest in diversity, as well as its
627
concept of critical mass.
He mocked diversity alternately as
628
629
and "trivial."
And, he called the majority's goal of
"aesthetic,"
ending affirmative action in twenty-five years "a [twenty-five]-year
630
license to violate the Constitution."
Thomas claimed-with dark
alarmism unrooted in reality-that "[c]ontained within today's majority
opinion is the seed of a new constitutional justification for . . . racial
.
,631
segregatiOn.
In their oppositions to affirmative action, no one can accuse Thomas
and Scalia of inconsistency. Scalia's approach to affirmative action and
inclusiveness is rooted in his assertion that "!i]n the eyes of government,
63
we are just one race here. It is American."
Operating from this belief,
he has opined that "government can never have a 'compelling interest' in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial
633
discrimination in the opposite direction,"
that "under our Constitution
634
there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race,"
and
that pursuit of "the concept of racial entitlement ... is to reinforce and
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race
635
slavery, race privilege, and race hatred."
Justice Thomas's own approach to affirmative action and
inclusiveness is the expression that the Equal Protection Clause
"categorically" prohibits application of race in decisions relating to
admissions in higher education and distribution of other public
636
Guided by this world view, he has denounced race-conscious
rewards.
637
preferential programs as "racial paternalism"
and insisted that

626. See id. at 356.
627. /d. at365-66,374.
628. See id. at 355 n. 3 (indicating, "[t]hat is, the Law School wants to have a certain
appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of the students
sitting at them"); see also id. at 354 n. 3 (contending, "[t]he Law School seeks only a facade-it is
sufficient that the class looks right, even if it does not perform right"). He also posited that diversity
"does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher education and therefore
presents only an illusory solution to the challenges facing our Nation." !d. at 355 n. 3.
629. /d. at 357.
630. /d. at 3 70.
631. /d.at365-66.
632. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
633. /d.
634. /d.
635. /d.
636. See Gratz, 539 U.S. 281 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("I would hold that a State's use of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is
categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.").
637. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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preferences designed to help people are as obnoxious as preferences that
oppress, on the ground that "[i]n each instance, it is racial discrimination,
638
plain and simple."
He has declared affirmative action as being "at war
with the princifle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our
63
Constitution"
and asserted that race-conscious pro~rams "undermine
0
the moral basis of the equal protection principle."
Responding to
Justice Steven's position in Adarand that "[t]here is no moral or
constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to Rerpetuate
6 1
a caste and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination,"
Thomas
contended, "I believe that there is a moral [and] constitutional
equivalence" between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that
distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current
notion of equality. Government cannot make us equal; it can only
642
recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law."
The only
departure to this familiar approach for Thomas was his irreverent citation
to Frederick Douglass, venerated among African Americans as a
foremost freedom fighter and supporter of black causes, to support an
argument against affirmative action, in Grutter, that many blacks regard
as unprincipled, given the advantages he, along with others, received as
643
an "affirmative action baby."
Justice Thomas's conservatism on the
court and his opposition to inclusive programs that seek to benefit

638. !d. at 241.
639. !d. at 240.
640. !d.
641. ld. at 243 (Stevens, J.,joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
642. ld. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
643. See Jarrett, supra n. 39, who accused Thomas of "stab[bing] Douglass in [the] grave" by
comparing himself to Douglass. See also Thomas Shows His True Colors on Affirmative Action
Ruling, supra n. 39. The expression "affirmative action baby" comes from Stephen L. Carter,
Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (Basic Books 1991). In his wordy dissent in Grutter,
Thomas claimed that affirmative action so stigmatizes its beneficiaries that "[ w ]hen [B]lacks take
positions in the highest places of government, industry, or academia, it is an open question today
whether their skin color played a part in their advancement." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting, joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Perhaps Justice Thomas is
also referring to himself. As part of the investigation that precedes the confirmation by the Senate of
a Supreme Court Justice, the American Bar Association (ABA), the premier national organization of
lawyers that represents the interests of the legal profession, rates each nominee, based on his or her
qualifications, as Highly Qualified (now called "Well Qualified"), Qualified, or Not Qualified.
Thomas got only a Qualified rating (and before the charges of sexual harassment against him by law
professor Anita Hill became public), with two members voting Not Qualified. See Karen O'Connor
& Larry J. Sabato, American Government: Continuity and Change, 394 (1999 ed., Allyn & Bacon
1999). Of the twenty-two previous successful nominees rated by the ABA, Thomas was the first to
receive less than a unanimous Qualified rating. !d. Thomas won confirmation "by the smallest
margin in the twentieth century." Baum, supra n. 50, at 55. His confirmation was made possible by
the effective support he received from the first Bush administration and because "many Democrats
favored the continuation of black representation on the Court." !d. at 55-56.
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minorities has led some to compare him, fairly or unfairly, in ideological
pristineness to a Scalia-without the talent and intellectual endowment
644
of the real Scalia.
Both Thomas and Scalia pride themselves as conservatives
committed to "originalism" as a method of constitutional interpretation.
Originalists base the meaning of the Constitution on what the document
meant when it was originally ratified. To the credit of these justices, they
usually practice the method that they preach. However, as Professor
Sunstein points out, this is not the case for the justices when it comes to
affirmative action. He cites correctly a great deal of historical work
which suggests that affirmative action was accepted by those who
ratified the Equal Protection Clause, stating that "in the aftermath of the
[C]ivil [W[ar, Congress engaged in numerous race-conscious efforts
singling out African Americans for special help." "Perhaps, the historical
work is mistaken " he said, but the two justices "have not even bothered
645
to investigate it."
Despite the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the conservative wing
of the Supreme Court is still alive and well. The new jurist who replaced
Rehnquist, former Judge John G. Roberts Jr. of the U.S. Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia, is an individual noted for his conservative
values and record, even if he lacks the ideological pristineness of
Rehnquist. 646 This is not to mention to inclusion of Samuel Alita, Justice
O'Connor replacement, whose appointment and confirmation to the

644. On Scalia's intellect, see Baum, supra n. 50, at 64, 169. Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.)
recently dismissed the speculation that Thomas could be in line for Chief Justice of the United States
following the expected departure, given the ill-health and increasing fragility of Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Reid, who is white, reportedly stated that Thomas "has been an embarrassment to the
Supreme Court. I think that his opinions are poorly written .... I just don't think he's done a good
job as a Supreme Court justice."). See Armstrong Williams, Racism Finds A Home in White Towers,
USA Today 25A (Dec. I 0, 2004). See also the previous footnote.
645. Sunstein, supra n. 500, at 80.
646. See Terrence Hunt, Court Reorder: Roberts Now Up for Top Job, Chic. Sun-Times 8
(Sept. 6, 2005) (stating that "[l]ike Rehnquist, Robert is deeply conservative" and that he was
nominated to succeed O'Connor because the latter's "tie-breaking votes on contentious issues like
abortion restrictions, campaign finance limits, discrimination laws, and religion" "angered
conservatives."). Nominated initially in July 2005 to replace O'Connor, Roberts was upgraded to the
Chief Justice position following the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist on September 3, 2005. On
possible reasons why the President did not choose Justice Scalia, said to be the favorite for the job
among conservatives, see Robert Novak, Bush Secretly Decided Weeki- Ago on Simplest Solution,
Chic. Sun-Times 8 (Sept. 6, 2005). According to Novak, selecting Scalia would have meant a longer
confirmation process given the associate justice's "notoriety as a right-wing icon," while conflicting
with President's Bush's known knack for simplicity. /d. Regarding the latter point, "[p]romoting
Scalia would have meant three confirmation processes at the same time: for Scalia as chief justice,
for Roberts as associate justice and for somebody to replace Scalia as associate justice. To the
strategists at the Bush White House, that looked like too many moving parts and the possibility of
something going wrong." !d.

92

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2006

Court some analysts predict could lead to "an ideological shift" on the
Court, given his known conservative orientation. 647
!. Tinkering with the "Injury in Fact" Requirement Necessary for
Standing in Equal Protection Cases

The final indicator of Supreme Court hostility toward affirmative
action analyzed here is its tinkering with the "injury in fact" requirement
necessary for standing in equal protection cases. The Supreme Court's
rulings have resulted in a relaxation of the requirement for standing.
Before 1993, it was necessary for a petitioner to show that he would have
648
received a benefit but for a preferential treatment against him.
From
649
1993, beginning with the Jacksonville case,
all that a petitioner had to
establish to make a prima facie case of injury in fact was that it did not
have equal opportunity to compete. Jacksonville involved the challenge
of an ordinance that gave preferential treatment to certain minorityowned businesses in the award of city contracts by an association. The
Court ruled that, to establish standing, the association did not need to
show that one of its members would have received a contract absent the
ordinance, loss of contract, or ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.
Rather, the injury in fact that it needed to establish was "the inability to
650
compete on an equal footing in the bidding process,"
specifically that
"it is able and ready to bid on contracts and that a discriminatory policy
651
prevents it from doing so on an equal basis."
This was a minimization
of the injury in fact requirement in equal protection cases to a point that,
for want of a better expression, effectively transformed the injury in fact
requirement into an injury in theory requirement.
More recently, in Gratz, the Supreme Court used the Jacksonville
line of reasoning to afford standing to a petitioner who sought
prospective relief against the University of Michigan for allegedly using
652
race in its admissions decisions.
Both Justices Souter and Stevens
653
objected to the award of standing in the case as overly indulgent.
The
Court rejected Justice Stevens's contention that, because the petitioner,
Patrick Hamacher, did not actually apply for admission as a transfer

647 See Hunt, Court Reorder, supra n. 646.
648. Northeastern Fla. Chapter. Associated Gen. Contractors ofAm. v. Jackmnville, 508 U.S.
656, 666 (1993).
649. !d.
650. !d. at 666.
65 I !d.
652. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 260-68.
653. See id. at 291-92 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); !d. at 287 n. 6 (Stevens,
J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting).
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student, his future injury claim is at best conjectural or hypothetical
654
Citing Jacksonville, Chief Justice
rather than real and immediate.
Rehnquist ruled that the inju7 in fact necessary to establish standing is
55
Rehnquist's argument went as follows:
the denial of equal treatment.
in bringing his equal protection challenge against the University's use of
race in undergraduate admissions, Hamacher alleged that the University
denied him the opportunity to compete for admission on an equal
656
basis.
When Hamacher applied to the University as a freshman
applicant, he was denied admission even though an under-represented
657
minority applicant with his qualifications would have been admitted.
After being denied admission, Hamacher demonstrated that he was "able
and ready" to apply as a transfer student should the University cease to
658
The Chief Justice also rejected
use race in undergraduate admissions.
Justice Stevens's contention that the use of race in undergraduate transfer
student admissions differs from the use of race in undergraduate
659
freshman admissions.
Justice O'Connor also cited Jacksonville for
authority in Grutter, indicating that "Petitioner [meaning Ms. GrutterJ
clearly h as stand mg to b nng th"IS 1awsmt. ,660
This tinkering with the requirement for injury in fact in equal
protection cases is part of a general pattern of chipping away at civil
61
rights by the Rehnquist court. In Alexander v. Sandovaf decided in
200 l, the Court ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed
individuals to sue only in disparate treatment cases, not in disparate
impact cases. The case dealt "a death blow to the right of individuals to
662
It also
challenge practices of institutional racism by states."
"overruled the decisions of nine of the twelve circuit courts that had
663
ruled on the issue in more than two decades of litigation."
Disparate
impact cases are cases related to institutional racism, that is, policies or
programs that have a racially discriminatory impact or effect. By
contrast, disparate treatment involves individual racism or intentional
acts of discrimination. Since the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, individuals have had the right to sue states for both types of
discrimination. But in this five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court took
o
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away the individual right to sue states practicing institutional racism. The
case involved a challenge to an Alabama law requiring all applicants to
take the state's written driver's license examination in English. The suit
alleged that in its impact or effect the requirement discriminated on the
basis of language or ethnic origin. The district court and the Eleventh
Circuit agreed. The Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act
allowed suit only in disparate treatment cases and did not reach the
664
merits of the case as to whether the requirement was discriminatory.
Justice Scalia, who is noted for his anti-civil rights orientation, wrote the
opinion of the Court. Justice Stevens bitterly dissented from the
665
judgment.
He wrote that "it makes no sense" to distinguish between
666
types of discrimination in terms of an individual's right to sue.
He
condemned his colleagues for reachin£ out to take the case when there
7
was no conflict between the circuits,
and he was infuriated that the
668
Court overturned two decades of precedent.
What makes Sandoval
potentially far-reaching is that disparate treatments, which require a
plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent, are difficult to win, compared to
disparate impact cases that require no such proof. Changes made by the
Rehnquist Court relating to standing have allowed far-tetched assaults on
affirmative action while depriving other potential litigants of an
opportunity for adjudication.
IV. CONCLUSION

Affirmative action is the use of race or gender, particularly race, in
decisions relating to distribution of scarce public resources, including
education. The Michigan cases are momentous because they signify,
without a shadow of doubt, that race will for a long time to come remain
a factor in those decisions. Grutter, which upheld the Michigan Law
School program, portrayed the kind of narrowly-tailored use of race that
in the view of the Supreme Court could be used to promote a compelling
governmental interest. Gratz, striking down the Michigan undergraduate
school affirmative action program, in contrast, provided an example of a
constitutionally impermissible use of race. These authoritative
clarifications became necessary given the legal and constitutional

664. See generally Alexander, 532 U.S. 275.
665. Justice Stevens read parts of his dissent, something a justice does to underscore the
momentousness of a decision. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 293--316.
666. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 310 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
dissenting).
667. /d. at 317.
668. !d. at 294.
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fuzziness that characterized the practice of affirmative action in the postBakke period before 2003. In the twenty-five years following Bakke, the
law on affirmative action remained unsettled, with race-conscious
669
policies under proscription in some regions of the country, like Texas.
Yet, none of these marks of progress minimizes the considerable
hostility that still pervades the Supreme Court jurisprudence on
affirmative action. An important function of this Article was to draw
attention to that reality and to highlight the nature of that abiding
hostility by identifying and discussing nine interrelated indicators arising
from a careful reading of the Michigan cases. The Article also takes a
historical approach that ties affirmative action to minority, especially
black, civil rights in America. It is a refreshing perspective that sets this
work apart from previous studies on affirmative action or the Michigan
cases. As the legal and political tribunal charged with the "province" of
pronouncing what the law is, the Sufreme Court has a leadership role in
70
the "job of ending discrimination"
and enthroning inclusiveness in
this country. Focusing on the role of the Supreme Court, this Article
shows how far we, as a society, have come in the politics of
inclusiveness without losing sight of unfinished business that also
portends how far we still have to go. The key to reconciling the tension
of progress on the one hand and the lingering problems on the other is to
keep in mind that the assault on affirmative action that preceded the
Michigan cases, which reached a peak in Adarand, will require much
more than just one Gruffer case, however momentous, to repair. Its
province and duty under the Constitution dictate that the Supreme Court
should play a leadership role in that reparation. Will the Court, since
October 2005, under the leadership of John G. Roberts, 671 live up to its
expectation in this role? To borrow the lyric of the Jamaican reggae
maestro, Bob Marley (1945-1981 ), only time will tell.

669. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
670. See Clinton, supra n. 19, at 1113, whose actual words were "[t]he job of ending
discrimination in this country is not over."
671. See e.g. David G. Savage, A Reading on Roberts: High Court's Lineup May Be an Early
Test for the First New Justice in II Years, ABA J. 12-13 (Oct. 2005).

